

**THE UKRAINIAN
HERALD**

**ISSUE
7-8**

ETHNOCIDE OF UKRAINIANS IN THE U.S.S.R.

introduction by
ROBERT CONQUEST

**AN UNDERGROUND JOURNAL
FROM SOVIET UKRAINE**

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The more widely the facts and feelings set forth in these pages become known to the world, the better equipped we will be to understand the central issue of our day—the essential attitudes of Moscow to other nations, including our own.

— From the INTRODUCTION
by Robert Conquest

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The *Ukrainian Herald* fell victim to this last mass drive by the regime against the Ukrainian intelligentsia's challenge to its established order. But only for a while. The *Ukrainian Herald*, Issue 7-8, appeared again, in the spring of 1974 . . . /its/ new militancy . . . in part an answer to the repressions of the last few years. But more than that, it seems to have been born of a desperation, an anxious fear that the Ukrainian nation might not survive this ethnocide, this newest assault against its existence.

(Continued on back flap)

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**ETHNOCIDE OF
UKRAINIANS
IN THE U.S.S.R.**

Spring 1974

An Underground Journal from Soviet Ukraine

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Introduction by
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Issue 7-8
Ethnocide of Ukrainians
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INTRODUCTION

By

Robert Conquest

The underground periodicals of Russia have for a number of years been familiar to readers in the West. Those of the subject nations of the U.S.S.R. are not so familiar, and it is a privilege to be asked to present the uncensored voice of Ukraine, largest and most powerful of these.

This collection is very much of the present and the future. That is to say, although the country's long past is bound to be a constant theme, central to any discussion of the national entity, nevertheless, there is no note of mere nostalgia. For the Communists, history is, of course, "politics projected back into the past," a continuous rewriting of, and perversion of the truth. And this implies continuous defense of the facts by all honest writers. But the perspectives of this book are nevertheless forward ones. The Republic on the Waterfalls, the Partisan War of the late forties, all the other movements of the Ukrainian nation, are seen not in any backward looking spirit, but rather as the roots, and the blasted trunk, from which the new growth of a free Ukraine must burgeon.

Ukraine is the largest subject-nation in the Soviet empire, unless, indeed, we include Russia itself. It has been remarked that the Russians themselves are precisely the people most degraded by the system, in that their proper national feelings have been perverted and incorporated into the machinery of oppression in a way which leaves them far less national pride and consciousness than other nations of the U.S.S.R.; at any rate, the well-known Marxist aphorism, that no nation which oppresses others can itself be free, certainly applies in this case.

A "liberal" U.S.S.R.—even in the Communist sense—is impossible; if it were "liberal" it would no longer be a U.S.S.R., since Ukraine and other national republics would almost certainly avail themselves of the right to secede. And the attitude of the Moscow authorities when it comes to even comparative encouragement of national feeling by a local Communist leader is well developed in the story of the purge of Petro Shelest.

It is remarkable how objectively the underground writers treat the political struggle within the Communist Party led by Shelest, when First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. It had, of course, been clear to all serious students that Shelest and his followers lost their positions for "nationalist" deviation, though widespread superficial comment in the West at the time attributed his fall to his being a "hard liner" on matters of foreign policy. This was a convenient myth from the point of view of those in the Kremlin who wished to give the impression that detente was triumphing. It was, indeed, reported that Shelest attacked the Czechoslovak leaders with special force at the famous meeting at Cierna-nad-Tisou. But even if it were true that this reflected any exceptional "hardness" on the issue of political reform, then that makes even more extraordinary and revealing the remarkable fact that an old party *apparatchik* should be found embracing on his home ground nationality policies more acceptable to his own republic than to the rulers in Moscow.

The Shelest affair, in fact, goes to show that national feeling, and opposition to Moscow centralism, is so strong in Ukraine that unless the Kremlin maintains unceasing vigilance, the Ukrainian Communist Party itself and even its leaders find themselves forced to take it into account.

It is natural enough, of course, that a party leader in Kiev should envy the independence from Moscow, however limited, enjoyed by the leaders of the states of Eastern Europe, most of them smaller than Ukraine.

In fact (looking at it from another angle), the leaders of Communist parties in the West, as well as in Eastern Europe, should in all logic stand for an independent, even if Communist, Ukraine. For the Brezhnev Doctrine, which purports to give the

"socialist community" the right to invade and repress any of its members which have gone to the bad, like Czechoslovakia in 1968, in fact means that the U.S.S.R. alone has this right—and simply because it is the largest and strongest. But if Ukraine and the other subject nations of the U.S.S.R. had this sort of independence, Russia by itself (though still the largest) would lose this overwhelming preponderance. So any Communist wishing to be something better than a puppet of Moscow's should logically work to this end.

Such Communists could, indeed, point out that the right of secession is guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution. . . . In practice, of course, the prospect of Moscow observing this item of the Constitution is, if anything, even less probable than that of their observing its other articles. For them, the opposite considerations apply: their power depends on their empire over Ukraine and the other territories. They will not voluntarily forgo it. Only in some unforeseeable and extreme political crisis, profound enough to shake the entire state to its foundations, is there any prospect at all of liberation; and in that case, it is if not impossible then at least thoroughly improbable that the Ukrainian Communist Party would—unless very temporarily—be the vehicle of Ukrainian national feeling.

And what are the prospects of so profound an internal crisis? One can only say, at this point, that the Soviet Union contains extremely potent "contradictions" (as a Marxist would put it), tending continually towards such a crisis though continually checked by an intensity of police and administrative activity unprecedented in world history, and that one of these tensions—moreover, the most powerful of all—is precisely the national feeling of the oppressed minorities.

Generally speaking, Ukrainian nationalism as it now exists is of a liberal and generous type. For example, that there was at one time a good deal of anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, is undeniable. As elsewhere, certain types of nationalism—those which regard members of any other culture as representative of the foreign oppressor—associated themselves with it. One of the most remarkable things about all recent currents of Ukrainian nationalism is the way in which it has not

only totally purged itself of any such taint, but has actually come to regard the Jewish population with special friendship, as fellow-sufferers under the ■■■■ oppression.

If Ukrainian nationalism is ■■■■ so powerful a feeling, and is ■■■■ embittered against rule from Moscow, the blame lies squarely on the rulers in the Kremlin, with their harsh record of national repression over half a century. It is not for ■■■■ Western writer to lay down the law about the future political relations between the Ukrainian and the Russian peoples. For, in principle, that is a matter for those people themselves, whenever circumstances arise in which they can both choose freely. But at least one can assert the general proposition, which nowadays is felt to apply throughout the civilized world, that self-determination, free choice, is basic.

There is no reason to believe that if the Russian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian peoples were free, they would not co-operate in the most friendly fashion, whether as independent states, or in some form of economic or even—in the long term—political union. The Baltic States co-operated closely in every way, though independent and not ■■■■ of the same ethnic origins. The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg combined in economic union to their mutual advantage a generation ago. Alexander Solzhenitsyn has written that he feels himself to be ■■■■ spokesman for the Russian and Ukrainian—and has elsewhere added Byelorussian—peoples. Thus, he gives them separate national identities, but himself identifies with them collectively. He sees them, in some free future, ■■■■ comrades. All the same, it certainly appears both natural and probable that ■■■■ free Ukraine would vote for state independence, and any higher unity with the other Slavonic nations would then have to start on that basis. If so, one can only suggest that Russians of good will should reconcile themselves to such a prospect, and seek fraternity rather than domination.

The underground voices of Ukraine, which speak to us in the pages that follow, are informed with ■■■■ passionate devotion to their national identity. At the same time, they examine with the greatest objectivity the actual facts of Kremlin policy as it has been carried out in their homeland. They make it clear

where responsibility for these acts rests—with the central leadership, over the years, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Not with all Communists: for many are shown to have had at least ■ realization of the danger and destructiveness of such ■ policy. Not with all Russians: for they rightly say, and warmly welcome the fact, that it is men like Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov who truly speak for the Russian conscience. (And, we may note that in Sakharov's new book, *O Strane i mire—My Country and the World*—he explicitly calls for a true affirmation of the right of secession of the Union Republics.)

The *Ukrainian Herald* concludes with ■ appeal to the United Nations to vote an indictment of Soviet colonialism. The UN majority is, after all, continually passing resolutions against far lesser colonial oppressions, and even non-existent ones, elsewhere in the world. It would be logical and decent if it were to show an honorable consistency in the matter. If it is unlikely to do so, that is because (as Solzhenitsyn says) only a small proportion of the United Nations' membership consists of governments representing their peoples, and is, in his words, ■ United Governments rather than ■ United Nations. But at least there is no reason why the democratic governments within the United Nations should not be as willing to press these perfectly true charges against Moscow ■ Moscow is to sponsor every sort of attack against them. There are some signs that the cowardice, appeasement-mindedness and timid defensiveness which have marked Western tactics in the UN may be on their way out. A crucial sign of this would be forthrightness and frankness about the Soviet Empire.

And, as with all independent voices from the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe, we find a rejection of that form of "detente" which leaves the Kremlin free to consolidate its anti-national—and therefore aggressive—imperialism. Meanwhile, the more widely the facts and feelings set forth in these pages become known throughout the world, the better equipped we will be to understand the central issue of our day—the essential attitudes of Moscow to other nations, including our own.

October, 1975

PREFACE

TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

Six issues of the *Ukrainian Herald* appeared between January 1970 and March 1972. Each began with the same "Assignment of the *Ukrainian Herald*," wherein were contained the credo and the purpose of the journal:

The *Herald* will include, without generalization, information about violations of the freedom of speech and other democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, repressions in Ukraine through the courts and outside the courts, violations of national sovereignty (facts relating to chauvinism and Ukrainophobia), attempts to disinform the citizenry, the situation of Ukrainian political prisoners in prisons and camps, various protest actions, etc.

For two years the *Ukrainian Herald* was the free, uncensored voice of the Ukrainian civil rights movement, reporting on events and phenomena in Ukrainian life that the official press either ignored or distorted. And there was much to report about. The times were marked by a remarkable chain of events: the cultural ferment of the sixties, the government's reaction, which culminated in a wave of repression in 1964-65, the resultant arousal of national and political consciousness, new waves of mass arrests and repression in 1970 and 1972.

The *Ukrainian Herald* fell victim to this last mass drive by the regime against the Ukrainian intelligentsia's challenge to its established order. The KGB — given the assignment of destroying the lifeblood of the civil and national rights move-

ment—the *samvydav* (self-publishing) network and its major journal, the *Herald*—and carried it out with ruthless efficiency. Among the hundreds of intellectuals and students who ■ arrested in early 1972 and who at this time fill the labor camps of Mordovia and Perm Region, prisons and special psychiatric hospitals, were the disseminators of the *Ukrainian Herald* and those whose *samvydav* articles were found in the journal. The voice of the Ukrainian opposition ■ stilled.

But only for a while. In the midst of the repressions of 1972 ■ young Ukrainian nationalist (and this is how he called himself) in Lviv answered the doubt and pessimism expressed by ■ visitor from the West with this bit of stoic resilience: "Sure, the situation is extremely difficult now. Brezhnev is following the foreign policy of Khrushchev and the internal policies of Stalin. But how many times in the past did our future look hopeless? Yet after things quiet down, the whole process somehow regenerates itself. And it will happen again. These things come in cycles."

And indeed, the *Ukrainian Herald*, Issue 7-8, appeared again, in the spring of 1974. What did it offer the nationally conscious Ukrainian? And what can the Western reader look for in this, the first issue, along with No. 6, of the *Ukrainian Herald* to be made available in English?

For one, just as the first six issues did, Issue 7-8 gives ■ picture of the Ukrainian reality that cannot be found in the official Soviet press and that remains mostly hidden from Western eyes. It tells something about the direction in which the Ukrainian opposition is moving, for the nature of the journal's content undeniably points to the fact that behind the publication of this last issue is a new group of people who understand well the international situation and the internal drift of Soviet politics, and who have access to inner-party information and to research materials which are out of the reach of the average Soviet citizen.

The *Ukrainian Herald*, Issue 7-8, consists mainly of two articles. "Partial Cooperation and Astute Diplomacy," written by the *Herald's* editor, Maksym Sahaydak (a pseudonym),

analyzes the politics of detente from the point of view of the democratic circles in Soviet Ukraine. It also echoes the warnings of Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov that the present policy of detente, pursued by the U.S. for economic advantages, will pose a danger to the West if it is not accompanied by the democratization of Soviet society.

The major article of the *Ukrainian Herald*, "Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.," gave this English edition its title. Its first section documents, on the basis of demographic statistics, the systematic destruction of the Ukrainian nation through physical genocide and forced Russification—a policy which is given the name "ethnocide." The second section details the implementation of the Communist Party's policy of Russification after the Party's Twenty-fourth Congress in 1971, as it was applied to the Ukrainian intelligentsia, Ukrainian scholarship, culture, language, and religion, and even to the Communist Party of Ukraine. Most thought-provoking is the statement, attributed to one of the "winners" in the 1972 purge of Shelest and his followers, that "if it had not been for the decisive action of the CC CPU (Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine), within the next few years there could have been in Ukraine a recurrence of the Czechoslovakian situation of 1968."

One of the striking features of this, the most recent issue of the *Ukrainian Herald*, is its departure from the editorial policy of the first six issues. Gone is the avowed insistence that the *Herald* was "in no event an anti-Soviet or anti-communist publication," that it would not include "any materials which were written especially for it and which had not circulated" (in the *samydav*). In contrast, the issue of spring 1974 takes "a clearly marked political position . . . of uncompromising anti-colonialism," speaks of "broadening the national liberation struggle and the struggle for democracy," and consists of two articles which were written expressly for the journal.

The *Herald's* new militancy is in part an answer to the repressions of the last few years. But more than that, it seems to have been born of a desperation, an anxious fear that the Ukrainian nation might not survive this ethnocide, this newest

assault against its existence. This desperation is reflected in the documentation of the Ukrainian tragedy in the Communist era—Lenin's betrayal of Ukrainian Communist after the Revolution, the artificial famine and the terror of the thirties, the liquidation of the Ukrainian resistance in the forties and early fifties—and in the recounting of the losses—the many millions of Ukrainians that should have been and are not. And it is reflected in the realization that the ethnocide against Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. is another "final solution," a purposeful attack against every aspect of Ukrainian life which has at its disposal the limitless resources of the Soviet regime.

But there is one important unknown in this picture—the position taken by the West.

Yes, the same democratic West which in the past shut its eyes and ears to the Ukrainian tragedy, which at times even played a part in it, but which, nevertheless, continues to stand for many behind the Iron Curtain as a symbol of hope. And in this era of detente the role of the West will be crucial for Ukraine and the other nationalities of the Soviet Union. Will it be the force that nudges the Soviet regime towards a democratization of Soviet society, will it find itself a seat on the fence, or will it become the regime's partner, whose technological and economic assistance will help drive the last nail into the coffin of the nationalities of the Soviet Union? Perhaps, the *Ukrainian Herald* was addressed more to us in the West, who are the ones that need these alternatives defined for us, than it was to those who live the reality.

This edition of the *Ukrainian Herald*, Issue 7-8, consists of the true and complete translation of the *samvydav* journal circulating in Ukraine. Annotations have been added to assist the English reader; they appear within the text in brackets and at the end of the journal in the section on notes. Comments and notes by the Ukrainian author(s) and editor appear in the text in parentheses and in notes at the bottom of each page. Also added to this edition is a section of biographical notes.

The system of transliteration used in this volume is somewhat eclectic. The intent was to provide a true and phonetic yet

simplified transliteration from Ukrainian into English. Proper names and terms not directly translated into English were transliterated from the language used in the text: mostly Ukrainian, but in a few instances, usually in quotes, Russian. Ukrainian terms and geographical names which are more familiar in English in forms transliterated from Russian are given in the Ukrainian form, but are in most cases initially accompanied by the more recognizable form. This was done in order to introduce Ukrainian terms and proper names into English in the Ukrainian rather than Russian form, yet at the same time to allow them to be more easily recognized. There were only two instances of deviation from this policy. It may yet be that the names of the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, and its largest port, Odesa, will be recognized in English in their Ukrainian forms. For now, they remain "Kiev" and "Odessa."

OLENA SACIUK, Ph.D.

BOHDAN YASEN

ABBREVIATIONS

A.S.S.R.	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPU	Communist Party of Ukraine
Komsomol	Communist Youth League
R.S.F.S.R.	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
S.S.R.	Soviet Socialist Republic
Ukr.S.S.R.	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Ukrainian Herald's **WORD TO THE READER**

Honored Reader!

For over two years you have not had the opportunity to familiarize yourself with our journal. Possibly, the long wait caused you to lose faith. But there is no power on earth that could kill the free word of a people who refuse to submit. No repressions, however cruel, have the power to break the spirit of Freedom.

And so it is that, under the most difficult circumstances, the next consecutive issue of our journal appears. The trying times have toughened us even more and brought us closer together.

Our journal will take a clearly marked political position, the guiding direction of which will be uncompromising anti-colonialism.

We will attempt to further unite around our organ all democratic, anti-colonial groups in Ukraine, for it is only in this direction that we can foresee progress in broadening the national liberation struggle and the struggle for democracy.

The success of our struggle is dependent on the mass dissemination of the free press. The circumstances of work which is being done illegally do not permit the editors of our journal and those activists involved in its dissemination to try to solve this problem alone. We see two ways of disseminating the free word: 1. External—broadcasts by foreign radio stations; 2. Internal—this, Dear Reader, is your selfless, profitless, persistent task. So remember the responsibility that falls upon your shoulders. When our journal falls into your hands, do not forget to duplicate and disseminate it by all means at your disposal, keeping in mind, all the while, the rules governing conspiracy. Only under these conditions will — be able to carry out, with joined forces, the proposed assignment we have taken upon ourselves.

So, Dear Comrades, let's go to work!

Part I

**PARTIAL COOPERATION
AND ASTUTE DIPLOMACY**

It is probably unnecessary, in ■■ turbulent times, to demonstrate the need for wide international contacts. This concerns primarily such superpowers as the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. The year 1972 was a turning point in the relations between the two giants. Extensive cooperation in trade and economic matters was outlined and is, in fact, already being realized in part. What brought all of this on?

The rapid growth of Japan and Western Europe gave birth ■ significant economic competitors for the U.S. Here it is important to point out the differences that ■■■ between Europe and the U.S., differences which were created primarily by the short-sighted policy of France, which, especially under De Gaulle, made numerous attempts to undermine U.S. might, forgetting that the rapid growth of France, Europe, as well as of all the free world, was possible only under the cover of a mighty America. Could France alone have possibly guaranteed its people that Soviet tanks would not make "excursions" on the Champs Élysées, as they did in Vaclav Square in Prague?

To the widening of differences between Europe and the U.S. also contributed the fact that the decline of England's economic importance in Europe led to ■ decline of her importance in world politics, ■ part which—and this should never be forgotten—she played with consistency, basing it on humane and democratic principles, showing farsightedness, and taking into account the interests of the entire free world.

The astronomical expenditures of the U.S. for defense, undertaken in the interests of the entire free world, and an exhausting war in Vietnam, shook the stability of the dollar.

A desire to maintain the high rate of production forced the U.S. government to seek new markets.

The threat of ■ energy shortage in the ■ future forced the business establishment in America to search for new ■ of energy and other raw materials. President Nixon took especially hasty steps in this area, out of fear that the European countries would leave the U.S. behind.

Finally, there was fear of a possible military conflict.

All of these things led to the Soviet-American understanding.

But what prompted the rulers of the Kremlin to such wide contacts? Here it is important to first point out the political factors which led to ■ crisis in the Soviet economy.

The Soviet regime, from its beginnings, based its support exclusively on terror within the empire-state and a relentless expansionism in its foreign policy. This is ■ state:

Where electoral rights do not exist—parliamentarism was done away with in 1918, when, on Lenin's orders, the Constituent Assembly was dispersed; since then, elections in the U.S.S.R. resemble the acts of circus magicians and serve only for propaganda purposes.

Where the Constitution exists only for the purpose of deceiving the international community, inasmuch as the rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R. are determined by the organs of the KGB. The very act of demanding that rights written in the Constitution be respected leads citizens into concentration camps, whose purpose it is to break people spiritually ■ well as physically.

Where censorship, first introduced by Lenin, for over half ■ century strangles the deepest [a word illegible in the original text—ed.] manifestations of living thought.

Where the rallying cries of the revolution, declared at its inception, have never been taken off the agenda, and, perhaps modified somewhat, still testify to the relentless drive for world domination by the heirs to the imperialistic policies of czarist

Russia, who hide, according to the needs of the time, behind verbal equilibristics of one kind or another.

Where, for the perpetuation of the existence of the Russian Empire, the name of which has been changed to the U.S.S.R. in order to better mask its true imperialist face, a policy of ethnocide of the non-Russian nations is being carried out, either by the mass destruction [of these nations]—the Stalin era; the so-called *rozkurkulennyya*¹ in the late 1920's and early thirties, during which time almost 6 million Ukrainians ■■■ destroyed; the mass shooting of political prisoners; the artificial famine in Ukraine in 1932-33; the terror of the thirties, which ■■■ unprecedented in the history of nations in magnitude and savageness and which destroyed 7 million Ukrainians; mass deportations to remote regions of the empire, where the climate is harsh—or by forced Russification.

Where there still exist varieties of serfdom (with respect to peasants).

Where defenseless workers, deprived of unions, are mercilessly exploited. (Those so-called unions which exist in the U.S.S.R. are not chosen by the workers but are set up by the party-administrative apparatus, and serve not the interests of the workers but those of the bureaucratic system.)

Where the totality of political, governmental, and economic power is concentrated in the hands of a tiny group of men, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who are accountable to no one, not to the people, not even to their own party.

Such a country is a fascist empire.

The existing order in the U.S.S.R. has nothing in common with socialism. The characteristic singularity of Soviet fascism is its ability to accurately mask its goals through the use of a gigantic propaganda machine and a monopoly on any kind of information. Its entire danger lies in the concealed nature of its hypocrisy; Soviet fascism is, for that reason, more viable than cynical fascism (Hitler's, for example).

All of this may seem strange, perhaps hyperbolized, to foreign citizens, even statesmen. And ■■■ wonder, for this can be felt

and understood only after living in the U.S.S.R. under the "rights" of its citizens.

A political-governmental system such as this must support itself ■ the largest army in the world (this inevitably leads to the militarization of the economy), on ■ huge apparatus of repression—the organs of the KGB and its secret collaborators—and on an incomparably large complex of propaganda organs. A regime which entrenched itself through deceit and repression ■ survive only with the help of repression.

And if you bring to mind the fact that the selection, cultivation, and assignment of cadres in the national economy is done not on the basis of business abilities, but through the prism of loyalty to party dogma, and that competition, the driving force of progress, is lacking in production, then the economic backwardness of the U.S.S.R. with respect to the developed nations of the world will be understood. A country with ■ reactionary form of political government cannot create optimal conditions for economic development.

And the state of the Soviet economy has become alarming. Industrial backwardness prevents the realization of ■ technological revolution at the proper speed and keeps workers' wages from being increased (the purchasing power of wages has declined in the last few years).

The unsatisfactory state of agriculture has created interruptions in supplying the population with food products. This was felt especially in 1972. The militarization of the economy has led to a situation where production of type "B" items [consumer goods] is ■ a very low level, quantitatively and qualitatively. This gives rise to speculation in mass proportions. The insufficient quantity and poor quality of its products keeps the U.S.S.R. out of international markets. But it often happens that the cost of products designated for export exceeds by several times the cost of analogous products intended for the home market. The regime partially compensates for difficulties in industry with an increased exploitation of the working class. For example, workers in the coal industry in Ukraine are forced to work on their off days—one, and sometimes two, Sundays ■ month. The expression "black Saturday," meaning ■

mandatory working day ■ one Saturday each month, has become common and habitual among workers. Many companies have several such "black Saturdays" each month. All of this breeds ■■■ and more discontent among the workers. Today no one wants to believe in the false promises of some kind of misty paradise on earth, a paradise which is always getting more distant.

An interesting situation has developed. The basic mass of the population does not want to accept, and does not believe in, the propagandist dogmas of the Party. The workers are dissatisfied with their economic situation. The leading segments of the intelligentsia cannot reconcile themselves to the spiritual terror. The non-Russian nations of the huge empire are unhappy with the unbearable national oppression by a regime of occupation. An ideological vacuum has been created inside the empire. But the workers remain unorganized and inert and do not see the way out of their difficult predicament. They often do not understand the real ■■■ for their unsatisfactory situation and believe that their immediate party-administrative leadership is mainly to blame for the pressure and exploitation. The massive stream of complaints in letters to central government and party institutions bears out this situation.

The leading intelligentsia knows well which roads would lead out of the economic and political stagnation: the democratization of political and civic life through a change over to a constitutional form of government, the granting of true suffrage to citizens, the guaranteeing of all human rights, the abolition of censorship, the return of the lawful rights of the Union republics—rights which have been ignored by the Muscovite imperial regime—and so on. But can the Soviet regime make such concessions to its citizens? Obviously, it cannot. Because then the regime would no longer resemble itself. Those who sit today atop the Moscow Olympus would under those circumstances be forced, sooner ■ later, to relinquish their limitless power, power which they now hold unlawfully, through the use of terror. It is well known that a thief ■■■ willingly returns that which he has stolen. Having clawed their way to the Kremlin's political helm, not by doing the will of the people, but through political

intrigue, by toadying to "those ■ the rung above," they do not wish to take into account the interests of the people. They find their support elsewhere—the KGB, the army, the propaganda apparatus.

But the Kremlin overlords understand well that a sharp deterioration of the material condition of the workers could bring them out of their inert state, and then the ideas of democratic intelligentsia could very easily take hold in their midst. Particularly, a shortage of foodstuffs in the industrially developed areas might move the inert ■■■■ and bring them out into the streets. And then, in order to save the terroristic regime, it would be necessary to sacrifice those who stand on the top rung of the political ladder. N. Khrushchev exited from the political arena under exactly those circumstances. But this does not mean that such micro-upheavals in the Kremlin will always serve to stem the raging tide. The more such changes at the top occur, the fewer guarantees the regime has that it remains the ■■■■ plete master of the situation in a gigantic empire. Brezhnev understands this very well. He knows that he cannot get very far on propaganda slogans alone. Plans projected by the Twenty-fourth Congress for the improvement of the material situation of the workers fell through. In fact, all expectations of the five-year plan, in all branches of industry, fell through. In order to save the regime, it became necessary to find the means of liquidating the crisis in the Soviet economy. It became impossible to save the situation using domestic resources, without introducing political changes. For that reason, the Kremlin overlords feverishly began to search for economic assistance from abroad, especially from West Germany and the U.S. And it must be said that up to now they have been quite successful. The catastrophe in agriculture in 1972-73, which might have brought about the twilight of the present regime, was averted with the help of the U.S. and other developed nations, who sold over 30 million tons of grain to the U.S.S.R. The U.S. alone sold 19 million tons. And yet, not ■■■■ within the Soviet empire informed citizens of the U.S.S.R. about the huge purchases of foreign products. On the contrary, they all trumpeted incessantly about the Party's wise ■■■■ in agriculture, moves which

made it possible for the population to be provided with produce. But this "providing for" is far from satisfactory. Even in Ukraine's ever-so-bountiful agricultural regions, butter and other dairy products, white bread, etc., cannot be found in stores, because the regime mercilessly robs those who grow the bread.

But this is not enough. In order to liquidate the threatening situation in industry, the regime needs financial and technical aid. Technological cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. has been projected on an unprecedented scale and is being put into practice, in part. Some American companies are trying, one ahead of the other, to win orders from the government of the U.S.S.R. An agreement has been signed concerning the technical outfitting of the Kama complex now being built. Leading the way is the American Occidental Petroleum Corporation, which has signed an 8-billion-dollar contract to build fertilizer plants in the U.S.S.R. and a huge gas pipeline from West Siberia to Murmansk, etc. The government of the U.S. supports the granting to the U.S.S.R. of "most favored nation" status in trade. This will enable it to obtain large credits on favorable terms, without which trade relations would be impossible. If such contacts went hand-in-hand with the democratization of the Soviet regime, then there would be hope for a real easing of international tensions, for the peaceful coexistence of different socio-political systems, and for an end to the cold war.

And now let us see whether there is any basis for hoping for the easing of international tensions, whether what is happening today can be called a true **■** of rapprochement between two superpowers. I will cite a modest example, but **■** which explains much. When Soviet propaganda **■** shouting the loudest about the easing of tensions and Brezhnev's visit to the U.S. had just begun [in June 1973], Voice of America broadcasts were being jammed with more diligence than **■** before. There is no **■** in even talking about broadcasts of Radio Liberty, even though for the Soviet citizen they **■** the only source of objective and comprehensive information. So how can there be any talk about an easing of tensions? Having found security in a favorable international climate and in

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American economic aid, the regime channeled all of its energies to nipping in the bud the democratic forces of the intelligentsia, the influence of whose ideas on the ■■■■■ it fears so much. After the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], the use of terror increased sharply; the regime established ■ neo-Stalinist order inside the empire. The staff of the KGB, which had been decreased under Khrushchev, ■■■ again increased in numbers to what it had been during the rule of Stalin. The KGB ■■■ given unrestricted powers and was equipped with the newest technological instruments of electronic and visual surveillance.

In December 1971 the Politburo gave the KGB the assignment of destroying the *samoydav* [the Ukrainian version of the *samizdat*].² In 1972, ■ wave of arrests rolled across the entire empire, in Ukraine more than anywhere else. Since then, searches are being carried out with regularity, and those suspected of free-thinking are subjected to electronic eavesdropping. Closed courts throw the outstanding representatives of the intelligentsia into concentration camps and psychiatric prisons. A massive purge within party ranks is under way, as well as the expulsion of students from universities, and the dismissal from jobs of democratically-minded intellectuals. The Moscow regime has adopted an open policy of destroying the national cultures of non-Russian peoples, in order to speed up Russification and thus eternalize the enslavement of the occupied nations, thereby preserving the huge empire. The Jewish question has become particularly acute. Deprived of the opportunity to develop their own national culture, Jews, especially the intelligentsia, are kept in the U.S.S.R. by force. Only an insignificant number of those wishing to leave receive permission to emigrate to Israel. It is pointless to bring up the emigration of other nationalities from the U.S.S.R. The ■■■■■ desire to emigrate from this camp-like state suffices as the justification for mandatory dismissal from work and harassment, and often leads behind the bars of a psychiatric prison or to ■ concentration camp. There is no hope for ■ improvement in the domestic political situation in the near future. This is evident from the strengthening of the dictatorial position of Brezhnev, who at the last [1973] Plenum of the Central Committee of the

CPSU was able to get Andropov, the head of the KGB, and Minister of Defense Grechko elevated to the Politburo [from candidates to full members]. Thus even ■■■ emphasis ■■■ placed on the apparatus of violence. The chauvinist and reactionary Suslov labors to find a "theoretical" justification for forced Russification and to advance the thesis about a mythical single Soviet nation (which is nothing but the old-but-retouched imperialistic "theory" of the Russian autocratic chauvinists). All the organs of information trumpet about the intensification of the ideological struggle. And what kind of easing of tensions can there be without a relaxation along ideological lines?

Under these conditions, Soviet-American cooperation will lead to the strengthening of the reactionary regime, a regime which has no thought of abandoning its ultimate goal of world domination. Precisely now is the time for the American side to show its determination, by placing alongside economic conditions also those of an ideological nature, and thus securing from the Soviet side ■ guarantee of civil rights for the citizens of the Soviet Union. Taking into account the crisis situation in the Soviet economy, expectations of ideological concessions by the Kremlin regime ■ well-founded, because at this time it must have American economic assistance, whatever the cost may be. Brezhnev understands that without such aid the present regime will find it difficult to stay in power.

We Ukrainians are for international cooperation in all possible areas. But the kind of cooperation we see now will be a great diplomatic victory for ■ regime that has set as its goal the destruction of our nation, and not only ours—this is true for all other enslaved nations as well. Such one-sided cooperation could lull to sleep the opinion of the international community and draw its attention away from the intensification of terror inside the U.S.S.R. And this, in the final analysis, could create a real threat to the democratic order in Western Europe and even in the U.S.A. itself. There are those in the U.S. who rejoice at the fact that articles slanderous of the U.S. have disappeared from the pages of the Soviet press, forgetting that this is but ■ diplomatic gesture. A blind faith in the sincerity of Soviet propagandistic declarations and the subordination of

American foreign policy to the desires of some American business circles, which do not want to see anything beyond temporary economic gain, have ■■■ than once led to the defeat of American diplomacy. However paradoxical it may seem, the U.S. has already ■■■ than ■■■ helped the Soviet regime to get out of critical situations. That is what happened during the NEP [New Economic Policy] of the twenties and during the industrialization of the U.S.S.R. in the 1930's. At that time, American companies did what ■■ Stalin could have done—out of a backward Russia they made one that was industrialized—by planning, building, and providing the technology for a whole line of industrial projects. American businessmen turned a fine profit then. And we Ukrainians paid a horrendous price! The artificially contrived famine in Ukraine in 1932-33 took the lives of more than 6 million Ukrainian people. And they were Ukrainians, to be sure, because victims came exclusively from the Ukrainian peasantry; the deadly famine did not reach the Russified cities. People succumbed to despair; there were many cases of cannibalism and insanity. This was the price of industrialization, because the Soviet fascist regime requisitioned the entire agricultural production of the Ukrainian peasant, then dumped the grain ■■ foreign markets at below world prices in order to get the hard currency needed for industrialization. At the same time, the occupation regime had another goal—to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry and thereby prevent the Ukrainianization of the working class in Ukraine. Russians made up the bulk of the subsequent influx of the labor force into the cities. American business also bears ■ responsibility for these crimes, for the gold that flowed into the safes of American Hammers⁸ was mixed with Ukrainian blood—still another price of industrialization.

The strengthening of the Soviet fascist regime also played a not-insignificant role in the emergence of the second fascist inferno, German Hitlerism. A Europe that was frightened by the threat from the East could not identify at once and stop in time the Hitlerite monster; rather, it hoped this new force would act as a bulwark against the spread of the Bolshevik regime. The Soviet regime did everything to help Hitlerism introduce the "new order" in Europe, and itself took part in

slicing up the map of Europe (the occupation of Western Ukraine and the Baltic states, the aggression against Finland), until it also fell victim to an attack by Hitler's Germany. Rich and powerful America calmly watched ■ the two fascist predators victimized one European country after another. And is it not worthwhile to recall today the words of President Roosevelt, who declared after the Yalta Conference that he believed in Stalin's sincerity? This was after assurances that the U.S.S.R. would not interfere in the political and economic lives of those European countries which had been freed from Hitler's occupation by the Red Army. Today the whole world knows what those promises were worth. The nations of Central Europe paid for the thoughtlessness of the American government, especially President Roosevelt's, with the loss of their independence. England, standing alone, was unable to oppose the spread of Soviet fascism into Eastern and Central Europe. Not only did the Soviet empire occupy considerable territory in Europe, but it also took possession of its economic potential and technological achievements (I have in mind the dismantling and relocation [to the U.S.S.R.] of a huge number of German-factories), which enabled it to develop its ■ industry, especially the military segment, at a rapid rate. Therefore, the Soviet regime owes its entrenchment, and even its existence, to a powerful U.S., which periodically, in critical moments, "nourished" it economically. This allowed the Soviet regime to gain strength, to solidify its hold over a huge empire, and to transform itself into a military superpower, while remaining a prison of nations.

American monopolies made huge profits on this. And the enslaved nations of the Soviet empire suffered countless casualties. The American people ■ also paying for this thoughtless policy. Today the U.S. spends 80 billion dollars for defense just to retain the defensive equilibrium. The monopolies, naturally, were not the losers—the dollars flowed into their safes while the American people paid for all this and will keep on paying even more. And would America have had to waste such sums ■ defense if that same America had not helped the Russian empire to industrialize? And now, when the U.S.S.R. is in the midst of an economic crisis, American monopolies are once again ready to provide economic aid, to strengthen it yet one more

time. If the Kremlin were not to receive such aid, it would be forced to shift a significant part of its cadres from its defense industry into the agricultural sector and this would be a real factor in any decrease in the aggressiveness of the regime. While some circles in America delude themselves into believing that economic cooperation will, of itself, lead to ideological rapprochement, we do not share these illusions, because we have seen the regime become even more repressive over the last two years. It is approaching that form which George Orwell depicted in his novel *1984*, a novel which is called utopian in the West, yet one which is becoming very real for us here. There are sober voices in the U.S. warning against undue enthusiasm over prospects of economic cooperation with the U.S.S.R., but President Nixon⁴ did not pay sufficient heed to them and kept insisting that the U.S.S.R. be granted "most favored nation" status in trade. Union leader George Meany declares that such status would be beneficial to the U.S.S.R. but would not be especially useful to the U.S. Senator Jackson takes the stand that the granting of this status should be made dependent on the emigration policy of the government of the U.S.S.R., although, it should be clear, one such condition by itself is not enough to justify economic cooperation, especially on so wide a scale.

As is well known, the government of the U.S.S.R. does not want to guarantee its citizens the right to freely emigrate. The Jews are especially suffering from this. But then you have businessmen like Hammer, who rushed to sign the above-mentioned agreement between Occidental and the U.S.S.R. Although he is a Jew himself and knows about life in the U.S.S.R. better than anyone else, having lived there for ten years, yet the life of his blood brothers, the Jews in the U.S.S.R., who are denied the right to develop their national culture and who cannot leave this concentration camp, is of little interest to him. Those like Hammer have but one morality—self-enrichment, no matter what the price. It seems that those like Hammer have more influence on the policies of the present White House administration than those who cannot watch in silence as human rights are being trampled upon in the U.S.S.R.

The U.S.S.R. and the American monopolies share common traits. The U.S.S.R. is a gigantic monopoly with a fascist form of government; in the U.S., monopolies are smaller and there are more of them. But all monopolies lead to totalitarianism. Considering the democratic nature of the political order in the U.S., American monopolies are, as yet, unable to seize total political power, but this does not mean that the desire is not there. There are those in U.S. government institutions to whom a political system like the U.S.S.R.'s has much appeal. Here is where Senator Fulbright must be mentioned. For several years we have kept track of his speeches and writings. And now, from a great distance, we feel the desire to voice our supposition that the activity he is involved with is carried on not without consultations with operatives from Suslov's department. Otherwise it is difficult to imagine anything comparable to the gift to Moscow that the closing of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe would be, something which Senator Fulbright insisted on so assiduously. Such an event would be catastrophic for us. It will become increasingly difficult to guarantee in the future that the number of such Fulbrights in American institutions will not grow, because once the Soviet regime becomes richer with the help of American capital, it will have more millions of dollars for the likes of Fulbright.

Soviet-American economic cooperation not conditioned by the American side with demands for the democratization of the Soviet regime will have tragic consequences for us, the enslaved nations. Above us hangs the threat, if not of complete destruction through Russification, then, at least, of a weakening to the degree that it would require decades, if not a full century, for us to rise from the ruins. The consequences of such cooperation will be deplorable for the American people and for other nations as well. Once it acquires huge reserves of capital and American technology, the Soviet regime will be able to realize its progressively expansionist plans—to build up its military might and increase the numbers of its agents in countries of the Third World. And the disarmament talks—they are nothing but a lot of diplomatic chatter and propaganda. The manner in which the U.S.S.R. objects to on-site inspections at the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks attests that this is exactly so. And it is

evidence of the fact that the Soviet leaders wish to conceal their real plans.

Economic cooperation will result in the rapid growth of the Soviet economy, with its might approaching that of America's. There will be no advantage in it for the U.S. such ■ there will be for the U.S.S.R., because it will be saving that antagonistic reactionary regime which has ■ its final goal the swallowing-up of America itself. It is important not to forget that the U.S. is dealing with an unreliable partner. That is the way it was with the Lend-Lease Program, for which the U.S.S.R. refused to pay its debts; only now, after several decades, it has agreed to pay off an insignificant part over a long period of time. And can anyone guarantee that such an affair will not be repeated when it comes to the payment for the technological aid the U.S.S.R. has received so far? The U.S.S.R. will have leverage in its hands—the delivery of natural gas and oil to the U.S.—with which it will be able to exert ■ influence on the American energy situation and on industry in general. The economic strengthening of the U.S.S.R. will force the U.S. to spend considerably larger sums on defense so as not to upset the military balance. The U.S.S.R. enjoys ■ definite advantage in this respect, because the Kremlin regime can mobilize any resources and put them to use without controls of any kind, and no one will even suspect how much is being spent and for what. Naive politicians from abroad are the only ones who believe Soviet statistics. The U.S. government must account for every dollar to the people; for that reason it will be increasingly difficult for it to compete with the Soviet military potential. One other problem faces the U.S. The growth of industrial might cannot proceed indefinitely. It will lead to a contamination of the environment to such ■ degree that America could become a victim of its own industrial growth. Comparing the territory of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., it is clear that here also the Americans are in ■ disadvantageous position. The conclusion is obvious: between two superpowers, of which the U.S. has a democratic form of government and the U.S.S.R. ■ reactionary form, there can be no talk of cooperation and no real easing of tensions, without the democratization of the latter. Without this condition, the U.S. will once again find itself in the role of one who

puts ■ knife in the hands of ■ robber and, by doing so, becomes ■ accomplice in ■ crime against humanity, and will itself become a victim of its ■ shortsighted policy. Those who determine the foreign policy of the U.S. must not forget this.

We Ukrainian democrats wish that it does not come to this.

We are for genuine and comprehensive cooperation in all areas important to the vital activity of nations.

MAKSYM SAHAYDAK

Part II

**ETHNOCIDE OF
UKRAINIANS IN THE U.S.S.R.**

**DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS
EXPOSING ~~THE~~ COLONIAL POLICY
OF MOSCOW'S OCCUPATION FORCES
IN UKRAINE**

DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS EXPOSING THE COLONIAL POLICY OF THE U.S.S.R. IN UKRAINE*

In the U.S.S.R., demographic statistics, as well as statistics in many other fields of science, are to a great extent kept secret. This is especially true of data which can expose the colonial policy of the government of the U.S.S.R. Such statistical materials are kept hidden from the average citizen and are available only to a very restricted circle of scholars who have special access to them.

As for demographic analysis which appears in supplements to special publications, it is either marked by superficiality and bias or it is downright false. Everything is squeezed into a propagandistic mold favorable to the Party's bureaucratic apparatus. Thus the task of this work lies in providing an analysis of the demographic indexes and giving them an objective explanation. Special attention will be directed towards those facets of demography which are ignored by official Soviet scholarship.

* In writing the present work we made use of the following sources:

1. *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 g.* [A summary of the 1970 All-Union Population Census], Vol. 4, Moscow, 1973.
2. *Ukrayinsky istoriko-geografichny zbirnyk. Vypusk II* [The Ukrainian Historico-Geographical Symposium. No. 2]. Kiev, 1972.
3. Y. E. Vodarsky. *Naseleniye Rossii za 400 let (XVI-nachalo XX vv.)* [The Population of Russia from the Course of 400 Years (the 16th to the Beginning of the 20th Century)]. Moscow, 1973.

If we analyze the data of the 1970 ■■■■■ and ponder the figures, especially while comparing them with figures of previous censuses, then we cannot help but be alarmed at the fate of the Ukrainian people.

Even a superficial acquaintance with the figures reveals at ■ glance the unusually low population growth of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. And so, in 1970 ■■■ have 35.2 million Ukrainians living on the territory of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic, and 40.1 million within the U.S.S.R. Let ■■■ examine these figures comparatively.

Records from the 1897 census show that there ■■■■ 19.8 million Ukrainians in Ukraine, and a total of 22 million in the whole of czarist Russia.

As we can see, the number of Ukrainians in the last seventy-three years has not even doubled (the number of Russians in the same period of time has grown from 55 million to 129 million). But at this point one should also keep in mind the fact that in the 1897 ■■■■■ ■■■ have data pertaining only to that part of Ukrainian territory which belonged to the Russian Empire. Thus, we are not taking into account the Ukrainian

4. A. S. Beshkovych. *Sovremennyy etnicheskiy sostav naseleniya Kubani. Doklady po etnografii* [The Current Ethnic Composition of the Population of Kuban: Papers in Ethnography]. Leningrad, 1967. (A printing of 5,000 copies.)

■. UZE [*Ukrayinska zahalna entsyklopediya* (The Ukrainian General Encyclopedia)]. Lviv, 1930-1935.

6. URE [*Ukrayinska radyanska entsyklopediya* (The Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia)]. Vols. 1-17. Kiev, 1959-65.

7. V. Kubyovych. *Heohrafiya ukrayinskykh i sumezhnykh zemel* [A Geography of Ukraine and of Neighboring Lands]. Cracow-Lviv, 1943.

8. D. Doroshenko. *Narys istoriyi Ukrayiny* [An Outline of the History of Ukraine]. Warsaw, 1933.

9. *Kubanskiye stanitsy* [Kuban Settlements]. Institute of Ethnography. Moscow, 1967.

10. Articles in Soviet and foreign newspapers and periodicals.

11. Part of the data was taken from documents published in *samvydav* publications and from ■■■■■ which we, for obvious reasons, cannot disclose.

population which lived in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (the data in the 1970 census does include Ukrainians from those territories which in 1897 were not under Russia). Also, the 1897 census did not designate nationality but only noted the native language. Under such circumstances it is not possible to determine the exact number of Ukrainians (religion could not serve as a differentiating criterion for Ukrainians). The only thing that ■■■ be established without any reservations is that the number of Ukrainians shown in the 1897 census is understated (to what extent—we do not know), inasmuch as under existing conditions of national oppression part of the Ukrainian population became Russified. This creates ■ certain difficulty when comparing that census with the censuses of the Soviet period. Nevertheless, the materials of the 1897 census describe the state of affairs more realistically, because they point out especially the qualitative aspect. The majority of those who had lost one of the principal [differentiating] features—their native language—had lost the capacity to develop their ethnic awareness. They were the ones who were absorbed into the Russian nation and became its active representatives. This process can be vividly illustrated using the examples of such famous Russian writers as Dostoyevsky, Korolenko, and many others. All of them, although of Ukrainian origin, had closer psychological ties to the Russians than to Ukrainians; thus, they became Russians and created Russian culture. A similar phenomenon took place on a mass scale in the scientific and academic world; its extent is now impossible to determine.

This phenomenon—under conditions of a ruling status for the Russian nation and the merciless oppression of the Ukrainian nation—was reactionary, independently of the will of the individuals who traveled down this road [of assimilation]. It was reactionary with respect to the Ukrainian nation as well as in the realm of mankind's progress because it strengthened that power structure which oppressed dozens of nations.

Under conditions existing in czarist Russia, where the Ukrainian nation was not recognized as a separate national entity by the government and where the Ukrainian language was outlawed, the acknowledgment that one's native language

was Ukrainian was indicative not only of ethnic consciousness, but also of ■ yearning for political self-rule and independence.

Therefore, from ■ qualitative standpoint, those 22 million Ukrainians are of the greatest interest to us, because they were an extremely active building force which formed the Ukrainian nation. And nothing less than ■ nation, because a fundamental characteristic of ■ nation is the struggle for its own statehood; and, as we know from past experience, only one's own independent country can insure the full development of a people (as an ethnic entity). The remaining Ukrainians, besides the 22 million, are of interest only if we want to investigate the Russification processes. Aside from this aspect, they are of no interest, since the Russified part of a nation, under conditions of national oppression and during a period of stagnation in the national development, is lost [to the nation]. Naturally, in this situation, as in everything else, exceptions are possible. During periods of national rebirth there exists the potential for the national rehabilitation of a certain portion of the Russified population.

Taking into account the above-mentioned facts, in further comparisons we will utilize the figure of 22 million as the ■ that indicates the real number of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire in 1897.

In 1913, on the eve of World War I, the population of that part of Ukraine which was under Russian rule totaled 35.2 million, while in 1923 it was 29 million.

World War I, the Russo-Ukrainian War of 1918-20 (against the Bolshevik Russian Army on the one hand and Denikin's White Army on the other), the terror perpetrated by the various occupation armies, all contributed to the depopulation of Ukraine. The pillage of the Ukrainian peasants carried out by the *prodzhahons*⁶ was the cause of famine in Ukraine in 1921-22. The famine raged the worst in the South of Ukraine. Although people in Ukraine were dying of starvation, convoys laden with plundered grain were being taken out of Ukraine. That the famine was not caused by crop failure can be further verified from ■ telegram sent by Lenin to Frunze ■ May 18, 1921 [which read]: "The harvest in the South is excellent. Now the main problem for the Soviet government, a question of life and death

for us, is to requisition from Ukraine 200-300 million poods [3.6-5.4 million tons]" (Lenin, *On Ukraine*. Kiev, 1957, p. 663).⁶ We do not know the exact number of victims claimed by the famine, but we can get ■ idea of its dimensions from the fact that 85% of the inhabitants of the city of Kherson died in the years 1921-22 (UZE, Vol. III).

Table 1

POPULATION OF THE UKRAINIAN S.S.R. IN 1926

POPULATION:	UKRAINIANS		RUSSIANS	
	millions	%	millions	%
29 million	23.2	80	2.6	9.2

In 1926 there was a total of 31,526,000 Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. At the ■ time, there were 8.5 million outside the boundaries of the Ukr.S.S.R., but this figure is based on grossly understated data (the ■ for the understatement will become apparent from the exposition which follows).

According to the calculations based on Soviet statistical data, there were 35 million Ukrainians in the Russian Empire in 1913. The entire Ukrainian population of the U.S.S.R. in January 1933 was 32 million.

In 1939 the population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. fell to 31 million.

What happened to Ukraine?

Maybe the Ukrainian people had lost their capacity for life, the ability to propagate? No! The statistics point elsewhere. The average figure of natural population growth in 1920-31 was 22 per 1,000 people. The peasant population during the years 1933 to 1938 decreased by 5 million; in this ■ period, the urban population increased by 4 million people. We thus have a deficit of 1 million people. One could assume that 4 million

peasants had migrated to the cities (although, in that case the mystery is what happened to the missing 1 million people). But this [assumption] is incorrect, because if that were the case, then there should also have been an increase in the percentage of Ukrainians in the cities, inasmuch as the population of the Ukrainian villages had diminished. In the thirties only one-tenth of the Ukrainian population lived in the cities. On the other hand, the percentage of Russians in the cities did not decrease, but increased, notably in the large industrial centers, as for example in the area of the Donbas,⁷ where it [the percentage of Russians] was the highest. The numerical growth of the cities was, therefore, due not to the influx of Ukrainian peasants, but to the flow of Russians from the Russian S.F.S.R. Data on migration bears this out. Having made the proper calculations, we come to the conclusion that Ukraine lost 9-10 million people between the years 1931 and 1938.

An average population increase per 1,000 people in the years 1933-38 was as follows:

urban population:	+73.2
non-urban population:	-37.4

Table 2 indicates the population growth in the Ukrainian S.S.R., by regions, for the years 1926-38.

Table 2.

POPULATION GROWTH ■ THE Ukr.S.S.R. IN 1926-1938*

REGIONS ⁸	Population in ■ in comparison with 1926 (1926 = 100%)			Average yearly population growth per 1,000 inhabitants	
	Total population	Cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants	Non-urban ■ with over 50,000 inhabitants	1897-1926	1927-1928
1. Vynnytsya	93.0	160	91.2	10.0	-6.1
2. Zhytomyr	95.8	122	93.5	9.8	31.3
3. Khmelnytsky (Kamyanets-Podilsky)	98.1	—	—	6.2	-1.6

4. Kirovohrad	88.1	151	84.8	12.1	-10.5
5. Poltava	84.4	146	80.8	9.4	-13.9
6. Sumy	90.6	145	89.2	9.6	-8.1
7. Chernihiv	97.5	191	95.5	8.0	-2.1
8. Kiev	101.2	162	89.3	9.4	0.4
9. Voroshylovhrad	143.8	333	125.7	18.9	28.6
10. Dnipropetrovsk	127.2	280	94.5	9.1	20.6
11. Zaporizhzhya	116.8	425	192.4	10.8	19.0
12. Mykolayiv	107.2	156	98.8	10.2	5.6
13. Odessa	103.0	144	87.2	6.7	2.4
14. Donetsk (Stalino)	191.3	312	143.2	20.0	51.7
15. Kharkiv	108.6	199	89.8	8.4	6.7

Where did millions of Ukrainians go?

Forced collectivization was accompanied by mass destruction of the more prosperous group of peasants, as well as by the deportation of a sizeable number of *kurkuls* and *semi-kurkuls*. The right to categorize peasants in the latter category was given to the so-called village activists—criminals, fanatics, adventurers, and opportunists who wished to profit from the misfortune of others.

Just in the first two months of 1931, 300,000 inhabitants were shipped out of Ukraine to Siberia, Kazakhstan, and to the Far North.

In the years 1932-33 a famine unparalleled in its dimensions raged in Ukraine, on the Don, in the Kuban, and in those areas along the Volga River where the majority of the inhabitants were Ukrainian.

The singular characteristic of the famine of 1932-33 was that it was not a natural disaster, but had been planned at the top in the Kremlin. It was, in a manner of speaking, a political famine.

The harvest in Ukraine in 1932 was good throughout the country, but the collective farm workers were not paid even a kernel of grain for a day of work. Moscow imposed on Ukraine an unbelievably high quota of sale of grain to the state. The centralized plan was carried out throughout all levels. It worked

* V. Kubyovych. *Heohrafiya Ukrayinskykh i sumezhnykh zemel* [A Geography of Ukraine and of Neighboring Lands]. Cracow-Lviv, 1943, p. 308.

in the following fashion: a quota ■ set for a region, but regional officials pledged to deliver even ■ grain [than had been stipulated] and so on down the line to the [individual] collective farm. Naturally, there ■ no way the collective farm ■ able to fill the quota. As ■ result, armed detachments of authorized agents were sent into the villages to enforce the shipping out of all the threshed grain. If ■ local official protested against such measures, he was relieved of his post and later liquidated. Such was the case, for instance, with the first secretary of the regional party committee in Odessa Region.

The peasants were deprived of any means of existence. During the winter and in the spring of 1933, ■ unheard of famine flared up, sending to the grave those millions of Ukrainian peasants mentioned above.

People, driven to despair, went mad and turned to cannibalism. At first, such cannibals were shot ■ the spot, but later they were thrown into concentration camps. Cordons of troops prevented the peasants from entering the cities; those who broke through wandered about until they fell down on the street. Such people were loaded onto trucks together with the corpses and dumped outside the city. Others were hunted down by the militia and later put on trial (those who were not completely exhausted). The peasants were easy to recognize by their dress. Some escaped capture by buying, if they had the means, city clothes from laborers.

It must be said that the cities, especially those like Kharkiv and Kiev, were carefully cleaned of the starving and the dead peasants, ■ that foreign correspondents and political figures could be shown the clean streets, thus rectifying the "slandorous fabrications circulated by bourgeois propaganda."

Entire villages died out. For instance, such villages as Chernechyna, Moroshyna, Oleshchyna, all in Poltava Region, died out completely; in the village of Veseli Shemrantsi in Kiev Region, 2,000 inhabitants died. There were thousands of such villages in Ukraine.

The great Russian writer and Nobel Prize winner A. Solzhenitsyn in his novel *The First Circle* accurately painted the

horrible picture, the proportions, and the location of the famine in these approximate words: "A wagon driver stalks through the village. He knocks on a door: 'Are there any deceased here? . . .' Or a little further on: 'Is anyone alive in there?'" (We quote from memory, therefore there may be some inaccuracies. These two phrases in A. Solzhenitsyn's novel are written in Ukrainian.)⁹

We will cite ■■■ more example to show the heights of hypocrisy and cynicism that were reached by the propaganda of the occupationary regime at that time in Ukraine. In the spring of 1933, at the entrance to the city of Kirovohrad stood a triumphal arch, and on it was the slogan: "We have entered the first phase of communism—socialism." Lying around the arch were the bodies of several dozen peasants who had died of starvation. This is the kind of socialism that was brought to the Ukrainian people by those who, "illuminated by the light of Lenin's ideas," were building "the most equitable" society in the history of mankind.

The organizers of the famine first of all pursued the goal of destroying as many Ukrainian peasants as possible. In order that it become clear why such a verdict was delivered against the Ukrainian peasantry, it is necessary to get a short overview of the political situation as it developed in Ukraine in the first decade after the October Revolution in Russia.

The Ukrainian people did not want to follow the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917 and demonstrated a strong willfulness to build their own independent state.¹⁰ Glaring proof of this fact were the election results to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, held throughout Ukraine on November 27-29, 1917. In these elections 3,433,500 votes (52%) were cast for the UPSR (Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries) alone, while the Bolsheviks received 754,000 votes or 10% (*God russkoy revolyutsii, 1917-18* [Year of the Russian Revolution, 1917-1918], Moscow, 1918, pp. 108-112).

If the objectivity of these figures is to be doubted, it can only be that they were juggled in favor of the Bolsheviks (the source is Russian). The rest of the votes were divided among the other parties. Ukrainian parties garnered 75% of all the

votes cast. The Bolsheviks picked up their votes in the industrial centers, mainly in the ■■■ of the Donbas, populated by ■ large percentage of Russians and having stronger Bolshevik organizations. As is well known, the UPSR was one of the most active organizers of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*.¹¹ Thus the facts speak for themselves. The results of the election showed that the Bolsheviks were a completely isolated group in Ukraine. And it would not be irrelevant to recall that after the catastrophic defeat of the Bolsheviks at the polls, Lenin committed a breach of faith by ordering the liquidation of the Constituent Assembly (a brilliant show of Soviet "democracy" immediately following the Bolsheviks' rise to power).

In December of 1917 the Bolsheviks initiated the calling together of the First All-Ukrainian Congress of [Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers'] Councils in Kiev. This Congress gave a full vote of confidence to the Central *Rada* (there were 2,500 delegates in all). Then the Bolsheviks, who had 80 delegates present, on Lenin's directive left the Congress and moved unhindered to Kharkiv, where they organized their own congress, which was attended by less than 200 delegates. As a result of a resolution by the Central Executive Committee¹² of the Councils, the first Ukrainian Bolshevik puppet government, the Peoples' Secretariat, was set up on December 30, 1917, consisting of 12 secretaries—eleven of them Bolsheviks and one member from the left-wing SR [a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party]. Ukrainians were in the minority in this secretariat.

Lenin needed ■ obedient organ, one which would create the appearance of a decorative independence, to pull wool over the eyes of that part of the Ukrainian population which was least nationally conscious and the most confused. And in this way this organ would contribute to preserving Ukraine's status ■ a colony of Russia, without any rights. The legitimate government of the Ukrainian People's Republic [the U.N.R.]—the Central *Rada*—did not accept the ultimatums of the Russian government, and, as a result, Ukraine's independence became a reality.¹³ At this point Lenin realized that he could no longer

rely solely on sweet lies, because he could lose once and for all that without which Russia could no longer be a great empire, without which she would not be able to dictate her will to dozens of nations—he could lose Ukraine. At this point the determined Lenin did not hesitate to use brute force. He dispatched to Ukraine a horde of conquerors 75,000 strong under the command of Antonov-Ovseyenko (an inveterate Russian chauvinist). At the same time Lenin hypocritically declared that Russia was extending her brotherly help to the Ukrainian workers. (Several decades later Poles and Hungarians would experience the same “brotherly” help, and fifty years later, the Czechs and Slovaks.)

On occupied Ukrainian territory Antonov-Ovseyenko, as absolute master, unceremoniously began to appoint his own men to the posts of commissars. In general, the Russian Bolsheviks in Ukraine, not wanting to recognize any type of Ukrainian government, actively opposed even the puppet People's Secretariat. But Lenin, who had the foresight, and who stood head and shoulders above those around him, shrewdly tutored Antonov-Ovseyenko thus: “It is more expedient to carry out one endeavor or another through the organs of the local government.” (Lenin, *Works*, Vol. 36, p. 432).¹⁴ Is it not better to dictate one's will to turncoats and traitors, who always turn up in considerable numbers in every captive nation, and to create an illusion of non-interference in the affairs of others? Or, another: “For God's sake, devote all of your efforts to eliminating all and any friction with the TsVK [Central Executive Committee] in Kharkiv. It is of the utmost importance for national considerations. For God's sake make peace with them and recognize any type of sovereignty they might want.” (Lenin, *On Ukraine*, p. 459). Indeed, why not make promises or recognize sovereignty in order to fight against it with greater ease? Did these promises stand in the way of plunder in Ukraine by the occupying forces? Wherever they passed through, there reigned the bloody terror of the Cheka. And all of this was done in the name of all the workers. Lenin's entire power rested in his brilliant mastery of the art of creating thunderous slogans for each occasion whose time had come. These slogans had a magical influence over the

backward, illiterate masses, they hypnotized surging crowds, which then obediently destroyed all the things the demagogical invocations directed them to.

When the crowd came to its senses, when the fever subsided—it was too late. Then all the violence was directed against those who had come to their senses; the masses were no longer controlled by spectral illusions, which every revolution gives birth to, but by fear of the beastly violence itself. This was the situation that developed in Ukraine in 1918-19. The slightest show of initiative on the part of the People's Secretariat that was not in the imperialistic interests of the Russian Bolsheviks was squashed at its inception. Thus, when in April 1918 the People's Secretariat passed a resolution to stop waging war against the Central Rada, this "government" was dispersed. And in November 1918 a new "government" was created on Russian territory—the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine, headed by Pyatakov.

Already in June 1919 [the decree], "On the Unification of Soviet Socialist Republics," was proclaimed. According to this decree, the following institutions were unified:

- a) military organizations and military commands;
- b) councils of national economy;
- c) railroad networks;
- d) commissariats of finance and labor.

Thus, sovereignty was being proclaimed in words, while in practice Russia was taking into its hands those elements without which sovereignty remains a utopia. Colonialism was being consolidated. The importance which Lenin attached to the usurpation of Ukraine can be seen from his blunt note to the organizational bureau of the Central Committee [of the Party]: "In my opinion, Frunze demands a bit too much. First of all, Ukraine should be taken completely; Turkestan can wait . . ." (Lenin, *On Ukraine*, p. 598). (The note referred to Frunze's requests that reinforcements be sent to Turkestan.) As we ■■■

see, it was written without unnecessary verbal twists and turns; after all, the note was addressed to his [Lenin's] own imperialists.

When the people of Ukraine saw the type of sovereignty that Russian Bolshevism was bringing them, they were in no way willing to resign themselves to this. An insurgent anti-Bolshevik movement flared up in Ukraine. Thus in 1920, according to data far from complete, there were 40,000 insurgent troops in occupied Ukraine.

Not only did the Ukrainian population rise against the Bolsheviks, but so did other national minorities living in Ukraine. Under the leadership of Dr. Rabinovich, a Jewish insurgent regiment of 2,000 men operated in the Balta area.¹⁵ But the sides were uneven and the most opportune moment to defend the U.N.R. [Ukrainian People's Republic] had been lost. The occupying forces, using ruthless terror, succeeded in crushing the movement for independence. The scope of this work does not allow us to examine more closely the events of that period.

The resistance encountered by the Bolsheviks in Ukraine became the barrier that prevented the spread of Bolshevism farther into Europe. This forced Lenin to draw some serious conclusions. In order not to alienate the Ukrainian Communists and their supporters, for example, the Borotbists,¹⁶ who (the latter as well as the former) continued to have illusions about the feasibility of building a sovereign Ukrainian state in confederation with Russia, Lenin had to play a clever political game to gain time. Precisely at this time Lenin began to make extremely critical remarks against the chauvinistic hardliners of Russian imperialism and promised the fullest sovereignty for Ukraine, calling for the implementation of Ukrainianization. But in practice, Russian Bolsheviks under Lenin's leadership spared no effort to bind Ukraine to Russia in the status of a colony.

Soviet propaganda practically chokes on its advertising of the creation of the Soviet Union as something voluntary, not forgetting to point out that the initiative for creating the Union came from the leadership of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine [CP(B)U].¹⁷ And now let us take a look at

who was the master in the CP(B)U. In 1921 Ukrainians comprised only 22% of the membership of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

If one does not look at the shopwindow display of how the Union was created, but analyzes the statistics of the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, then it can be seen how "voluntarily" Lenin's motion, that the republics, "all enjoying equal rights," sign an agreement for the creation of the Union of the S.S.R., was accepted. There were 2,214 delegates at the Congress, of whom 1,673 had the right to vote and 541 had advisory rights. The R.S.F.S.R. had 1,727 delegates, of whom 1,217 had the right to vote, and Ukraine, Trans-Caucasia, and Byelorussia together were represented by 488 delegates, 440 of whom could vote.

Nor did they forget about the "equal rights" of the delegations in the Soviet of Nationalities they created. According to Article 15 of the constitution existing at that time: "The Soviet of Nationalities is composed of five representatives from each federative and each autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and of one representative from each of the autonomous regions [*oblast*] of the R.S.F.S.R." Therefore Ukraine and Byelorussia had five representatives each, the R.S.F.S.R. had five representatives from each of its seven autonomous republics and ■■■ representative from each of its eleven autonomous regions, and Transcaucasia had fifteen representatives. This is how the "indestructible Union of free republics was conceived forever by Mighty Russia." Not only were they "conceived" together, but mortared and enclosed by barbed wire.

The resolution of the national problem in the manner that the enslaved nations had hoped for never entered into Bolshevik plans. How Lenin maneuvered with respect to this question while gaining precious time, we have already shown above.

It is appropriate to recall at this time how the Russian Bolsheviks strove to preserve the Russian Empire and to continue its imperialistic policies. The following lands, exclusively Ukrainian as to their ethnic composition, were incorporated into the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic: the western part

of Kuban-Chornomorya [the Black Sea coastal regions], some districts in the Kursk and Voronezh provinces, and in the Don Region.¹⁸ Even a so-called Donets-Kryvy Rih Soviet Republic¹⁹ was created, and was also incorporated into the R.S.F.S.R. by her "creators." Into this Donets-Kryvy Rih Republic were included the provinces of Kharkiv and Katerynoslav. But this move exposed the intentions of the Russian plunderers to such an extent that Lenin was forced to admonish his careless disciples: "With respect to the Donets Republic," Lenin wrote in a letter to Ordzhonikidze, "tell comrades Vasylenko, Shakov, and others that no matter how they manipulate to separate their region from Ukraine, it will, according to Vynnychenko's geography, still be considered a part of Ukraine and the Germans will try to conquer it. Therefore, it is totally absurd for the Donets Republic to refuse to stand in one united line of defense with the rest of Ukraine." (Lenin, *Works*, Vol. 50, p. 50.)

Thus, Lenin was criticizing the leaders of the Donets-Kryvy Rih Republic not for dismembering the living substance of Ukraine and attaching Ukrainian territory to Russia, but because it was impossible to realize this plan under the then existing political conditions, since at that time the Ukrainian government—the U.N.R.—was already in existence, ready to stand up for its people and territory.

At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), chaired by Lenin, a motion was carried according to which the "government" of the Donets Republic received the following order: "The convened All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Councils should be attended by comrades from all of Ukraine, among them also those from the Donets Basin. It is mandatory to form at this Congress one government for all of Ukraine." (*Bolshevitskiye organizatsii Ukrainy v period ustanovleniya i ukrepleniya soveyetskoy vlasti. Sbornik dokumentov i materiyalov* [Bolshevik Organizations of Ukraine in the Period of Establishing and Consolidating Soviet Rule. A Collection of Documents and Materials]. Kiev, 1962, p. 66.)

Such a so-called government ■■ necessary in order to have
■ pretext later for seizing all of Ukraine.

The [Russian Bolshevik] government headed by Lenin branded and persecuted all those who, not in words but in deeds, wanted to take advantage of the right to self-determination proclaimed by the Bolsheviks.

The Borotbists should be recognized ■ a party that violates the fundamental principles of communism through its propaganda for the division of the armed forces and by its support of banditry. . . . (The banditry that Lenin is referring to are the peasants' rebellions against the plunder and terrorism inflicted on them by the Russian occupation forces—author's note.)

Their [the Borotbists'] struggle against the slogan of a close, the closest kind of union with the R.S.F.S.R. (in other words, against colonialism—author's note) is likewise contrary to the interests of the proletariat.

All our policies should be directed towards a systematic and unwavering liquidation of the Borotbists, which is to take place in the near future. Towards this end not one transgression of the Borotbists should be overlooked and punishment should be immediate and severe. An effort should be made to gather information about the non-proletarian and unreliable background of the majority of the members of their party. (Thus, what was needed was ■■ excuse to persecute the Borotbists, inasmuch as they stood up for the workers and peasants of Ukraine—it is widely known that they protected precisely these two exploited classes. For political reasons this could not be used against the Borotbists, since it could only increase their popularity with the Ukrainian population—author's note.)

The moment of liquidation should be decided upon shortly; the exact time will be designated by the Polit-

buro and the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee will be notified.*

That is who dictated his will ■ the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, and through them to the Ukrainian people, while hiding behind popular phraseology about the right to self-determination.

As is known, the Borotbist party was disbanded and some of its members joined the CP(B)U. Later, in the thirties, almost all of them were physically exterminated. The Ukapiists²⁰ [Ukrainian Communist Party] met with ■ similar fate.

In order to have Ukraine fully under control, it ■ necessary to promise as much as possible. That was the style of Leninist diplomacy.

After the death of Illich [Lenin], his faithful disciple Stalin inherited the difficult task of holding together and strengthening all that the "great teacher" had managed to create.

The complexity of the task lay in the fact that with each passing moment from the time of the October Revolution more of the illusions it had sown flew to the winds.

During Lenin's time, the two equally balanced factors which enabled the governing nucleus of the Bolsheviks to retain power in their hands were violence and slogans for propaganda purposes. The former was used against all those who did not want to follow the Bolsheviks and who could see the consequences of their actions in the future—the prosperous classes, the intelligentsia, and, in the national [non-Russian] periphery of the empire, against the peasants themselves. The latter [factor] captivated large masses of workers and the poorer peasants—the workers were drawn by the cult of the worker as a creator of hegemony, and the landless peasant was attracted by the dream of generations about owning land. The national minorities dreamed about freedom from national oppression. Since socialist ideals were impossible to bring to life in the underdeveloped economic soil of the Russian Empire, these ideals only allowed the Bolsheviks to seize power and, while concealing the under-

* *Leninsky sbornik* [Collected Works of Lenin], Vol. 35, pp. 93-99.

development of a large mass of the population, to keep it in their hands, with the help of the two above-mentioned factors, for some time to come.

Gradually, the illusions began disappearing. Under the rule of Stalin, who did not want to deviate from Lenin's path, terror, in its dimensions and forms unprecedented in all the previous history of mankind, became the decisive factor.

During Lenin's period of Ukrainianization, the contradictions between reality and Bolshevik propaganda became ■ clear ■ day. Thus in 1929, at the height of pseudo-Ukrainianization, Ukrainians made up only 36.2% of the ruling establishment of the Republic and only 26.8% of the regional governing bodies in all of Ukraine. Such a state of affairs was concurrent with the Leninist plan of an unquestionable centralization of all economic and political life. And without a decentralization of the empire, real Ukrainianization was out of the question. It was precisely during the period of Ukrainianization that the discord between the Ukrainian Communists, who were in favor of Ukrainianization, and the Russian Bolsheviks, advocates of imperialism, became aggravated.

Shumsky, the Commissar of Education, protested against the Russification of the school system. The economist Volobuyev protested against excessive economic centralization, which he felt to be a basis for colonialism. And it is precisely at this point that the shattering of illusions took place for those who had blindly followed Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks, and who had helped the occupying regime bridle their own people.

Moscow's occupying government did not stop even before the physical extermination of their brothers by party, conviction, and social class, because the existence of a sovereign Ukraine did not enter into the strategic plans of the imperialists from Moscow—those crowned as well as those uncrowned.

The case of M. Skrypnyk illustrates quite well the shattering of those illusions. He was ■ fanatical communist who believed that it was possible for the Ukrainian nation to flourish under Moscow's protection. He accepted in good faith all of Lenin's sweet words, forgetting that ■ nation can develop normally and

tap all of its spiritual and material potential only within the framework of its own independent state. Without doubt, although he was a Ukrainian patriot, Skrypnyk found himself ■ captive of revolutionary illusions to such a degree that the consequences of his actions ■■ behalf of the Ukrainian people were tragic.

But the main stumbling block for Moscow's imperialists in Ukraine were not the Ukrainian Communists. They were not numerous and could be controlled by the Russian-Bolshevik majority in the CP(B)U; those who openly expressed their dissatisfaction with Moscow's colonial policies could be either broken morally or destroyed physically, as was done in the late thirties.

Although Ukraine was conquered, this did not mean that she had been placed on her knees forever. The Ukrainian people, with their eternal desire for national independence, continued to exist. At the beginning of the thirties the memory of the struggle for freedom begun by the Ukrainian People's Republic was still fresh in their minds.

Forced mass collectivization initiated in 1929 dashed the peasants' illusions about the possibility of possessing the dreamed-about and fought-for land and this set them against the Bolshevik government with even greater hostility.

Stalin and his toadies had to make a choice: they could either forget the strategic plans of Russian imperialism for world domination and allow the enslaved non-Russian nations to choose their own fate, or carry on the policies of their predecessors—the czars—and continue annihilating the non-Russian nations, primarily the Ukrainian people, since Ukraine for centuries provided Russian imperialists with an economic basis. The latter [option] was taken.

Moscow's regime was carrying out its dictatorial policies in Ukraine not only by military force, but also through the control that the Russian-dominated and Russified cities, even though they constituted the minority, exercised over the preponderant Ukrainian villages.

Thus, according to the 1926 census, the total urban population of that part of Ukraine which was then under Moscow consisted of 5.7 million persons, while in the villages there were 23.8 million. Such control could not be too promising for the long run. Furthermore, plans were being made for industrialization, which would necessitate an influx of a new working force from the villages into the cities. The city was faced with the prospect of Ukrainianization. This meant that the occupying regime would lose its control over the Ukrainian city, over the intelligentsia, over the administrative apparatus, and this in turn would make it necessary to recognize the sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation not only in words but in deeds. The invaders understood this only too well. Thus Stalin, speaking at the Tenth Congress of the Russian CP (of Bolsheviks) declared:

It is clear that while in the cities of Ukraine up to this time the Russian elements still predominate, with the flow of time these cities will inevitably be Ukrainianized. Forty years ago Riga was a totally German city, but since the cities grow at the expense of the villages, and the villages manifest themselves as guardians of the national [spirit], today Riga is a Latvian city. Fifty years ago all the cities of Hungary were German in character, while now they are Hungarian. The same can be said of Ukrainian cities, which are Russian in character and which will become Ukrainianized, because all the cities grow at the expense of the villages. The village is the representative of the Ukrainian language, which will enter into all the Ukrainian cities as the dominant element.

The occupying regime feared this like the fire and still fears it today. Bolshevik Moscow, headed by the "father of all nations," put to use all of its power to prevent the Ukrainian city from becoming Ukrainian. And this was the main reason for the death-carrying famine in Ukraine in the years 1932-33!

This "original" and "most equitable in the whole world" method of solving the national problem was devised by "Father Stalin."

The second reason for the famine of 1932-33 lay in the search for funds for an industrialization [that was to be undertaken] at a pace which would outstrip capability, an industrialization of the entire empire, at that. The huge sums necessary for this were not available. It was decided to find them in bountiful Ukraine, by snatching from the peasants the last morsel of bread from their mouths. The bread was needed to satisfy the growing needs of the cities and, primarily, in order to obtain hard currency, for export.

In order to withstand the competition, the U.S.S.R. sold the grain on the international market at dumping prices. When a hundredweight of wheat on the international market in 1930 sold for nine guildens (data taken from the Dutch press), the U.S.S.R. was selling a hundredweight for five guildens, ■ for seventy kopeks per pood (when converted to Soviet currency). On the domestic market one pood of wheat cost twenty-five rubles! Therefore, in order to obtain the necessary amount of currency by this method, the export of grain had to be increased. And they did indeed increase it, by wresting from the peasants everything to the last grain.

From Column 2 of Table 3 it is evident that the most drastic decreases were in the populations of the following regions: Poltava, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsya, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, Chernihiv, and Kiev. As can be seen, the regions where the greatest part of the population died out ■■■■ those which were traditionally agricultural; in the above-named regions the population declined in the smaller cities as well.

There were somewhat fewer victims in the districts of Polissya, because there the population saved itself from starvation by fishing and hunting. They ■■■■ shooting down crows and rats, and other birds and animals which traditionally are not edible.

To the deadly famine one needs to add the executions by shooting and the mass emaciation of the "enemies of the people" in prisons and concentration camps in the thirties. Unfortunately, their exact number is unknown, because Soviet statistics, supposedly the most progressive in the world, is silent on the subject, as if the cat got its tongue.

The average annual population growth in Ukraine for the years 1897 to 1926 was greater than in the period from 1927 to 1938, regardless of the fact that within the former period fell World War I and the Civil War, both of which also destroyed large numbers of the population.

If one takes into consideration the fact that the latter period was "peaceful," and that during this period no noticeable epidemics were evidenced, then such destruction of a civilian population has been unknown in the history of mankind. Even Hitler's bloody fascism could not surpass Soviet "socialism" in the number of victims.

* * * * *

The number of Ukrainians living within the entire Ukrainian ethnic territory in 1930 was:

U.S.S.R.	35,025,000
on Ukrainian lands incorporated into Poland	6,000,000
on Ukrainian lands incorporated into Rumania	1,100,000
on Ukrainian lands incorporated into Czechoslovakia	855,000
<hr/>	
Total	42,980,000

(The number of Ukrainians in the thirties cannot be given at a specific date since the censuses were taken at different times in the various countries: in Poland in 1931, in Czechoslovakia and Rumania in 1930, in the U.S.S.R. in 1926. Therefore, the number of Ukrainians living in Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia is given according to the above-mentioned censuses, and in the U.S.S.R. according to statistical data for 1931.)

As is well known, those Ukrainian lands that were incorporated into Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia (later into Hungary), were annexed to the Ukr. S.S.R. in 1939, 1940, and

1944 [respectively]. Therefore, for the reasons given above, the number of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. should have increased. As the 1970 population census of the U.S.S.R. showed, Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. numbered 40,750,000 persons.

In almost forty years the number of Ukrainians did not increase, but, on the contrary, decreased by 2 million. Under normal conditions of growth, according to calculations, there should be no less than 60 million Ukrainians. Why aren't there that many and where should one search for 20 million Ukrainians!?

Let us compare the number of Ukrainians of the Western regions of Ukraine (Lviv, Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpatska, Rivne) in 1930-31 with their numbers in 1970:

1930-31	7,950,000
1970	7,821,000

From this we can see the *decrease of the Ukrainian population in Western Ukraine.*

Table 3.

**THE POPULATION OF UKRAINE'S WESTERN REGIONS
IN 1970
(in thousands)**

TOTAL POPULATION	UKRAINIANS		RUSSIANS		Ukrainians who specified Russian as their native language
	in cities	in villages	in cities	in villages	
8,752	2,328 (29.4%)	5,493 (70.6%)	410 (92.1%)	35 (7.9%)	85

Soviet demographers try not to notice the decrease in the Ukrainian population, and if they do touch upon this question somewhere, they try to explain away the decrease of Ukrainians as a consequence of World War II.

In World War II Ukraine lost 4.5 million to 5 million people (of the general population, not Ukrainians alone). This number has long ago been compensated for by the natural population

growth. The ■■■ can be ■■■ in the other European countries through which the hurricane of ■■■ passed (as in Poland, for instance). Therefore, it is impossible ■ explain this phenomenon in terms of World War II causes. The demographers remain silent about the other pertinent factors.

The reasons for the decrease of the Ukrainian population in the Eastern regions of Ukraine were partly discussed above (the Bolshevik terror of the twenties and thirties in Ukraine and the famine of 1932-33).

To all this one should also add the famine of 1946-47, which was not ■ tragic ■ that of 1933 because the population of the above-mentioned regions escaped death partially through the help of their brothers in Western Ukraine (this holds true for many Russians from the regions of Kaluga, Bryansk, Voronezh and others, who also tried to save themselves in Western Ukraine from death by starvation), but which nevertheless also had ■ negative influence on the demographical indexes.

In Western Ukraine, the seven-year war of national liberation of 1944-50 had taken a great toll. Unfortunately, we do not know the exact figures. The number of victims is kept concealed as one of the top government secrets, as is true, by the way, of the detailed data of the 1939 population census (in particular where it refers to the national composition). It ■ worth pointing out that over 2 million Ukrainians were deported from Western Ukraine to Siberia and the Far East in the years 1947-51. Furthermore, this deportation was carried out with the most barbaric methods: during the harshest seasons of the year (late in the fall and in early spring), in cattle boxcars, without medical aid, with ■ limited amount of food and water (the drinking water was rationed out in small portions), and under unsanitary conditions. The deportees were usually transported into remote and untamed regions of the taiga, into places with a climate uncustomarily ■■■ for the inhabitants of Western Ukraine.

All of this led to ■ high rate of mortality, especially among children and older people.

On top of this, the regime fostered among the native population feelings of hostility towards the exiles. Against this background, what an outrage it ■ for them to be forced into signing documents which stated that they were emigrating for ■ from their native land voluntarily. But they did sign, since those who refused were not even permitted to take food for the trip for their children.

After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU it became known that the Kremlin tyrants had nurtured ■ plan for the total resettlement of Ukrainians to Siberia. What saved Ukrainians from such "endeavors of the older brother" were their large numbers and the unexpected death of the "Father of all peoples."

It is unknown how many Ukrainians were thrown into the concentration camps. But on the whole, in the years 1945-56 Ukrainians constituted over 50% of the prisoners of the concentration camps, and in ■ camps the figure rose to 70%. Some idea as to their number can be deduced from the following fact: addressing the meeting of the regional party activists in Lviv on March 17, 1973, Kutsevol, the First Secretary of Lviv's Regional Party Committee, stated that from 1956 to the present 55,000 members of OUN²¹ had returned to Lviv and Lviv Region from places of isolation (what refined terminology!), and that [of this number] not all, so it seems, have repented and some continue to engage in subversive activity. But how many did not return and will never return? Only God knows, because even the humanoid beasts of the NKVD probably do not themselves know the exact number.

Even the graves of those patriots tortured to death remain unmarked. They were buried like animals or incinerated in crematories.

To all that was said above, ■ is necessary to add that during the retreat of the Soviet armed forces from Western Ukraine in 1941, all political prisoners were destroyed. Thus in the prisons of Lviv, Lutsk, Ternopil, Stanyslaviv, Drohobych, Stryi, Zolochiv, and in other cities, 40,000 political prisoners from the "voluntarily reunited"²² Western regions of Ukraine were shot or tortured to death by the NKVD.

In the "Brygidky" prison in Lviv, tractors were run in the prison yard in high gear in order to drown out the sound of machine-gun rounds. Some prisoners ■■■ walled in their cells, which were then doused with fuel and set on fire with the prisoners still alive. Only ■ few individuals survived.

In the environs of Dobromyl, in Lviv Region, the NKVD rounded up 700 men under the pretext of mobilization into the army, then shot them and threw the bodies into the salt mines.

All the common graves of those liquidated after the war ■■■ destroyed.

In 1941, one of Ivan Franko's sons, Peter (a chemical engineer and former pilot in the UHA²⁸), ■■■ destroyed. At the beginning of the war in 1941 he ■■■ taken from Lviv and, it was rumored, shot in Zhytomyr.

From the examples cited, it is obvious that the occupying regime resorted to the physical destruction of the Ukrainian people in Eastern Ukraine (in the twenties and thirties) as well as in Western Ukraine (the forties and fifties). And yet, this method did not fulfill the hopes of the occupiers. The present leaders of the CPSU have opted for a different approach in liquidating the Ukrainian people (this applies as well to the other non-Russian peoples): the method of spiritual destruction of ■ people—denationalization, with simultaneous Russification. The occupiers began to push the Russification policy in Ukraine with greater intensity after the Twenty-fourth Party Congress. We will deal with the mechanics of Russification in more detail later.

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One cannot help but be disturbed by the decline in the birth-rate in Ukraine. In 1969, the number of births per 1,000 inhabitants had decreased by ■■■ than one-third in comparison with 1950.

The index of general mortality shows an increase. In 1969 it came out to 8.6 per 1,000 inhabitants—an increase of 28% as compared to 1960.

The decline in the birthrate and the increase in the over-all mortality ■■■ be explained by the fact that the percentage of

older people in Ukraine is increasing. Thus in 1939, 8.2% of the total population ■■■ the age of 60, while in 1970 it reached 14%. This significant increase in the number of older people can be explained by the departure of the younger, active population of Ukraine, that is, by emigration within the empire (external emigration for Ukrainians and other nationalities of the U.S.S.R., with the exception of the Jews, is forbidden). The great majority emigrates to Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Far East and the Far North. As can be seen, the emigrational flux from Ukraine flows towards the very ■■■ regions to which the occupiers had exiled sizeable masses of Ukrainians in the past. Now there is ■■ more forcible deportation, only forced emigration. The saying goes that ■■■ doesn't emigrate out of luxury. If anyone, Ukrainians know the truth of this saying well, because bitter fate had forced them to taste this "luxury" when destitution drove them out in masses across the ocean from Halychyna, Bukovyna, and Zakarpattya, during both the Austrian and Polish rule, while Ukrainians from Naddnipryanshchyna went to Asia.²⁴ The occupiers from Moscow cause the emigration of Ukrainians by creating unsatisfactory economic conditions for Ukrainians "on their native land, yet not their own."²⁵

The Kremlin colonizers constantly extract capital from Ukraine for the development of remote areas of the Russian empire.

Thus in the mid-1960's from Ukraine's gross national income the imperial Muscovite government returned to Ukraine only 13%, while robbing 87%. At the beginning of 1970, centralization became ■■■ more intensified and led to increased plunder. Thus, Ukraine accounted for 23% of U.S.S.R. exports in 1973, while receiving only 15% of the imports.

The figures of the Republic's income ■■ a state secret and are not made public in the press.

Such ■ colonial policy hampers Ukraine's development. It leads to an increase in unemployment and part-time employment among Ukraine's population. This type of phenomenon is especially characteristic of the Western regions of Ukraine, and

also of Khmelnytsky, Vinnytsya, and Chernihiv regions, where industry is being developed at a slow pace.

According to the 1970 census, the urban population in the above-mentioned regions totaled 30%; the number of Ukrainians in the cities was lower—29.4%.

On the other hand, in Voroshylovhrad and Donetsk regions, in the Donbas, the urban population was up to 83% and 87% respectively (but then that is where you have the greatest percentage of Russians residing in Ukraine).

Everywhere in Ukraine there is unemployment of sorts. It is difficult to find employment in one's profession. Mainly, this applies to people with a higher education who are forced to work as ordinary workers in order to somehow survive (this does not apply to Russians). Not infrequently one can come across a Candidate of Sciences²⁸ who works as a bricklayer, a Doctor of Sciences who works as a librarian, or engineers, teachers, and lawyers who work as unskilled laborers. Furthermore, for the slightest demonstration of national pride, Ukrainians are summarily fired.

Ukrainian workers are recruited for work in areas of Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Urals and in other far-flung regions. The peasants are agitated into moving to the Far East; some social privileges are extended to them as an encouragement.

Herein lie the reasons for the forced emigration.

At a time when the population growth of Ukrainians in Ukraine is small (from 1959 to 1970 there was a 3.1 million increase of Ukrainians, or about 9.7%), the number of Russians in Ukraine grows much too fast (in the same period, their number has increased by 2 million, or, by 28% (1); thus in 1970 there were 9.1 million of them in Ukraine). Such a rapid increase of Russians can be explained mostly through artificial population growth, that is, by their migration from Russia.

The second issue of the *Ukrayinsky istoryko-geohrafichny zbirnyk* [Ukrainian Historico-Geographical Journal] testifies to the fact that:

The numerical growth of Ukraine's urban population is increasing in all the regions at the expense of the

villages of the R.S.F.S.R. . . . Ukraine's cities have had an artificial population growth at the expense of the rural localities in all the large economic areas of the country, without exception. The most significant contribution to this growth was made by those coming from the following areas: the Central Chernozem, the Central Regions, Kazakhstan, the Northwest, the Far East, and from Byelorussia. . . .

The largest increase in population was due to the migration from the Russian Federation (it was much larger than from all the other republics put together).

In the years 1959 through 1971 the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East had lost 200,000 persons to Ukraine.

Of all of the immigrants coming to Ukraine from the different republics of the U.S.S.R., 75.5% of them come from Russia. This is happening at a time when Ukrainians are forced to leave Ukraine in search of a scrap of bread and migrate usually to Russia, the country the Russians are leaving for the "prosperous south of Russia" (as Ukraine was called up to 1917).

Therefore, when we take into account the reasons which are forcing Ukrainians to migrate out of Ukraine, it becomes clear that the migration of Russians into Ukraine is not a spontaneous process, but is primarily something that was thought up and organized by the authorities and motivated by political considerations.

The Russians settle almost exclusively in the cities (with the exception of the Crimean Region).

On the whole, 7,712,000 Russians live in Ukraine's cities, which is 84.6% of the total number of Russians in the Ukr.S.S.R. In the cities of Ukraine's Western regions this percentage reaches 92.1%, or a total of 410,000.

The very fact that the Russians reside in the cities of Ukraine points to their privileged status, since living conditions here are better than in the Soviet village, with its system of neo-serfdom.

The Russians are given preference when they apply for jobs, they find living accommodations immediately, and all cultural

services (schools, the press, radio programs, theaters, etc.) are created for them.

The occupation regime in Ukraine, by bestowing upon the Russians various privileges and by constantly fanning among them the fires of fanatical Russian chauvinism, turns them into a convenient tool for the Russification of the Ukrainian population.

Soviet propaganda clamors constantly and in every possible way about the unparalleled flourishing of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. and likes to enumerate the number of institutions of higher education, schools, specialists, etc. They never forget to remind everyone about equal rights to higher education, regardless of national or racial origin.

And now we will turn to the figures and take a look at what they are saying. A summary of the 1970 census reveals the following facts about the level of education among Russians and Ukrainians, per 1,000 inhabitants of each given nationality*:

Table 4.

	UKRAINIANS			RUSSIANS		
	With higher education:	With a secondary specialized education:	With a general secondary education:	With higher education:	With a secondary specialized education:	With a general secondary education:
U.S.S.R.	35	64	128	45	80	117
R.S.F.S.R.	73	105	133	43	76	110
UKRAINE	30	■	127	■	■	175

As can be seen from the above table, for each 1,000 inhabitants of Ukraine, the number of Russians with a higher education is 2.2 times higher than the number of Ukrainians with a higher education, and there are almost twice as many Russians with a secondary specialized education.

* *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda. Tom IV. Natsionalny sostav naseleniya SSSR* [A Summary of the 1970 All-Union Population Census, Vol. 4 (The National Composition of the Population of the U.S.S.R.)]. Moscow, 1973, pp. 393-4, 405-6, 475-6.

In 1970 there were 601,000 Russians with a higher education in Ukraine. This at a time when there was a total of only 1,583,000 inhabitants with a higher education in Ukraine. Russians account for over one-third of those with a higher education.

These figures reflect, as clear as day, the real state of affairs. Such is the "equality" which party propaganda hollers about without restraint.

All this points to the social and national inequality of Ukrainians. Those 601,000 Russians, after all, hold in their hands the key positions in the Party, in the government, and in the administrative and economic ruling establishments.

The colonial regime in Ukraine is not only able to hold in its grip the entire economic and political power by all possible means, but, on top of that, by its continuous implementation of mass Russification, blocks the way to higher education for those Ukrainians who have resisted Russification and who retained their national pride and dignity.

The children of past and present political prisoners are barred from higher education, as are the children of those who were deported to Siberia in the 1950's. For children of Ukrainian intellectuals, admission to institutions of higher learning is drastically restricted. As a result, the doors to institutions of higher learning are closed to millions of Ukrainian youths and girls in their native land.

It is harder for graduates of rural secondary schools (who are the ones that constitute the bulk of non-Russified students) to hold their own in competition for admission to institutions of higher learning, because the level of their preparation is lower than that of graduates of city schools, among whom there is a considerable number of Russians and Russified Ukrainians.

In addition, the overwhelming majority of Ukraine's institutions of higher learning (with the insignificant exception of those in the Western regions of Ukraine) are Russified, because the whole educational process (and that means also the entrance exams) is carried out in the Russian language. This, in turn, creates additional hardships for graduates of Ukrainian schools when

they enter institutions of higher learning. In Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, only in the university are lectures conducted in Ukrainian, and even there in far from all departments. In all the other institutions of higher learning in Kiev lectures ■■■ conducted in Russian. All of the above explains the continuous decrease in the percentage of Ukrainians with ■ higher education.

On the other hand, in the R.S.F.S.R., for every 1,000 Ukrainian inhabitants there are more persons with a higher education than there are for every 1,000 Russians. This explains the singularity of the Russian chauvinistic colonizers, who transfer ■ considerable number of highly qualified Ukrainian specialists to the R.S.F.S.R.; the distribution of cadres throughout the whole empire is, after all, centralized.

While the Russians living in Ukraine feel like masters in their own home, with full rights, the Ukrainians in the R.S.F.S.R. have absolutely nothing to satisfy their national needs, with the exception that on their passport or in ■ poll, they can write down "Ukrainian" in the column under "nationality." And even then it has to be transcribed in Russian. The colonizers kill two birds with one stone: go, they say, to Russia, to become Russified (if not you then your children), and to be of use as specialists; on the other hand, in your place we will work on your Ukrainian ethnic masses, and there we, ■ the "older brother," will put into effect—Russification, "great and noble, internationalistic."

Russia has been practicing this type of colonial policy for centuries. One could list thousands of Ukrainian scientists and representatives of culture and the arts who, though Ukrainian, worked for Russia and are counted among prominent Russians, while the Ukrainian nation was being bled dry.

We notice the very same [phenomenon] today on ■ massive scale.

It is important to take note of the following peculiarity: within the 20 to 29 age bracket, per 1,000 Russian inhabitants there ■■ 54 persons with higher education; among Ukrainians, respectively, only 39. (This data is given for the total population of the U.S.S.R. in 1970. Corresponding figures for Ukraine alone do not appear in printed census materials, although in

Ukraine the analogous data would ■ doubt offer even more of a contrast.) So, the advantage is on the side of the Russians. And this points to the fact that Russians enter institutions of higher learning in greater numbers, right after finishing secondary school. There are two ■■■■■ for this: first, the chauvinistic policies of the CPSU leadership, which grants Russians privileges in all areas, the admission of students included; secondly, the much better social situation of the Russians (this is especially applicable to Russians living in the national republics), which allows them to continue with their education right after finishing secondary school.

The above-cited comparative figures on education serve ■ ■ good illustration of how the national problem gives birth to one of ■ social nature, and indicate that there can be no talk about solving the social problems without ■ solution of the national question.

Continuing our analysis of the 1970 census, we will show with figures how the national problem is being resolved in the U.S.S.R. on the whole, and the Ukrainian [problem] in particular.

In 1970, 3,017,000, or 8.5% of Ukrainians living in Ukraine, named Russian as their native language. In comparison with 1959 their number has increased by 942,000 persons, or by almost 2.6%. Let's reflect ■ this fact: Ukrainians who live in their native land and who have their own "sovereign state," as propaganda maintains, disown the language of their ancestors, and call ■ foreign language their own. The question then arises, can such people be called Ukrainians? What is it then that determines their national belonging? Is it, perhaps, the nationality column in one's passport? But who can give assurances that in ■ year's time or in "X" number of years from now by a ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. the passport column designating one's nationality will not disappear, ■ if it were licked off by a cow's tongue. There is still another variant: the Party and the government may decide to abolish passports (although this variant is more Utopian, because then what would the citizens of the "developed socialist society" pride themselves in?). What will designate one's nationality then? These people have lost the most important

indicator of one's nationality—the language, and with that, the ability to think in Ukrainian. They have lost the psychological bond with the Ukrainian people. Such Ukrainians ■■■ be called “paper” or “abstract” Ukrainians. Their affiliation with the Ukrainian people is strictly a formality. Their bond to Ukrainians is only a genetic one. At the same time, they are not just some cosmopolitan abstractions. These people consider their native language to be Russian; therefore, Russian culture has become their native culture, they think in Russian. This means that, in terms of real characteristics, they are no longer Ukrainians; neither are they Russians. The overwhelming majority of them are turncoats who have accepted Russian oppression ■■ something normal. The greatest number of mixed marriages, with Russians, of course, occurs among such abstract Ukrainians. And this leads already to the weakening or to ■ certain severance of the genetic link with Ukrainians in the coming generations. It leads to a severance of even the formal link with the Ukrainian people. This is ■ reserve for increasing the number of Russians.

Among the 3,017,000 Russified Ukrainians, inhabitants of the cities account for the vast majority, some 2,771,000. Soviet propaganda strains to present the Russification process ■■ something objective and progressive, as a drawing together of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., and the Russian people as the ideal bearer of internationalism. Here is what L. Brezhnev said at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU:

In the creation, strengthening, and growth of that mighty union of peoples, equal in rights, who have stepped onto the road to socialism, all the nations and nationalities of our country have played their part, and first of all, the great Russian people. Their revolutionary energy, selflessness, industriousness, and deep internationalism have by all rights earned them respect from all the peoples of ■■■ socialist Fatherland.

L. Brezhnev ■■■ right in emphasizing the role of the Russian people in the creation of the “powerful union” (we talked about

this above), ■ people so adroitly used by political adventurers for conquering other peoples (it appears that even in Brezhnev's lies one can read the truth, if ■ knows how to read correctly).

The elevation and idealization of some singular, infallible people, the emphasizing of the messianism of the Russian people, can in no way affirm the equality of all peoples and strengthen friendship among peoples. It is a small step from here to Hitler's "theories" about the exclusive role of the German people.

And here is what L. Brezhnev went on to say further at the above-mentioned Congress:

In the past years under the Party's leadership, new steps ■ taken on the road towards ■ thorough rapprochement of the nations and nationalities of our country. . . . In the future, the Party will continue to educate all workers in the spirit of socialist internationalism and implacability towards any manifestation of nationalism and chauvinism (No, no—don't think for one moment that this means Russian nationalism and chauvinism. The Russian people ■ the only people in the world not characterized by nationalism or chauvinism—our [author's] note) national narrow-mindedness and conceit, in whatever form, in the spirit of deep respect for all nations and nationalities.

The natural processes of assimilation and rapprochement, in the presence of equal rights for all, should look as follows: the Russian minority in Ukraine would draw closer to the Ukrainian majority and would to ■ degree become assimilated in the Ukrainian sea. But what do the figures indicate?

Of the 9.1 million Russians who live in Ukraine, 0.2%, ■ 135,000 persons said Ukrainian was their native language, and only 2.5% of these speak fluent Ukrainian (the Russians have the most trouble learning the languages of other nations of the U.S.S.R.).

Is this not ■ striking example of "the deep respect for all nations and nationalities" ■ the part of a people characterized by their "deep internationalism"? That's Brezhnev's brand of Russian chauvinistic "internationalism" for you.

The Kremlin bosses interpret internationalism ■ the self-appointed right to be international gendarmes.

How can there be talk about internationalism when the integral parts, which the "inter-" concept brings together, are destroyed, and everything is brought down to the same ■ denominator of "mono," in this instance, to animalistic Russian nationalism-chauvinism. And ■ is precisely this, because how else ■ we interpret the Party's general line in its adopted course of "implacability . . ." towards "national narrow-mindedness and conceit" (not to even mention nationalism)?

What do the Kremlin ideologists understand by "national conceit"? Could it be, perhaps, pride in one's nationality, love of and respect for one's people, their language, culture, customs, and traditions? This is exactly how the newspaper *Pravda* explained this particular question in ■ article on September 6, 1972, commemorating the opening of the school year in the Party's educational system: "International education is indissolubly linked with overcoming all vestiges and manifestations of nationalism, the cause of which lies in the lack of political maturity on the part of a certain number of people, in an adherence to outdated national traditions and customs. At the same time it should be kept in mind, that in ■ situation of fierce ideological struggle, the imperialists strive ever harder to exploit the national question in their anti-Communist propaganda, and openly support nationalistic revisionist movements." It should not be forgotten that this quote belongs not to ■ private person, but was printed in an editorial in the empire's central party organ and provides the guideline for all members of Lenin's party (all communists, without exception, twenty-year-olds and eighty-year-olds, are obligated without fail to attend and participate actively in political education meetings—this is ■ mandatory ritual). It is obvious from this editorial what kind of spirit the Party's leadership is trying to bring up its members in. In the first place, in the spirit of implacability towards "outdated national traditions and customs."

Thus, that which each nation had acquired throughout whole centuries by absorbing the social wisdom of tens and hundreds

of generations and collecting ■ in the concept of national traditions and customs, that is, those specific characteristics of each nation without which the existence of ■ people as ■ national entity is unthinkable—all this party ideologists today consider outdated and call for its destruction. Where is the logic in all this? If some phenomenon or other in the social consciousness is outdated, it dies out by itself. And yet, party propaganda confirms that indeed there are ■ people who follow these customs and traditions, and turns its main thrust against them. Who ■ these people? They ■ precisely those ■ of non-Russian ethnic individuals who, despite all the efforts of Moscow's chauvinists, have not become Russified. If they ■ only ■ small group of people, then what would be the sense in directing against them all those throngs of communists (if it were only the communists, but it is also the regime's main strength—the KGB men, as well)? With this action, the party ideologists assert that the very existence of separate nations has become obsolete (this thesis, as the Party's theory and especially its practical application in regard to the national question show, does not apply to the Russian people).

It is no wonder then that a new fable has been created in the Kremlin about a "new historical community—the Soviet people." Who needs this abstract cover, under which the Russian chauvinistic backbone hides?

It is high time for the Russian imperialists to realize that it is the Russian Empire that has become outmoded, although it was touched up with a new coat of red paint in 1917. Because, be it as it may, the enslaved peoples of the Russian Empire do exist and ■ fighting for their independence, although under circumstances unbelievably tough and complicated. And this struggle will grow more intense with time, irrespective of whatever terror the occupiers may use, because the illusions, born of October 1917, about the possibility of national and social liberation within the boundaries of ■ centralized, multinational Russian state have been completely dispelled.

For ■ greater understanding of the Russification policies of the CPSU I will cite ■ few more quotes. In the speech "O

Pyatidesyatiletiiu Soyuzu SSR [On the 50th Anniversary of the U.S.S.R.], delivered in ■ openly chauvinistic spirit, Brezhnev declared: "The rapid growth of international contacts and cooperation is leading to ■ increase in the importance of the Russian language, which has become the language of intercourse among all the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union. And we all, of course, rejoice that the Russian language has become one of the universally recognized world languages! . . . The breakdown of national barriers, the importance of which was often discussed by Lenin, the establishment of preconditions for the further drawing together of the nations of the U.S.S.R., is proceeding in both the material and the spiritual spheres."

Well, Russians can be proud that their language has entered upon the world arena, that its importance grows, but they should not forget at whose expense ■ is being accomplished, that its price is Russification and colonial exploitation, that this is being done, therefore, at the cost of squeezing out the languages and cultures of and exploiting tens of non-Russian peoples. For us, non-Russians, this is grief, but ■ an honest Russian rejoice at might which is being built ■ ■ else's misfortune? Whom did Brezhnev have in mind when he declared "We all rejoice"?

No, not us, Ukrainians, ■ the Uzbeks, and, in the final analysis, not the Russians, whom they also try to keep in servile obedience, poisoning their consciousness with chauvinistic fanaticism. No, Brezhnev did not speak in the name of a fictitious "Soviet people," nor in the name of the Russian people, because the long-suffering Russian people speak through other lips, the lips of such Russian patriots and humanists as A. Solzhenitsyn and A. Sakharov. Brezhnev spoke in the name of the Russian chauvinists Suslov and Andropov, in the name of the international flock of ■ who caw the Russian song of chauvinism and who rely on the support of the new exploitative class, whose ■ is the party-bureaucratic apparatus, and which is armed with the predacious teeth of the KGB.

In the above-mentioned speech, Brezhnev went on to say:

It should not be forgotten that nationalistic preju-

dices and exaggerated or distorted manifestations of national feelings are phenomena which are extraordinarily viable and deeply rooted in the psychology of people who have not attained full political maturity. These prejudices remain intact even under circumstances when objective premises for any such antagonisms in relations among nations have long ago ceased to exist. One shouldn't lose sight of the fact that the manifestations of nationalistic tendencies often intertwine with aspirations for autonomy [in the Republics], which happens to be akin to nationalism.

. . . At the same time the Party considers intolerable any attempts whatsoever to restrain the process of the drawing together of nations, to hinder it under any pretext whatsoever, and to artificially strengthen national separateness. Because this would contradict the general direction of the development of our society, as well as our internationalistic ideals, the Communist ideology, and the interests of the building of Communism. . . . We have excellent grounds to speak of ■■■■ widely encompassing concept, of the great patriotic feeling of all our people, about the all-national pride of the Soviet man.

It seems that everything is made perfectly clear for the thinking Soviet citizen: what happens to be the final goal of official policy, what the Party will tolerate and what it will not, and who it is that needs this new "all-national pride," although it's ■■■■ old ■■■■ the Russian Empire. For ■■■■ better understanding of the goals of the CPSU's leadership we will set up ■■■■ few historical parallels. The Russian czars, after all, were ■■■■ candid, their terminology was simpler, but the ultimate goal of the crowned and the uncrowned rulers is the same—the "one and indivisible" empire, the name does not matter.

In confidential instructions to the Attorney-General of the Senate, Prince Vyazemsky, Catherine the Great wrote: "Little Russia,²⁷ Liffyandiya,²⁸ and Finland are provinces which are governed ■■■■ the basis of privileges granted ■■■■ them; to violate

these privileges at this time would be very awkward, but still these provinces cannot be considered foreign and to treat them as one would foreign lands would be blatant stupidity. Those provinces, as well as the Smolensk area, should be subjected to Russification by the use of simple measures, so that they will stop eyeing ■ like wolves in the forest." Or, in her instructions to Governor-General P. Rumyantsev [she wrote]: "... Try to uproot among the Ukrainians their false image of themselves as a people completely different from the Muscovites."

Two centuries later, in the ■ issue of 1973 of the Ukrainian periodical *Komunist Ukrayiny* [The Communist of Ukraine] (how Ukrainian this periodical is, you can judge for yourselves from the following quote) ■ find the following:

Some scholarly and literary works have deviated from class and party criteria in their appraisal of social phenomena and processes. In them the historical past of the Ukrainian people has been interpreted from ■ ideologically erroneous position of "selfhood," and the struggle for unification with Russia has been depicted in a distorted way (these ■ exactly the very ■ class positions from which Russian court historians and chauvinistic politicians treated the Ukrainian people's struggle for national liberation and the act of annexation of Ukraine to Russia according to the Treaty at Pereyaslav²⁹—author's comment), [as were distorted] the events of the October Revolution and the civil war, and the socialist rebuilding of society. Some men of letters stray in their works from the pressing topics of the present, exhibit national narrow-mindedness, litter the Ukrainian language with archaisms³⁰ and with artificial expressions. All this is harmful to the education of our people, and of youth in particular.

... No such so-called "national problem," about which those abroad clamor so much, exists in the Republic (whether it exists we will yet show with concrete examples in the second part of this work—author's note). The national problem has been solved

by ■ in the best way, correctly, according to Lenin's principles.

What ■ closeness of views between today's rulers and their predecessors of 200 years ago, only the words are slightly more veiled and there is a certain change in the terminology used: instead of the motto "orthodoxy, autocracy, ethnicity," it is "party membership, class consciousness, ethnicity" (the apple hasn't rolled far from the apple tree, has it?); instead of "all-Russian patriotism," there is "all-national pride of the Soviet man," instead of the "one and indivisible," there is the "inviolable Soviet Union" (although the Constitution, to muddle things up, allows the opposite), instead of "Russification," there is "drawing together" and a whole series of other synonyms for it. And all of this is meticulously hidden behind the rose-colored front of internationalism.

Party ideologists strain to prove that the national problem doesn't exist here, that it has been concocted abroad; inside the empire the Party's information services constantly remind about its non-existence (that's intriguing, why talk and write so much about the nonexistent?). In the meantime, hundreds of the best sons and daughters of the Ukrainian people ■ thrown quietly, without trial (we don't have the moral right to call the mock trials held behind closed doors real trials), and with the help of the "omnipresent" KGB, into prisons, concentration camps, psychiatric murder wards³¹—"a new variant on the gas chambers," ■ they were aptly labeled by A. Solzhenitsyn. Thousands upon thousands are subjected to persecution while still free, because they dare to defend the Ukrainian language and culture.

There is no doubt that the national problem in our country has been settled according to Lenin's directives, because he was, after all, ■ man of experience, a master in the art of diplomacy, who knew how to take into account both the accomplishments and the shortcomings of his predecessors. But in what manner this problem has been solved and continues to be solved (though Brezhnev insists that "the national question has been completely settled, settled once and for all, and irrevocably") can be seen

from the above-given figures and from the facts, which we will provide further on in our exposition.

Before proceeding with the demographical analysis, we will quote a few more statements made by party officials and the press.

Addressing the party meeting of Kiev University on October 3, 1973, the First Secretary of the CPU, Shcherbytsky, found it necessary to remind everyone again, what an internationalist should be like (in the Russian chauvinistic meaning of the word):

To be an internationalist means to express feelings of friendship and brotherhood towards all peoples of our country and, first of all, towards the great Russian people, their culture, their language—the language of the Revolution, of Lenin, the language of international unity. (Why “first of all” to the Russian people, their language and culture, and not to the German people and to their rich spiritual and material culture, to the German language—the language of Marx and Engels; to the talented and long-suffering Jewish people, whose history in so many ways reminds one of the history of the Ukrainian people, especially in its tragic moments? Why not to the brotherly Polish people, why not to the English language—truly the most international language, why not in equal measure to all the peoples of this Earth, which in our time is no longer so large?—author’s note.)

To be an internationalist means to lead an uncompromising struggle against nationalism, and in particular against the fiercest enemy of the Ukrainian people—Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism—and also against international Zionism; it to be intolerant of any kind of manifestations of national narrow-mindedness, national boasting (the speech was given in the Ukrainian language, the czarist governor-generals used only the Russian language—author’s note).

Everything is perfectly clear except for one thing: Is it not time for this "well-developed socialist society" to get rid of the epithet "bourgeois"? What if by chance we should drag it into communism, then what?

To hate everything that is one's own, everything native, and to grovel slavishly before everything Russian, to become turncoats, apostates, and janissaries—this is what today's Soviet ideology demands of us.

The leadership of the CPSU has adopted a policy of forcible ethnocide of the non-Russian peoples.

How can there be any talk of Ukrainian nationalism in this case, when the conqueror behaves on our land ■ the master, robs us of our material treasures, tears down our culture while forcing upon us his own, in order to destroy us completely? And the resistance put up by the Ukrainian people against their violators should not be mistakenly called nationalism. It is ■ antipode of Russian chauvinistic nationalism—an immunoreaction in favor of national self-preservation. After all, we do not covet anything Russian, we pose ■ threat to the Russian people ■ their culture; on the contrary, we deeply respect the better achievements of their culture, we revere and love ■ real brothers the just and manly sons of their nation.

As for the policy of ethnocide directed against us, the newspaper *Izvestiya* (Feb. 12, 1972) characterized it rather well, while writing, it is true, about the internal policies of the CPC [Communist Party of China]. But all the reader needs to do is to substitute "the U.S.S.R." in place of "China," and everything will fall into place—he will see a penetrating characterization of the national policy of the CPSU:

Although the Constitution of the People's Republic of China formally recognizes the equality of all nations, the non-Chinese peoples find themselves in a subservient condition, deprived of their rights to develop their national economies and cultures. All of them are threatened by compulsory assimilation, which has be-

come the goal of Peking's state policy.

The Maoists even attempt to give a theoretical basis for their imperialistically chauvinist policies. Chinese propaganda wants to prove in every way the necessity for the "melting of the different nationalities into a single nationality" (in the U.S.S.R. the creation of the "new historical community—the Soviet people," is based, naturally on the Russian foundation—author's note). At the same time it is stressed that "the Chinese should become the backbone." Peking's "theoreticians" have remarked not infrequently that the goal of their national policy is the . . . "total liquidation of national features and differences" (what the Party and L. Brezhnev personally say on this very topic, we have already cited—author's note). . . . The current course taken by the Peking leadership on the issue of nationalities is the continuation of the old policy of forced racial and cultural assimilation of the non-Chinese minorities which had been carried out by the Chinese emperors.

. . . Manifestations of any feelings of national consciousness, aspirations to develop their culture and language, are being persecuted by the Chinese administration. The desire of the national minorities to study their language and culture are considered "revisionism" and "bourgeois nationalism."

What is there left to say? Soviet ideologists clearly and correctly assess everything that the Chinese chauvinists are doing. The very same thing in their own backyard they pass off as progress.

How can there be any talk in the U.S.S.R. about the development of national economies in the Republics, when even Brezhnev himself states that: "The economy of the Soviet Union is not the sum total of the economies of the individual Republics and regions. It has been for a long time a single economic organism, founded on the basis of common economic goals and interests of all the nations and nationalities." Aren't Ukrainians very fortunate that they must ask Moscow's permission if

they want to build an underpass in Kiev? Or is it not a sign of the flowering of the Ukrainian nation's prosperity that in inclement weather villages in the Poltava or Zhytomyr Regions can be reached only by tractor, if at all, because of the lack of roads?

Why is it then that the real figures of national production and national income in the U.S.S.R. ■ so diligently concealed behind circumventive comparative percentages? This is exactly where the truth as to who profits by this excessive economic centralization is hidden.

Isn't a good indicator of the level of ■ republic's "sovereignty," for instance, the fact that the ■■■■ for any kind of second-rate district newspaper is chosen and confirmed by Moscow? (Can ■ "sovereign" republic's government in Kiev concern itself with such trifles?)

The singularity of Soviet colonialism resides in the fact that, along with economic bondage, ■ devotes just as much attention to spiritual oppression, whose aim is systematic Russification and which, in the opinion of the Kremlin sages, should lead to the complete ethnocide of the non-Russian peoples.

The Russification begins in establishments for pre-school children. On the whole, public nurseries and kindergartens in Ukraine are predominantly Russian. Those children's establishments which are formally considered Ukrainian are to ■ great degree Russified, because when they are being staffed preference is given to Russians or Russified [Ukrainians], who do not want to carry out the educational program in Ukrainian. As a result, such children's establishments ■ Russian, though they hide behind Ukrainian shingles.

The Ukrainian school has become ■ problem in Ukraine. In the cities of the Donbas, for instance, there ■ no Ukrainian schools at all, nor are there any in the Crimea. In such cities as Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhya, Mykolayiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Odessa, and in many others, only a few solitary Ukrainian schools remain, and even these are on the outskirts.

Graduates of Lviv's institutions of higher education who go to work in Donbas, but who do not want their children to

attend Russian schools, are forced to send their children to their grandmothers, if they live in Western Ukraine, where Ukrainian schools still exist. Their demands that Ukrainian schools be established in the cities where they have to work always elicit the same response—an accusation of being a Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist, with the attendant consequences.

Even in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, the number of Ukrainian schools grows ever smaller. The following example is characteristic: in June 1973, party officials tried to change the I. Franko School on Lenin Street into a Russian school. The parents who protested such high-handedness were advised to send their children to one of the schools on the outskirts of Kiev.

Ukrainian schools are being turned into Russian ones at the slightest pretext: that there aren't enough teachers who could teach the courses in Ukrainian, or that the Russian schools are overcrowded, etc.

Furthermore, in many schools there is the practice of introducing parallel classes taught in Russian, which are considerably larger than those taught in Ukrainian. In time, such schools become either Russo-Ukrainian or totally Russian.

A number of subjects in Ukrainian schools are always taught in Russian (this practice has become very widespread in the city of Kiev—the school is Russian but the Ukrainian shingle has been saved for the benefit of foreign tourists).

The number of Russian schools is highly disproportionate to the number of Russians living in Ukraine. As a result, to a great extent they are intended for Ukrainians and the non-Russian minorities living in Ukraine.

Those Ukrainian schools that do exist in Ukraine can be considered Ukrainian in name only, because in reality they are permeated with the imperialistic chauvinist Russian spirit. Can a school be considered native when, for all practical purposes, children there are not taught the history of their motherland—Ukraine? During lessons on the history of the U.S.S.R., only a few events from the history of Ukraine are mentioned, and

always in an interpretation that is distorted and convenient for the Russian occupiers.

The teaching of Ukrainian literature and language is fully unsatisfactory. The outstanding works of Ukrainian classical literature are not taught at all. The so-called class-party approach to studying the historical and cultural heritage of the people is calculated towards cultivating in the students ■ distorted view of Ukraine's history and her prominent [historical] figures.

The low level of the humanistic and pedagogical training of teachers and the chauvinistic atmosphere in institutions of higher learning are the reasons why the schools are staffed with inferior personnel, who usually help the KGB men deal with those teachers-enthusiasts who do try, at least partially, to fill the national vacuum among students.

During breaks between classes teachers communicate among themselves and with the students in Russian. Under the pretext of trying to improve the students' Russian, the schools organize month-long sessions of the Russian language, during which students are forced to speak only in Russian during breaks and after class, as well as in class (this is in addition to classes of Russian language and literature). Such practice is commonplace in the Ukrainian schools of Kiev (one can't even speak of the Donbas and other industrial centers because there they don't have Ukrainian schools to begin with). In the 1972-73 school year this very same system began to be implemented in a number of Ukrainian schools in Western Ukraine (for instance in Zboriv, a district center in Ternopil Region, in Secondary School No. 79 in Lviv, and in many others). Naturally, ■ month-long sessions of the Ukrainian language are ever organized in the Russian schools of Ukraine!

At ■ session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in July 1973, at which a draft for the basis of educational legislation for the U.S.S.R. and all the constituent Republics was being discussed, Deputy P. Fedoseyev stated that: "In the course of the discussion on the pending bill, as well ■ in the report by Comrade K. T. Mazurov (and this is important since Mazurov

had expressed the wishes of the Politburo—author's note), every-
■ emphasized the importance of teaching the Russian lan-
guage in schools, as the language of international communication
of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. Therefore it is necessary that all
the educational establishments of the U.S.S.R., of the Union
Republics and the Autonomous Republics, all the educators,
all the language specialists should constantly keep in mind the
goal of further perfecting the organization of ways and methods
of teaching and studying the Russian language in school and
outside of school." What solicitude about the development of
other languages! Incredible, isn't it?

Furthermore, we have the words of the Minister of Education
of the U.S.S.R., speaking at the same session: "Legislative mea-
sures are being accepted which deal with the improvement in
the teaching of the Russian language, chosen voluntarily by the
nations of the U.S.S.R. as the language of international communi-
cation. This problem is especially relevant with regard to the
national schools, where ■ a voluntary basis all students ■
learning Russian side by side with their native language." If
he were a czarist minister speaking before the State Duma, ■
could tell him: The Minister is lying, because nobody knows
exactly when the peoples of the U.S.S.R. voluntarily chose the
Russian language to communicate among themselves—unless it
was at the time when the Kingdom of Muscovy was growing
into the Russian Empire and when it was "voluntarily" being
"joined" by non-Russian nations, or "reunited," as it is fashionable
to say today. They "reunited" one after the other, the small and
the large, the near ones and the ■ farther off, those grateful
and those ungrateful for the brotherly help of the Russians.
Or maybe it was at the time when the Soviet Union was being
"voluntarily" created. Who knows, but we will keep on hoping
that the Party's class-oriented falsification of history will pinpoint
this date for us.

Therefore, at the present stage of the educational process in
the national schools, it is impossible to inculcate in the pupils
■ love for their native land, its culture, history, and language.
The result is a spiritual vacuum, the absence of any feelings of
national pride and dignity in the young generation.

A large role in the processes of Russification in the upcoming generation is played by children's literature, the overwhelming majority of which is published in Russian.

In the past few years, movies and television programs for children in the Ukrainian language have become a rarity.

A great scarcity of textbooks for schoolchildren in Ukrainian is evident.

We have already talked to ■■■■ degree about the Russification of establishments of higher education. To this one should add that a Soviet higher school does not feel it is its purpose to give the graduates ■■■ education in the fullest meaning of this word. The ruling class of the U.S.S.R. fears those with ■■■ higher education. A lion's share of the time is taken from the students in order to stuff them with Leninist dogmas (over here Marxism is also prepared in sufficient quantity, with those works which conveniently fit party propaganda being offered to the students). As ■■■ result, the institutes mass produce graduates who do not possess a well-rounded education, but who are, rather, specialists in this field or another, with poor preparation in the nonhumanistic disciplines and a totally inadequate one in the fields of philosophy, history, jurisprudence, and philology.

The mass diffusion of television in Ukraine is used to thrust upon the population the Party's ideology and Russification.

Thus in 1972 the programs of "Ukrainian Television" (the second channel) were broadcast throughout only 35% of Ukraine's territory. In the Crimea, for example, programs of the Republic's telecasting are not broadcast at all, with the exception of those which appear on the central television network in the Russian language.

The Ukrainian language is systematically being forced out of science and out of the realm of production, as a result of which its development does not keep pace with the normal activities of everyday life; this in turn leads to the curtailment of its functions.

had expressed the wishes of the Politburo—author's note), everyone emphasized the importance of teaching the Russian language in schools, as the language of international communication of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. Therefore it is necessary that all the educational establishments of the U.S.S.R., of the Union Republics and the Autonomous Republics, all the educators, all the language specialists should constantly keep in mind the goal of further perfecting the organization of ways and methods of teaching and studying the Russian language in school and outside of school." What solicitude about the development of other languages! Incredible, isn't it?

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The Ukrainian language is systematically being forced out of science and out of the realm of production, as a result of which its development does not keep pace with the normal activities of everyday life; this in turn leads to the curtailment of its functions.

An unrelenting, purposeful littering of the Ukrainian language with Russicisms³² is being conducted through the periodical press, radio, and in literature.

Those writers and representatives of the creative intelligentsia who stand up in defense of the purity of their native language are thrown as prey to the KGB.

Leading party officials devote a great deal of attention to the problems of this new erosion. Mainly this is done under the cover of protecting the purity of the Ukrainian language from being littered by archaisms.

Towards the end of 1973 the Secretary of the CC CPU [Communist Party of Ukraine] and its ideologist, the well-known Ukrainophobe V. Malanchuk, lectured writers at a party meeting of the Kiev branch of the Writers' Union of Ukraine in the following manner: "I cannot help but touch upon, at least briefly, a question which should be of particular concern to the literary community. I am referring to the culture of a language, to linguistic craftsmanship in literature. One can observe in the works of some authors ■ unhealthy tendency towards littering the language with archaisms, dialecticisms, and with individually created neologisms. . . . Disregarding established norms, ■ translators have opened wide the doors to all sorts of archaisms, Polonisms, Galicianisms."³³ It is not the catastrophic avalanche of Russicisms, which are truly disfiguring the Ukrainian language, that perturbs this lackey, but the fact that a number of authors really care about the multifaceted development of the Ukrainian language.

The director of the Institute of Literature of the Ukr.S.S.R., academician M. Shamota, puts the matter more concretely: "Under the pretext of enriching the language of literary works, the cobwebbed corners of the dictionary have been dusted off and efforts made to erode the living language out of literature, especially in those places, where it has naturally and consequentially come closer to Russian. With the triumph of such tendencies we would end up with a dead literary language, a Ukrainian Latin. Serious linguists have frequently called our attention to the danger inherent in such tendencies. . . . Even

to this day we find in periodical publications such artificial or outdated words ■ 'chasopys' [newspaper], 'zalyubleny' [in love], 'zdorovy' [to greet], 'vidsotok' [percent], 'nebavom' [soon], 'nabutky' [acquisitions], 'pid orudoyu' [under the direction], 'sh'ohodennya' [of today] . . . 'narazi' [for now]³⁴” Anyone who knows at least some Ukrainian can, on the basis of the above-given quote, come to an understanding of why this “academician” and the institution he directs exist. They exist precisely for the purpose of waging a continuous battle with Ukrainian literature and diverting the writers’ attention from the real problems of the Ukrainian nation.

Shamota is not alone in doing this type of dirty work. Another one like him is the creator of the “theory” of bilingualism, the director of the Institute of Linguistics at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. S.S.R. and also an “academician,” Byelodyed (we did not make a mistake here; it is exactly under this name that this “academician” publishes his works in Russian).³⁵

All scholarly institutions in Ukraine are called upon to fight to uproot national consciousness in the population. Their official publications, although formally some of them are published in Ukrainian, are nevertheless anti-Ukrainian in spirit.

For the sake of conclusiveness, let's take ■ look at, say, the *Ukrayinsky istorychny zhurnal* [Ukrainian Historical Journal], the official publication of the Institute of the History of the Ukr. S.S.R. and the Institute of the History of the Party, run by the CC CPU. In its Issue No. ■ for 1972, in the article “Petro i Ukrayina” [Peter and Ukraine], V. Dyadychenko writes: “. . . Peter's struggle for the acquisition of the coastline in the South went hand in hand with the deep and vital interests of the Ukrainian people.”

Speaking of the cultural reforms of Peter I, the author continues: “These reforms also had a progressive meaning for Ukraine. Russian books and textbooks ■ being sold here.” This is at the time when a ban ■ first placed on publishing books in the Ukrainian language and when Muscovite censorship was first introduced. At the end of the article the author sums up with the words: “Soviet historical scholarship is marked

by its objective appraisal, based ■ irrefutable facts, of Peter I's role in the history of our country. The acts of this czar had ■ progressive meaning: . . . Peter I ■ a far-sighted diplomat. Under his leadership Russia ■ able to neutralize Turkey and triumphantly ended the Northern War,³⁶ which enabled her to enter into the circle of the great world powers. The reforms of Peter I left ■ deep mark in the field of culture as well. All of this was of great significance to Ukraine."

Thus, the conquest of foreign lands, the enslavement of other, non-Russian peoples, the creation of a great and powerful imperialistic country with the cruelest oppression of other nationalities in all of Europe, the author (and he is not alone in this) considers a progressive phenomenon. The fact is that Peter I, especially after Ukraine's fatal defeat at the Battle of Poltava, literally bled Ukraine, about which there is truly irrefutable data; he trampled the terms of the Treaty of Pereyaslav;³⁷ he tightened the feudal yoke; he liquidated the Hetmanate³⁸ and destroyed the Sich³⁹ for the first time; he began an overall drive for the Russification of Ukraine, which has lasted to our days. And this is what the author tries so hard to pass off as something progressive, something which "was of great significance to Ukraine"!

Moreover, in the first 1973 issue of the same journal, another "sage," a member of the editorial board (1), M. Kotlyar, has really let himself go. In his review of M. Kytsenko's book *Khortytsya v heroyitsi i lehendakh* [*Khortytsya*⁴⁰ in Heroica and in Legends] we read the following: "M. Kytsenko is not the first Soviet scholar researching the history of the Zaporozhian Kozaks⁴¹ to have considered the 'Kozak Republic' (as Karl Marx called the Sich) democratic, but K. Marx didn't write this! . . . A faulty understanding of the above-mentioned expression by K. Marx has led to the idealization of the Kozak society, to the exaggeration of the democratic nature of its laws and regulations, which the author has allowed to creep into his presentation. . . . The book idealizes the governing system of the Sich, the activities of its leaders, particularly Sahaydachny." (Is it not that the reviewer does not like this outstanding commander because he dealt the Turks a crushing blow at Khotyn⁴² and

thus in no small measure helped avert the threat from the Ottoman Empire not only for Ukraine but for all of Europe as well; this wise statesman and diplomat, who prepared the ground for Ukraine's liberation from the oppression of the Polish nobility; this humanist and enlightener, who founded and organized schools in Ukraine, among them Kiev College, which later became the Kievan Mohyla Academy;⁴³ this ardent patriot, who knew how to rise above personal slights and, so as not to sow dissension, always yielded to the Kozak Council, which often deposed him as Hetman, and then, during especially difficult and fateful moments for Ukraine, would again entrust him with the *bulava*⁴⁴?—author's note.)

Kotlyar continues:

The main shortcomings of M. Kytsenko's book is his one-sided presentation of the relations between the Zaporizhzhya and Russia. As a result one gets the erroneous impression that the Russian government allegedly did nothing but oppress and destroy the Kozaks. One cannot quote without comment . . . a folk legend . . . which says: "And Peter the First first began to destroy the Kozak Sich and to hang the Kozaks, sending their bodies down the Dnipro [Dnieper] afloat." The behavior of the Russian command towards the Kozaks during the Russo-Turkish wars of the 18th century is described in approximately the same vein.

Kotlyar cannot even comprehend the idea that if there were ■ honest authors, then the conquerors also would require ■ commentary (the lies of turncoats and falsifiers like himself—author's note). But let's read on:

His description of the last years of the Zaporozhian Sich only testifies to the fact that the author of the work under review did not take into account some of the principles of the development of the historical process . . . : "The czarist government searched for ■ pretext to destroy the Sich and to usurp the free territories of the Zaporozhian Kozaks."⁴⁵ This train of thought is

persistently repeated by the author in several places. The reader can get the false impression that the Sich was supposedly destroyed thanks to the whims of that "bitch's mother" Catherine the Great and her "fattened" favorite Potemkin.⁴⁶ . . . The existence of the Zaporozhian Sich in the 18th century ■■■ a historical remnant. (This is something new! Even during the worst Stalinist times obscurantists the likes of Kotlyar did not permit themselves such ■■■ interpretation—author's note.) The outmoded military organization and methods of conducting military campaigns, the anachronistic nature and inconsistency of the Sich's leadership, which was not used to fighting battles in the ranks of a regular army, all this made the Kozak army of little use in the type of battles waged in the 18th century. At this time the Zaporozhian army no longer constituted a prestigious military force (the whole trouble was that the Kozaks didn't even dream of conquering foreign lands—author's note). . . . The Kozaks left great expanses of the steppe in its wild state; this, and the ■■■ of extensive methods in agriculture,⁴⁷ hampered the settling of the South, its agricultural and industrial development, and thwarted the inhibition of the birth of bourgeois conditions. It can be considered a miracle that the Sich survived almost till the end of the 18th century. It outlived itself by at least a century. (And is it not a greater miracle that the Ukrainian people still exist and struggle to this day, in spite of all the wishes and efforts of the conquerors, who mercilessly tried to destroy our people and still continue to do so by every possible means?—author's note.) The idealization of the social order of the Zaporozhian Sich, the absolutistic praise of its role in the history of Ukraine, a subjectivistic explanation of the ■■■■ for and conditions of its liquidation are characteristic of a series of other works of M. Kytlenko, for which he has been already rightfully criticized.

The foreword by O. Apanovych . . . didn't help the book any either, since it idealizes the democratic system

which supposedly existed at the Sich, and contains false statements to the effect that the Sich headed the struggle against the aggression of the Polish nobility in the 18th century. . . . In the foreword by O. Apanovych there is not one word about the state of development of the Sich from the time when it was in full bloom in the 16th century, nor about its transformation, finally, into a stumbling block to the development of Ukraine's South. . . . In the preparation for publication of books like the ■■■ by M. Kytsenko, a professionally qualified review by authoritative scholarly organizations is an absolute necessity (which organizations and what measures are being used against those scholars mentioned by Kotlyar in his review and against many others will be discussed in detail in the second part of our work—author's note).

This is how the official fabrication of "Ukrainian" history looks at the present.

It would be worth the reader's while to take note of the given review from another angle—that is, how the so-called class approach in modern Soviet pseudoscholarship is being used in evaluating the past.

The primary task of every organ of the periodical press in Ukraine is to foster denationalization. The reader is inundated by an avalanche of disinformation, various slanderous forgeries against the leaders of the national movement, past and present, and against those outstanding representatives of the creative intelligentsia who do not wish to peddle their consciences. An exceptionally large amount of such material is printed in the newspapers of Western Ukraine (the occupiers ■■■ probably taking into account the lower level of Russification in this area).

Every newspaper is assigned a collaborator of the KGB, not ■ member of the staff, who constantly at the orders of the KGB composes an assortment of fake documents. For instance, in Lviv's regional newspaper *Vilna Ukrayina* [Free Ukraine] the KGB man is Byelinsky, in Lviv's Komsomol paper *Leninska Molod* [Leninist Youth] it's Toropovsky, in the Ivano-Frankivsk newspaper *Prykarpatska Pravda* [Subcarpathian Truth] it's Kolo-

dyazhny and Ulchenko, in the all-Republic journal *Ukrayina* it is its editor-in-chief Podolyan, and so on.

It is also worth remembering that for over half a century now the occupiers have been continually destroying Ukraine's intelligentsia, especially the creative intelligentsia. Thus, in the twenties and thirties alone, 448 writers ■■■ eliminated from the creative process. One hundred thirty well-known writers ■■■ shot or tortured to death in concentration camps. H. Kossynka, D. Falkivsky, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, R. Skazynsky, K. Bureviy, M. Lebedynets, R. Shevchenko, I. Tereshchenko, and dozens of others were shot. Persecuted, M. Khvylovy committed suicide. M. Dray-Khmara, M. Kulish, M. Zerov, S. Yefremov, Ye. Pluzhnyk and many, many others were destroyed in prisons and concentration camps. And how many were there of those who were not as well-known, who had just begun to join the creative process when they were shot? That we do not know. In recent years writers are not shot, yet their destruction continues: some are doomed to a slow death in psychiatric murder wards—Z. Krasivsky, A. Lupynis, V. Ruban, and others. Others ■■■ in concentration camps and prisons, in inhuman conditions (I. Kalynets, V. Moroz, V. Stus, Ye. Sverstyuk, I. Svitlychny, V. Chornovil, V. Marchenko, and many others). And finally, the largest group—those forced to be silent. This is an unheard-of bloodletting of a nation.

Let the reader in the U.S.S.R. or abroad not make the mistake of thinking that the Ukrainian people are somehow especially prone towards assimilation and so fecund in producing turncoats. No, that is not true. It should not be forgotten that over the centuries the Ukrainian people were growing up and reaching maturity, struggled and continue to struggle under exceptionally complex and difficult circumstances. Are there not plenty of cases of apostasy, for example, in the captive nations in Central Europe? The heart of the matter is that Ukraine is ■ colony. Furthermore, the colonizers, in order to eternalize their domination, are trying to destroy the very essence of the Ukrainian nation—its national individuality—and by doing so to turn the Ukrainian people into obedient slaves.

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In carrying out their policy of Russification in Ukraine the occupiers employ the method of diluting and freezing of the Ukrainian nation. It is based on the fact that with increased economic development the cities play an increasingly predominant role in economic and spiritual life. It is precisely through the forced Russification of the cities that the imperialistic Russian chauvinists are carrying out their anti-Ukrainian policies. Populating the cities with ever greater numbers of Russians (basically as a result of emigration from Russia; their influx into the cities of the Ukr.S.S.R. is not being limited!) and giving them ■ privileged status—this is done under the pretext of so-called international help for Ukrainians on the part of the Russians and also under the slogan of waging an unrelenting struggle against manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism—the occupiers are giving the cities a Russian character.

This is especially true of the large cities, because, first of all, it is basically here that all the scholarly and cultural institutions and cadres are concentrated and, secondly, because it is here that the overwhelming majority of industrial objects are found and because they grow quickly in population (in the period between the censuses of 1959 and 1970 in cities with populations of 3,000 or more, the number of inhabitants has increased by 485,000, while in cities with populations from 100,000 to 500,000 and more, ■ has increased by 5,125,000).

Taking into account the increasing migration of the young rural contingent into the cities, the occupiers are trying with all their might to “freeze” the Ukrainian element in the Russified city environment. This theory is clearly supported by figures: of the 3,017,000 Ukrainians who acknowledged Russian as their native language, 2,771,000 were from the cities.

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During censuses of the population in the U.S.S.R., “nationality” and “native language” are determined. Such phrasing of the question is illogical. You ■ have but one native mother, she that bore you (genus—kind). This should also be the relationship towards one’s native language. The language of

the nation into which one is born should be considered the native language. For a person may, for one reason or another, not know the language of the people with whom he is genetically tied, but if he possesses the psychological consciousness of national belonging, then he should consider his native language the language of his predecessors by blood. If such a relationship disappears, then the psychological element which is decisive in the creation and coalescence of a nation also ceases to exist. One cannot consider as real Ukrainians the over 3 million Ukrainians whose psychological bond with the Ukrainian nation has been severed. This is confirmed, as well, by the fact that 1.5 million of those Ukrainians, who consider Russian their native language, speak fluently in Ukrainian. In this instance it would be appropriate to ask the question concerning knowledge of one's native language and nationality. But stating the question in this manner is disadvantageous for the chauvinist Russian imperialists, since it would disclose their policies of colonization and racism. Official propaganda sings the praises of, encourages, and forcefully implements Russification, while calling it internationalization.

The occupiers make extensive use of this 3-million-strong corps of turncoats in its struggle against the Ukrainian people. It is from among their number that the occupying regime recruits its staff of party and governmental functionaries. They are used as informers for the KGB and for organizing various defamatory campaigns against Ukrainian patriots and cultural leaders. In other words, with the help of these renegades the occupiers create the impression that their will is also the will of the whole Ukrainian nation.

Therefore, taking into account the above, it is indispensable to determine the real number of Ukrainians in the Ukr.S.S.R. They number not 35,283,000, but only 32,266,000.

As can be seen, the losses due to spiritual ethnocide are considerable. They are frightening in that they constitute an undermining force within the nation.

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There ■ yet another interesting feature of the latest census. The data on the ethnic composition of the large cities is kept semi-secret and unavailable to the general public. The press published data on the ethnic composition by regions ■ a whole, with the exception of the city of Kiev, the capital of the Republic.

As far as the population of the city of Kiev is concerned, in 1970, 64.8% (1,057,000*) [of the inhabitants] were Ukrainians. In comparison with 1959, their number had increased by 389,000 persons, ■ that the percentage of Ukrainians in Kiev increased by 4.6%. These figures, however, must be considered questionable because, in the pursuit of propagandistic indexes, during the 1970 population census the population of the zone of suburban rural localities was added to the city of Kiev. Moreover, 238,000 (!) Ukrainians in Kiev consider Russian to be their native language. Therefore, the actual number of Ukrainians in the city of Kiev is 819,000 persons or 50.18% (!).

There are 373,000 Russians living in Kiev, and between 1959 and 1970 their number has increased by 118,000 (in 1959 there were 255,000 of them). The rapid increase in the number of Russians in Kiev is due, to ■ great extent, to artificial growth achieved through immigration. More than half of the Russians who reside in Kiev (220,000) do not speak Ukrainian (is this not proof of the "equality of rights" of all the nationalities?).

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Now we will take a quick look at the status of the ethnic minorities in Ukraine. With the exception of the Russian minority, which enjoys many more rights than the autochthonous Ukrainian population, all the other ethnic minorities are totally without cultural rights (naturally, not through the fault of Ukrainians).

Russian imperialism was cruelest in its treatment of the Crimean Tartar people, who ■■ deported from their native

* *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* [A Summary of the 1970 All-Union Population Census], Vol. 4, p. 178.

land and for 30 years now have been denied the right to return to their homeland. An act of violence unprecedented in this day and age!

There are 777,000 Jews living in Ukraine, 385,000 Byelorussians, and 295,000 Poles. These are the largest ethnic minorities in Ukraine, aside from the Russians.

Nevertheless, these minorities do not have any schools of their own, not a single newspaper, not one social or cultural association, etc. The Poles are an exception. For their 295,000 inhabitants they have two schools and one folk theater in Lviv.

It is pointless to discuss the less numerous ethnic groups.

It is not difficult to fully comprehend the results of such "equality of rights." For instance, only 13.1% of the Jews consider Yiddish their native language, only 14.0% of the Poles consider the Polish language as their own, and 37.9% of the Byelorussians name Byelorussian as their native tongue. The majority of them, with the exception of the Poles, consider Russian their native language (654,000 Jews and 206,000 Byelorussians).

A decrease in the number of the above-mentioned national minorities is evident; in 1970, ■ compared to 1959, there was ■ decrease of 63,000 Jews and 63,000 Poles.

Only the number of Russians is increasing everywhere. Thus, the ■ hideous Russification process devours everyone.

The occupiers adroitly exploit the national minorities in Ukraine for their own shameful purposes: while Russifying the national minorities, they at the same time ■ them for the Russification of Ukrainians and in doing this to set them off against that part of the Ukrainian population which is nationally conscious, thus fostering mutual hatred. This type of policy is constantly being carried out with regards to Jews and Ukrainians especially, although in recent times it has been ■ complete fiasco.

The unusually small population growth among Ukrainians in Ukraine is due to a whole set of reasons founded in the

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existence of colonial oppression. One of these reasons is the emigration of Ukrainians within the empire. Emigration under normal circumstances should result in an increase in the number of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. outside the borders of Ukraine. But let's take a look at what really happens.

According to the figures of the 1926 census, it was ascertained that 8.5 million Ukrainians lived outside the borders of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Their distribution was as follows:

R.S.F.S.R. (European part)	5,807,000
Kazakh-Siberian Kray	2,240,000
S'iry Klyn	171,000
Zeleny Klyn: Spask District	232,000
Blahovishchensk District	86,000
Total	8,536,000⁴⁸

From the data of the 1970 ████████ we see that the number of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. living outside the borders of Ukraine ████████ to 5,469,000 [distributed] as follows:

R.S.F.S.R.	3,346,000
Kazakhstan	930,000
Moldavia	507,000
Byelorussia	191,000
Uzbekistan	115,000
Kirghiz S.S.R.	120,000
Latvia	53,000
Georgia	50,000
Turkmenistan	35,000
Tadzhik S.S.R.	32,000
Estonia	28,000
Lithuania	25,000
Total	5,432,000

The other 37,000 Ukrainians live in other Republics. Thus there is an obvious decline, by 3,057,000, in the number of

Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. in 1970 as compared to 1926. If one recalls that the 1926 census did not include Ukrainians living in the Baltic Region, then the decrease is even larger.

It is evident that this decrease came about as a result of the Russification of Ukrainians. Official propaganda praises such assimilation processes ■ progressive phenomena, and considers them something natural, something which supposedly is taking place voluntarily.

But even ■ cursory acquaintance with the figures will reveal the real ■■■■■ behind the catastrophic decline of Ukrainians and the continuous increase in the number of Russians. The real ■■■■■ for this state of affairs is spiritual ethnocide.

For the sake of comparison it would be worthwhile to turn one's attention to the processes which are taking place in Ukrainian emigré communities in countries with real democracies.

At the beginning of the thirties of the present century, Ukrainians settled in the following countries of the diaspora:

U.S.A.	800,000
Canada	400,000
Brazil	80,000
Argentina	50,000
Total	1,310,000

(Here ■■■ ■■ citing data about emigrants in countries with the largest settlements.)

At the beginning of the 1960's the following changes took place among Ukrainians in the above-mentioned countries (as can be seen, the figures are somewhat dated):

U.S.A.	■ 1 million
Canada	" 700,000
Argentina	" 150,000-180,000
Brazil	" 140,000-150,000
Total	1,990,000-2,010,000

Moreover, there are Ukrainians residing in almost every Latin American country and in all the countries of Europe. The total figure in Poland is almost 300,000 persons, in Czechoslovakia over 145,000, in Rumania 70,000, in Yugoslavia 40,000, in West Germany 25,000, etc. About 50,000 live in Australia. There ■ Ukrainians living in many of the countries of Asia and Africa, but ■ do not have any data as to their numbers that is more ■ less accurate.

The U.S.A. ■ serve as a good example of the increase in Ukrainians. The last wave of Ukrainian emigrants to the U.S. took place after World War II, because emigration from the Soviet "paradise" is forbidden to Ukrainians as well as to other nationalities.

How is it that Ukrainians abroad, cut off from their native Fatherland, do not disappear, but live and flourish? Their numbers increase even though a given number of them do become assimilated. The truth of the matter is that there, in democratic countries, forced assimilation doesn't exist. Ukrainians truly feel like citizens with equal rights. They are free to acquaint themselves with the cultural heritage of the Ukrainian people and are not prevented from adding to it themselves. There, Ukrainians have the right to form Ukrainian political parties, to establish cultural societies, artists' groups, Ukrainian schools, churches, to develop Ukrainian scholarship, and to publish Ukrainian books and periodicals, etc.

The emigré writers' association *Slovo* [The Word] numbers 150 writers.

A Ukrainian Journalists' Association was founded abroad. The Shevchenko Scientific Society continues to carry on its work in New York, with ■ full members (the Society was liquidated in Ukraine in 1939 after the occupation of Lviv by the Soviet armed forces).

In the countries of the Ukrainian diaspora, Ukrainians are carrying out extensive publishing activity: the publication of the *Entsyklopediya Ukrayinoznavstva* [Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies] in eight volumes is nearing completion; the classics

of Ukrainian literature ■ being published, ■ are historical works and works of Ukrainian authors which cannot see the light of day in subjugated Ukraine; Smoloskyp Publishers of Baltimore⁴⁹ have already twice published the literary heritage of V. Symonenko; seventy-five Ukrainian magazines are published, and many more newspapers. This list could go on for pages. The press is free from censorship.

The Free Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences carries on its activities in New York; a Center for Ukrainian Studies has been established at Harvard University, the Ukrainian Free University operates in Munich, as does the Catholic University in Rome, which also houses the Museum of Ukrainian Arts.

Canadian Ukrainians have achieved great success in their political and cultural development. They ■ well represented in provincial as well as in the federal governments. The cultural and educational activities among the Ukrainian inhabitants of Canada are set up well, especially among the youth. In the Province of Manitoba alone, 106 Ukrainian schools have been established.

The World Congress of Free Ukrainians is doing an enormous job of uniting and coordinating.

The Ukrainian people outside the borders of their Motherland have won recognition and respect for themselves with their persevering and fearless work. And we are all deeply grateful to those peoples who sympathize with our cause.

The continuing achievements of Ukrainians abroad throw our oppressors into ■ horrible rage. They stop at nothing in order to besmear our sacred aspirations with lies. And so, fabrications about our activists and about Ukrainian organizations continuously appear in the Soviet press, making them out to be mercenaries in the hire of foreign intelligence services, and similar absurdities.

In truth their work is motivated by the realization of their social obligation before their own people and by ■ deep concern for the fate of the Ukrainian nation.

It will suffice to let one fact ■■■■ as an example: an 80-year-old Ukrainian immigrant in the U.S., V. Yurkovsky, donated \$100,000 (1) to the Center of Ukrainian Studies at Harvard and \$40,000 more for its publishing activities, establishing ■ special fund for this purpose. What do you call this? Selling out? It is the culminating feat of the whole life of ■ Ukrainian worker and patriot!

Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R., outside the boundaries of Ukraine, do not even have one Ukrainian school, not one Ukrainian newspaper (we have already talked about the quality of the "Ukrainian" press in Ukraine), not one cultural society, in short, they do not have anything, except lifeless propaganda slogans about equal rights.

The frequent demands made by Ukrainians for the opening of Ukrainian schools only brought them accusations of bourgeois nationalism and harassment. This is what happened in the Kuban, the Far East, Karaganda, Vorkuta, and even in Ukraine itself, in the cities of the Donbas.

In view of all the above, how blasphemous were the words that Brezhnev spoke at ■ ceremony celebrating the 50th anniversary of the U.S.S.R.: "Our Party succeeded in accomplishing that which the most-developed capitalist states, which boast about their democracy, did not and cannot accomplish. It is ■ fact that even today the national problem remains acute in the U.S.A., Canada, Belgium, not to mention Great Britain."

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On the basis of statistical materials about the ethnic composition of Kuban (now called the Krasnodarsky Kray) we will trace how the Soviet rulers effect the ethnocide of the Ukrainian people living in the U.S.S.R. but outside of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Beginning at the end of the 18th century and all the way through to the thirties of the 20th century, the Ukrainian inhabitants in Kuban constituted ■ majority. This is borne out

by all demographical data up to and including the materials of the ■■■■ population ■■■■

In 1926 the population of Kuban consisted of 58.8% Ukrainians and 34.7% Russians.*

The number of Ukrainians and Russians in Kuban's three main divisions [okruh]** were distributed in the following manner:**

DIVISIONS

	Total Population	According to Nationality		According to Language	
		Russians	Ukrainians	Russians	Ukrainians
Kuban	1,278,134	384,462 (30.01%)	850,985 (66.58%)	527,982 (41.31%)	715,222 (55.95%)
Armavir	773,720	468,288 (60.52%)	266,556 (34.45%)	672,011 (86.85%)	70,093 (9.05%)
Maykop	274,251	170,892 (62.31%)	86,003 (31.35%)	225,243 (82.13%)	33,962 (12.38%)
Total	2,326,114	1,066,535 (41.9%)	1,412,276 (55.6%)	1,527,616 (62.3%)	954,651 (37.7%)

But in such districts as Balopashin (now Cherkes), Voznesensky, Nevinomsky, Uspensk of the Armavir Division, the Ukrainian inhabitants were in the majority. Ukrainians constituted a majority in the Khadizhinsk District of the Maykop Division.

From the data of the 1926 census it can be seen that in the Chornomorsk [Black Sea] Division, which now forms part of the Krasnodarsky Kray [Kuban], the population consisted of 67.2% Ukrainians and 32.8% Russians (not counting the inhabitants of other nationalities, whose percentage is unknown).

* Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Leningrad. F. 135, op. 3, No. 287, 295.

** *Kubanskiye Stanitsy. Etnicheskiye i kulturno-bytovyye procesy na Kubani* [The Stanitsas of the Kuban: Ethnic and cultural-social processes in the Kuban]. (Moscow, Nauka [Science] Publishing House, 1967), p. 31.

In the Chornomorsk *stanytsyas*,⁶¹ which during the [redacted] census [redacted] part of the Don Division and later were included in the territory of the Krasnodarsky Kray, the population [redacted] made up of 81.3% Ukrainians and 18.7% Russians.

Up to and including the year 1938, the Ukrainians in Kuban constituted the majority; in the western part of the land, in Chornomorya, they made up 80-90% of the population.

The figures of the 1959 census show a catastrophic decline in the number of Ukrainians, down to 4.2%, and a simultaneous increase of Russians, up to 95.8% (in actual numbers, 2,742,000 Russians and 145,000 Ukrainians).

The 1970 census revealed a further decrease in the percentage of Ukrainians—down to 3.7% (in actual numbers it translates to 3,982,000 Russians and 170,000 Ukrainians).

Some Soviet "scholars" try to discredit the data of the 1926 census, as, for example, L. Chyzhykova, a fellow in the Institute of Ethnography in the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., did in her article "Zaseleniye Kubani i sovremennyye etnicheskiye protsessy" [The Settling of the Kuban and Contemporary Ethnic Processes] (*Sbornik Etnografii*, No. 6, 1963). The data of the 1959 census, on the other hand, is accepted without any reservations.

But the authenticity of the materials of the 1926 census is borne out by the history of the settlement of Kuban. The settlement of Kuban prior to the Revolution can be divided into two major periods: 1) military colonization (1792-1868);⁶² 2) free settlement by a civilian population (1868-1917). In addition, during the first period the settlement of the land was realized simultaneously through the organized resettlement of civilian inhabitants and the influx of refugees.

The first settlers in the Kuban, on a mass scale, were Ukrainians.

After the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775, part of the Kozaks crossed the Russo-Turkish border and founded the Zadunayska Sich [the Sich-beyond-the-Danube].

In 1784 at the behest of the czarist government, in order to strengthen the border with Turkey, the Kozaks were given permission to form the Kozak Army of the Buh, which in 1788 was renamed the Army of Loyal Kozaks, and were allowed to settle on the territory between the rivers Buh and Dnister. That same year this army was again renamed the Black Sea Kozak Host [Chornomorske Kozatske Viysko].

In 1792 the Black Sea Kozak Host was resettled on the lands conquered from Turkey, in the triangle between the Black and Azov Seas, on the Black Sea frontier line from the River Laba along the right bank of the River Kuban to the Sea of Azov. This army was used for the further colonization and conquest of the Caucasus.

At first, the Black Sea Kozak Host retained the military and administrative system which had existed at the Zaporozhian Sich. They founded forty *kurin*⁵³ villages (the names were taken from [Zaporozhian Kozak] *kurins*), with the military and administrative center at Katerynodar (now Krasnodar).

The czarist government allotted 30,000 square kilometers of land for the 25,000 Ukrainian Kozaks.

The Kozak army was reinforced by resettling Kozaks from the former Hetman State.⁵⁴

Later, the Budzhak Kozak Army and the Azov Kozaks were resettled in the Kuban.⁵⁵

In the years 1808-11, 1820-21, 1848-49, 77,000 persons from Left-Bank Ukraine⁵⁶ ■■■■ resettled in the Kuban. In 1832 several thousand girls from the former Hetman State ■■■■ forcefully resettled in the Kuban, in order to decrease the deficit of female inhabitants and to speed up the general increase of the population.

Two years after the first resettlement of the Ukrainian Kozaks, that part of the Don Cossacks (who ■■■ of Russian descent) which formed the Cossack Line Army of the Caucasus ("*liny-nyky*"), ■■■■ resettled to Kuban. Simultaneously with the military resettlement of Kuban, there ■■■■ a steady stream of refu-

gees, especially from Ukrainian provinces, where the population remembered the old Kozak freedoms and did not want to accept the cruel feudal system being introduced by Russian czarism. Besides, they were drawn to their brothers by blood and their former protectors—the descendants of the Zaporozhian Kozaks.

Ukrainian Kozaks settled in separate *stanytsyas*, mostly in the western part of Kuban, and did not mingle with the *liniynyky*. Russians predominated in the eastern part of Kuban. Territories beyond the Kuban were settled by Ukrainians and Russians alike, in more or less equal numbers.

All the non-military settlers — called *inohorodni*.³⁷

Among these “*inohorodni*” the majority were also Ukrainians.

The census of 1897 established the fact that one-third of the inhabitants of Kuban were born outside its borders. The majority of them, 41.16%, were born in Ukrainian provinces—Kharkiv, Poltava, Katerynoslav, Tavriya, Chernihiv⁶⁸—while a minority, 34.58%, was born in the Russian provinces of Voronezh, Kursk, Orlovsk, Tambov, and Donetsk. But, as is well known, a considerable percentage of the population in these southern chernozem provinces of Russia was also made up of Ukrainians.

The absurdity of the conclusions drawn by such “scholars” as Chyzhykova is demonstrated by still another fact. According to the 1897 census, it was established that 49.1% of the inhabitants of Kuban considered Ukrainian to be their native language (!), while only 41.8% named Russian. From this data alone one can conclude that there must have been more Ukrainians in Kuban than 49.1%, since a portion of them must have become Russified due to the chauvinistic policies of the czarist regime.

There is, therefore, no basis for doubting the veracity of the figures found in the 1926 census.

But the catastrophic drop in the Ukrainian population of Kuban demands a disclosure of the reasons behind it. First of all, there is a set of factors due to political conditions. The main factors are the following: administrative and political, psychological, and social, and the errors committed in compilation of the 1959 and 1970 censuses.

All of these factors influenced and continue to influence the ethnic makeup of the population of Kuban, throughout the existence of the Soviet regime. These factors operate inter-dependently, with separate ■■■ being singled out in any given period of time.

The annexation of a part of Kuban, with its huge and overwhelming majority of Ukrainian inhabitants, into the R.S.F.S.R. could not help but affect the level of national consciousness of the Ukrainian population.

Political conditions led to the noticeable extermination of a part of the Kozaks, especially of their military, administrative, and creative intelligentsia, and also led to its resettlement during the civil war and in the first years after the war's end into other, more remote, regions of the empire, as well as to emigration abroad. This applied to both the Ukrainian Kozaks and the Russian Cossacks. But since the Ukrainians constituted a majority, their losses were greater. Furthermore, Ukrainians were subjected to greater harassment also for the reason that the most nationally conscious part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Kuban maintained contacts with the Ukrainian People's Republic.

At that time a new military and political administration appeared in Kuban, one which ■■■ totally alien to the indigenous population. The Kuban population, being, on the whole, prosperous, became hostile towards the new Soviet order which was being forced upon them.

Although changes in political life in the first few years after the establishment of the Soviet regime in Kuban caused the above-mentioned losses, nevertheless, they did not noticeably alter the ethnic ratio. They did, however, cause ■ negative psychological resonance which was not conducive to the consolidation of the Ukrainian population.

At the end of the twenties and the beginning of the thirties, social and physical factors begin to play ■ major role in reducing the Ukrainian population of Kuban.

It was at this time that a forced ■■■ collectivization began. The population of Kuban ■■■ socially ■■■ homogeneous and

well-to-do than that in other regions of the empire (For every adult male member of a Kozak family eighteen years of age and older, there was an average allotment of 8 hectares [19.8 acres] of arable land. The allotments varied in accordance with the climatic zone—smaller in the south and larger in the north.), and put up a desperate resistance against collectivization.

The peculiarity of the class struggle in Kuban consisted in the fact that it was waged, on the one hand, between a majority of the population hostile to Soviet rule and, on the other, a minority of the land-poor *inohorodni*, who enjoyed the support of the Red Army units and the workers' military detachments. This led to mass *rozkurkulennya*⁵⁹ and the deportation of the population to Siberia and other remote regions.

In the monograph *Kubanskiye stanitsy*, the authors, in writing about the period of collectivization, are forced to admit:

Some of the intensification of the class struggle also resulted from the fact that during the implementation of collectivization, the principle of free choice on the question of joining a kolkhoz was often violated, while in dealing with the middle peasant, measures were often used which were excusable only in dealing with the kulak problem, i.e., confiscation of property, deprivation of suffrage rights, and deportation to remote lands. All this led to the fact that in Kuban there was a greater percentage of those who were taken off their land and exiled.

Most of those deported (sometimes entire *stanytsyas*) were Ukrainian. Thus from the "Poltava" *stanytsya*, one of the largest in the Black Sea Region, a *stanytsya* which had its origin in and name from the Poltava *kurin* on the Zaporozhian Sich, all of the Kozak inhabitants were deported; the *stanytsya* was renamed "Krasnoarmeysk" [Red Army] and repopulated with newcomers from Russia's central provinces and from the Urals. Many such examples could be cited.

To the physical factor in the decrease of the Ukrainian population in Kuban one must add the artificially created mass

famine of 1932-33, similar to the ■■■ in Ukraine.

Whole *stanytsyas* died out and the country turned into ■ wasteland. The depopulated *stanytsyas* ■■■ repopulated with emigrants from Stavropolsky Kray, Central Russia, and the Urals. In 1933 from the just-mentioned areas came 500 families to the Medvediv *stanytsya*, 200 families to the Troytsya *stanytsya*, 136 families to the Staro-Myshastiv, and so on, into all the *stanytsyas* of Western Kuban, which was formerly ■ wholly Ukrainian ■■■ in its ethnic composition. From this list alone one can get a fairly good idea of the extent of the devastation caused by the famine. Naturally, not ■ word of truth about this famine, the reasons behind it, and the number of its victims appeared in any Soviet periodicals or scholarly publications. Nor is this horrible period depicted in the "socialist realism" of Soviet literature. Even the 1939 census data on the Krasnodarsky Kray has not been published. The falsifiers from the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. have the following to say about this tragedy:

Major difficulties ■■■ encountered in the building of the kolkhoz [*kolhosp*] system, difficulties which were skillfully taken advantage of by the kulaks [*kurkuls*] in 1932-33, when they mounted ■ last assault against the kolkhozes. Striving to organize mass sabotage, the kulaks seized upon the occasion of ■ poor harvest, hid all the available grain, and then spread the provocative rumor among the population that all those who had any grain would be shot and that in order to save themselves they should hide this grain. . . . Large stores of grain were uncovered at that time, while all around people were dying of starvation.

It is quite easy to refute this brazen lie because, first of all, the collectivization in such bread-producing regions as Kuban and Ukraine had, on the whole, been completed by the end of 1932. Secondly, before the end of the collectivization period, the *kurkuls* were already in exile and were breaking in the forested gorges of Siberia. The confiscation of their possessions and their

deportation were calculated to make a psychological impression on the rest of the population and to help herd it into the *kolhosps*. In the third place, the famine ■■■ about not as a result of ■ poor harvest in 1932, but because all of the grain had been requisitioned by the government. And so the famine raged in the winter and early spring of 1933. Those peasants who survived did not have the strength to harvest the grain in 1933 and for this purpose the regime ■■■ forced to engage the urban population. And fourthly, the famine was created artificially to undermine the strength of the largest non-Russian nation in the empire, a nation which had taken energetic steps towards the creation of its own national state. This was something which stood in the way of the creators of the new Red Russian empire. That part of the Ukrainian people which lived in Kuban was not bypassed by these processes.

Along with the physical genocide of the Ukrainian people, the thirties were marked with the beginning of the implementation of spiritual genocide, which continues to the present time.

In the twenties and at the beginning of the thirties, a partial "Ukrainianization" was initiated in Kuban and in other ethnically Ukrainian territories, as well ■ in Ukraine, through the efforts of the government of the Ukr.S.S.R. Ukrainian primary schools were founded, as were reading rooms and libraries, and the regional newspaper *Krasnoye znamya* [The Red Banner] from time to time carried a page in Ukrainian.

In the thirties, starting in 1933, the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Kuban, accused as it was of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, was totally liquidated. Ukrainian libraries and reading rooms were destroyed. The local newspaper stopped printing its Ukrainian page. Between 1933 and 1937, all 746 Ukrainian primary schools were turned into Russian schools.

Today the Ukrainian population in Kuban does not have its own schools, press, literature, theater, etc. It is deprived of its own intelligentsia, without which ■ nation is doomed to spiritual poverty. Everything has been replaced by its Russian counterpart. The education of the upcoming generations, beginning in nursery schools and all the way to the institutions of higher

education, is carried out in a spirit of Russian chauvinism. In educational institutions, in governmental and economic establishments, present-day officialdom reacts to the Ukrainian language with hostility. Any efforts of individual enthusiasts to change this terrible state of affairs are met with rabid opposition from the authorities and bring repressive persecution.

Spiritual genocide is behind the high degree of Russification of the Ukrainian population in Kuban. It has contributed even more to the emergence of national passivity and to an unusually low level of national consciousness. A lack of national consciousness such as this often leads to confusion over ethnic labels, which has led to an artificial decrease of the Ukrainian population in Kuban, as established by the censuses of 1959 and 1970. It should be noted that the psychological factor and the factor of inaccuracy in determining national belonging were fundamental during the last two censuses, in contrast to the 1939 census, in which the physical factor was the most important in this decrease.

Thus, part of the Ukrainians in Kuban considered themselves "Kozaks," and during the [redacted] used this term in reply to the question about their nationality. A part of the Russians called themselves "cossacks" [*kazak*]. For the Russians the term "cossack" reflected their class membership, while [for the Ukrainians] "Kozak" is an ethnic term, inasmuch as throughout the whole history of the Zaporozhian Sich the Kozaks played the role of representatives and protectors of the national interests of the Ukrainian people. The resettlement of the Kozaks to Kuban took place at a time when the term "Ukrainian" had not yet attained absolute recognition everywhere and by everyone as the term designating membership in the Ukrainian nationality. This happened much later, when the Muscovite Realm transformed itself into the Russian Empire and the term "Ukrainian" began to play the role of a barrier against Russification. Separated from the roots of their own nation and from its struggles for liberation, the Ukrainian Kozaks in Kuban, nevertheless, preserved the ethnic [redacted] of "Kozak."

The term "*rusky*" has gone through an analogous process. Ukrainians, usually the descendants of civilian settlers and refugees from Ukraine, also used this term during censuses to designate their nationality. The terms "*rusky*" and "*rusky*"⁶⁰ do not have anything in common. Everyone knows that Ukrainians in Halychyna [Galicia] and Zakarpattya [Transcarpathia] called themselves "*rusky*" till the end of the 19th century and even at the beginning of the 20th.

Nevertheless, during census taking the terms "Kozak" and "cossack" [kazak], "*rusky*" and "*rusky*" were merged into one concept—*rusky* [Russian].

In the instructions to the 1926 census it suggested that the term "*rusky*" be used as a collective concept for Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians. During the 1959 and 1970 censuses the term *rusky* totally displaced the concept "*velykorus*" [Great Russian], but it also stopped playing its former collective role.

A. S. Beshkovych writes: "Some staff members of the militia did the census a disservice when, at the beginning of the thirties, in issuing passports to a portion of the population, they often wrote "*rusky*" under the column for nationality, not understanding the local ethnic terminology."

It is hard to believe that such behavior on the part of the militia staff was a result of their slow-wittedness; it is more likely that this falsification was done purposely, since similar instances were very widespread not only in Kuban (on the Zeleny Klyn almost all Ukrainians, in analogous incidents, were written down as "*rusky*" in reference to their nationality).

"If in spite of all of this, the 1959 census, nevertheless, registered 3.9% of the inhabitants as Ukrainian, this can be explained to a great extent by the fact that those Ukrainians must have come to Kuban from Ukraine shortly before the taking of the census and had Ukrainian passports, on which it was indicated that they were 'Ukrainian'. These Ukrainians settled around the region evenly." (A. S. Beshkovych).

As an honest scholar and longstanding researcher of Kuban, A. S. Beshkovych criticized such "scholars" as Chyzhykova and

others like her in his talk before the Geographical Society in Leningrad in 1964. He warned:

I would like to caution the members of this complex expedition of the Institute of Ethnography, who have been studying the customs and culture of the Krasnodarsky Kray, ■ the probable authors of the monograph of this expedition, against the uncritical use of defective demographical sources, ■ well as against hasty conclusions as to the ethnical integration of the population.

The process of integration is complex and lengthy. If during the taking of the census, the people for ■■■■ reason use the ethnic designation of another people, that does not necessarily ■■■■ that they have lost their [national] character, their language, their style of cultivating the land, their customs, and their culture. In Kuban this process is in its incipient stages. On the whole, the errors of the census can be corrected by a detailed study of the customs and linguistic features of the Kuban population.

At this time, the ■■■■ is very quickly replacing the old in culture and in customs. But this innovation is not new only for the Ukrainians, but for the Russians, and for other peoples as well, and not only in Kuban . . . the process of development is above any national considerations.

How did the associates of the Institute of Ethnography of the U.S.S.R. react to the comments of this outstanding scholar?

In the monograph *Kubanskiye stanitsy*, published in 1967, more than half of which was written by Chyzyhkova (180 pages out of 354), the authors strive to justify the Russification policies used in Kuban.

Already in the foreword Chyzyhkova pounces on A. S. Beshkovych: "A. S. Beshkovych endeavors to prove that in the pre-revolutionary years in Kuban there always was ■ steady predominance of the Ukrainian population over the Russian." This

is what disturbs these "scholars," whose task is not to make honest scientific investigations but to deliberately distort the facts. Chyzhykova goes on to say: "Historians do not have at their disposal conclusive figures about the numerical relationship between the Ukrainians and the Russians in Kuban. . . . It is doubtful whether the conclusion of dialectological and ethnographical maps published before the Revolution can be used for appraising the quantitative relationship between the Ukrainian and Russian ethnical components in the various districts of Kuban." Here we also find unprovoked attacks against the pre-revolutionary historian of Kuban, F. Shcherbyna: "The research of this author, one who held a reactionary point of view, merits a particularly critical appraisal." As it is known, he was criticized by Lenin himself (!) and, naturally, the gods are infallible.

Everything that compromises the contemporary Russian imperialistic chauvinists is discarded or distorted.

Disregarding the fact that there is an overwhelming amount of documented materials about the predominating number of Ukrainians in pre-revolutionary Kuban, the "scholars" of the Institute of Ethnography of the U.S.S.R. strive to deny this and have even cast doubt on the veracity of the figures of the 1926 census.

Well then, let's disclose the "scientific" positions which they have taken up and how, without even noticing it, they themselves deny those conclusions which they are trying to prove.

Thus in the above-mentioned monograph the very same Chyzhykova writes: "The study of historical data dealing with the settlement of the northwestern regions of Kuban during the 18th and 19th centuries reveals that settlers from the provinces of Katerynoslav, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, and Kiev predominated here." But further on: "In 1897, 41.8% of the inhabitants of the Kuban Region considered Russian as their native tongue and 49.1%, the Ukrainian language." Despite all that has been said, it is worthwhile to take note of a small but meaningful detail: everywhere in the text, Chyzhykova, without exception, puts *russky* first and *ukrainsky* in second place.

"The figures obtained on the basis of the 1959 census," Chyzhykova continues, "basically give an accurate picture of the

state of the national consciousness of the inhabitants of the districts under investigation."

From the above-given quotes it is evident how Chyzhykova contradicts herself. After all, the matter under consideration was not the level of national consciousness and the census simply did not investigate this aspect. What was being determined was national membership, but to have it done objectively, appropriate informational work among the population and a well-intentioned approach to this matter of great responsibility were needed.

Conclusions ■ to the "objectivity" of the figures given in the 1959 census can be drawn even with the help of some of the materials published in the above-mentioned monograph.

There we can read: "In determining nationality the decisive factor for them is the place of birth or the district of prolonged residence." Further on, examples are given, probably to make it more convincing: "My father and mother were born in Ukraine, I consider myself *ruscky*, ■ I was born in Kuban (how could this unfortunate man know that the territory of Kuban is in no way Russian—author's note); in addition, I call myself Kuban; my ■ are *ruskys*," relates I. K. Litvinov. . . . H. M. Hubenko says: 'I was born in the province of Poltava . . . my father brought me to Kuban when I was eight. According to my passport I am at this time a *ruscky*. ■ don't consider myself Ukrainian, since I have lived in Kuban for so many years.'

Let's not judge these people, confused and maimed as they are by cruel national oppression. Instead let's ask those titled "scientists" from the Ethnographical Institute: And how many million fewer "*ruskys*" would there be if the very same criteria were used to determine their nationality ■ ■ used, for instance, for establishing the nationality of Ukrainians in Kuban or in the Far East? And is it only the Ukrainians? For it is a fact that tens of millions of "*ruskys*" "were born," continue to be born, and "reside for ■ prolonged period of time"⁶¹ on the usurped territories of others.

And despite all this, the nationally and politically ignorant Ukrainian element in Kuban has not lost its basic ethnic characteristics. Even the authors of the above-mentioned tenden-

tious monograph are forced to admit this, despite their chauvinistic persuasion. Here is what they write about folklore influences:

In the New Year's poetry of Kuban, Ukrainian forms predominate. This is evidenced by the proliferation of the *shchedrivky* [Epiphany carols] throughout Kuban, seen by the investigators as typically Ukrainian forms of carols. In the prevalent Ukrainian New Year's poetry one can observe not only its recent influence in Kuban itself, but also the much earlier influences of the Ukrainian New Year's poetry, which V. I. Chycherev considers "comparatively more diversified in content and imagery and much newer in its quality," on the New Year's poetry of the Southern Great Russian regions, from which came the settlers of Kuban.

At the present time, caroling in Kuban is a joyous pastime or game, enjoyed mostly by the children.

In the Black Sea *stanytsyas* the songs of Ukrainian poets ■ preferred. . . . Less popular in Kuban are the songs which have originated in the cities and the *chastushka*. . . .⁶²

The *chastushka* in the Kuban, now as before, does not have a prominent place in the repertoire of the younger and middle generations, not to mention the older generation, of kolkhoz workers of Kuban. . . .

Many of the inhabitants of the *stanytsyas* recall that in the thirties the settlers (from Russia—author's note) sang *chastushkas* walking down the streets. Presently these have been forgotten by them and their children.

The settlers from other regions of Russia, the same as the *inogorodniye*, representing as to their composition a non-permanent group of inhabitants, accepted, ■ ■ rule, the culture of the local population, which, in contrast, made up the permanent and numerically greater contingent of the *stanytsyas'* settlers.

Even the already-mentioned Chyzykova is forced to admit that:

... In separate aspects of life of the population, in the western as well as in the eastern districts, the influence of Ukrainian traditional culture—in the type of dwelling (the manner of construction, the interior plan of the living area), in the clothes worn (the cut of the *sharavary*,⁶⁸ the way their shirts, the type of belts worn by the women), in the food (the widespread popularity of such dishes as *varenyky* and *halushky*), etc.—manifested itself with special markedness. The more permanent preservation of Ukrainian ethnographical characteristics in the dwellings and in several other facets of daily life, in comparison with those found in Southern Russia, should be explained, obviously, by the history of Kuban's settlement.

But her chauvinistic fanaticism leads Chyzykova to the following conclusion:

A constant stream of settlers from other regions of the country, with a significant number of Russians, the annexation of Kuban into the Russian Federation (didn't the German national-fascists excuse the *anschluss* of Austria on the same grounds? [author's note]), school education in the Russian language (isn't the liquidation of a Ukrainian school a "joyous" event for Ukrainians? [author's note]), the spread of more progressive social forms of culture (let's give the author a helping hand: "international" [forms of culture], which translated into the language of those who put into practice Lenin's policies on nationalities in the empire means "Russian" [author's note]) in the period of the building of the Communist society, and many other reasons (it's better not to mention these, because it could be frightening [author's note]), lead not only to a closer drawing together but also to a consolidation of the various groups of the Russian and Ukrainian population in Kuban (just

how the Ukrainian population is being "consolidated" the reader can well imagine ■ the basis of all that has been said up to ■■ [author's note]).

It's probably impossible to reach ■ higher degree of cynicism and hypocrisy.

We will be benevolent and will not wish upon the Russians such ■ consolidation, because ■ do not want to find ourselves in the shoes of people like Chyzhykova.

In our account we cite a considerable number of quotes and figures in order to prove that the artificial decrease of the Ukrainian population in Kuban during the taking of the census ■ is not ■ innocent mistake. This purposeful falsification is done in order to hide the Ukrainians behind ■ Russian label and thus deny the justification for demands for national equal rights and the cultural development of the Ukrainians in Kuban. This is, therefore, only one link in the complex chain of ethnocide carried out against the Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. We have also revealed how the Soviet science of lies and hypocrisy, based ■ class and party orientation and motivated by socialist chauvinism, strives to justify the rapacious national policy of the CPSU.

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The status of Ukrainians in other parts of the empire where they are subjected to complete national discrimination, is no better than in Kuban.

Moldavia, for instance, can serve as a good illustration. Ukrainians living there number 507,000, considerably ■■ than the number of Russians (414,000), but all schools except those which are Moldavian are exclusively Russian, without regard to the fact that Ukrainians there are compactly settled.

And so it is that Russian schools are also intended for Ukrainians and Moldavians.

Although during Shelest's administration the CPU [Communist Party of Ukraine] conducted talks with Moldavian leaders about the possibility of establishing Ukrainian schools, nothing, ■ ■ well know, came out of this.

And such spiritual coercion reigns everywhere. No wonder then that in 1970, out of 5,469,000 Ukrainians living in the U.S.S.R. outside the borders of Ukraine, 2,799,000 named Russian ■ their native language. That is ■■ than 50%. The level of Russification has reached that high!

The policy of discrimination on the basis of nationality can in no way ■■ to strengthen the bonds of friendship and mutual understanding among peoples; on the contrary, it engenders national antagonism and often gives rise to ■ pathological hostility. Russian chauvinism is to blame for this.

Summing up all that we have said so far, we end this section with the words of an outstanding Ukrainian philologist and philosopher, O. Potebnya, written almost one hundred years ago:

Language is not only ■■ of the basic components of nationality but also its most perfect image. . . . If it were possible to unite all mankind under one language and in general into one nationality, this would be the destruction of human creative thinking. This would be the same as the substitution of the five senses/ by ■ single one, even if this ■■ were sight rather than touch. To exist man needs other people and ■ nationality needs other nationalities. Consistent nationalism is internationalism. . . . Denationalization amounts to rudeness, to a moral sickness; to the incomplete use of the available resources of perception, of mastery, and of persuasion; to the weakening of the energy of thought; to ■■ abominable desolation in place of the ousted yet unreplaced forms of consciousness; to the weakening of bonds in the upcoming generations, bonds which have been replaced by weak ties to foreign generations; to the disorganization of society, immorality, and villainy.

. . . A nationality devoured by another nationality, after ■■ immeasurable loss of its strength, will still, in the end, bring the latter ■■ ■■ disintegration.

We took this quote from the original, which is in Russian, since at that time in the czarist Russian empire the use of the

Ukrainian language ■■■ forbidden, and although at present there is no such official prohibition, nevertheless, to print such words today would be unthinkable, because they ■■ ■■■ ■■■ applicable today in the Soviet Russian empire than they ■■■ a hundred years ago. Only the form of national oppression has changed; the oppression itself has remained and has become more cruel than it ■■■ before.

THE GENERAL POGROM

THE GENERAL [REDACTED]

"Summing up the heroic accomplishments of the past half-century, we have more than sufficient grounds to say that the national question in the form that [REDACTED] inherited from the past has been settled fully, settled definitively and irrevocably." (L. Brezhnev).

How this question continues to be settled by the CPSU, although Brezhnev states unconditionally that it has been irrevocably settled once and for all, [REDACTED] will show in this section by citing concrete facts.

1. [REDACTED] Policy of Total Russification.

The policy of Russification of the non-Russians in the U.S.S.R. has always been an integral part of the CPSU's internal policy. But in the last few years it has become even more intensified.

The Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU can be considered the beginning of a new stage in the nationalities policy of the U.S.S.R.—a stage of total Russification. This congress fully de-[REDACTED] the name "the Congress of Chauvinists and Russifiers." Therefore, we will restrict ourselves exclusively to illuminating those events in Ukraine which followed this congress.

In Brezhnev's report to the Congress we find the "theoretical" justification for the policy of Russification. A newfangled "theory" about the emergence of a "new community—the Soviet people" has appeared on the scene, and once again, for the nth time, the ever-growing role of all that is Russian is emphasized under the guise of internationalism.

Against the general background of the intensification of terror during the post-Congress period, the assault against the national Republics stands out especially.

Taking into account the Ukr.S.S.R.'s important role in the economic might of the Russian empire, the main thrust has been directed against Ukraine.

Guided by the general policy [REDACTED] the nationality question outlined at the Congress, the Party and the KGB began to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] specific, practical action.

Already in November, at the plenary meeting of the CC

CPSU, the Secretary of the Lviv Regional Committee of the CPU, Kutsevol, reported on the work of the regional party organization. In a resolution adopted at the meeting, efforts toward the international and atheistic education of the population were termed inadequate. Suslov made the motion for the removal of Kutsevol from the post of the First Secretary of the Regional Committee. Only the intercession on his behalf by the First Secretary of the CPU, P. Shelest, allowed Kutsevol to temporarily remain in his position. Why was the first blow directed against the Lviv Region? Because due to certain historical circumstances, the western regions of Ukraine are the least Russified.⁶⁵ Moreover, Lviv is the main scientific, cultural, and industrial center of Western Ukraine.

It should be noted that no mention whatsoever was made in the Soviet press about the above-mentioned resolution. After the plenum a campaign was conducted among party activists, during which a confidential letter from the CC CPSU was read. The letter stressed the allegation that Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists in their subversive activities were exploiting the Ukrainian language as a means of nationalistic propaganda. Furthermore, it was explained that insistent demands for the use of the Ukrainian language in government offices, educational institutions, and in places of employment should be considered a manifestation of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. As can be seen, the forced introduction of the Russian language is not considered Russian nationalism. The Party calls this "internationalism."

Gradually, an intense press campaign was mounted, no longer directed against so-called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, but against nationalistic tendencies, national narrow-mindedness, and against outdated national customs. An avalanche of party resolutions and directives poured down to subordinate organizations, to educational, and scientific institutions, etc. Then a massive wave of arrests swept the ranks of the progressive intelligentsia. There were mass dismissals from work among the creative and scholarly intelligentsia, and purges among students. The scum of society was beginning to show its ugly head.

The KGB completely slipped out from under the control of the CPU leadership. The number of KGB men and undercover agents increased sharply.

The head of the Republic's KGB, Fedorchuk, fired off reports to Moscow, [charging] that the leadership of the CPU was not helping the KGB in carrying out its work effectively. Shcherbytsky and Malanchuk, pursuing their careerist ambitions, tried to convince Moscow's Politburo that P. Shelest was a nationalistic deviationist. Under such circumstances, the CC CPSU saw Shelest as an obstacle to the implementation of their pogrom policy in Ukraine.

2. The Purge of Party Cadres of the CPU.

The Kremlin overlords did not dare to carry out in one fell swoop a mass purge of the liberal-minded cadres within the party leadership in Ukraine, which were led by P. Shelest. This could have brought undesirable repercussions, since P. Shelest had the support of the majority of the first secretaries of the regional committees of the Party, among whom only three were openly hostile: Dekhtyaryov in Donetsk, Dobryn in Ivano-Frankivsk, and Vatchenko in Dnipropetrovsk. All the anti-Shelest men were led by Shcherbytsky.

The situation was made even more complicated for Moscow by the fact that P. Shelest, as a member of the Moscow Politburo, was supported by a number of party leaders in the national Republics, particularly in Georgia, Moldavia, and in others.

Therefore Moscow chose the old and tried route of underhandedness. P. Shelest was urgently summoned by a telephoned telegram to attend a meeting of the Politburo. This happened a few hours before it was to convene. The atmosphere in the Politburo was charged with open hostility towards Shelest (He was even offered the "penal" chair, that is, the one which is reserved for those who attend the meeting for the last time. Such is the ritual.). He informed that he would take on the duties of a Deputy Prime Minister. Shelest was accused of provincialism and national narrow-mindedness, which allegedly had given rise to a nationalistic movement in Ukraine. Upon leaving the conference room, Shelest remarked to his aides:

"Everything is finished." At this same meeting Brezhnev turned to Shcherbytsky and said: "Go and take on the functions of the First Secretary." Shelest was not allowed to leave Moscow. Apparently the members of the Politburo feared that he might call a plenum of the CPU, which of itself could have been sensational, although this was highly unlikely.

In fact, Shelest's secret Moscow arrest began at that time.

Immediately after his return from Moscow, Shcherbytsky introduced himself to the proper party functionaries as the First Secretary of the CPU, although all of this was done in an atmosphere of complete secrecy. Shcherbytsky was formally "elected" First Secretary at a plenum of the CPU on May 25, 1973. Shelest was not allowed to attend this plenum.

Throughout the second half of 1972 and in the first months of 1973 various slanderous rumors were being circulated against Shelest, accusing him of fostering the growth of corruption in the Republic. The following fact is typical of what went on: Two anti-Jewish pogroms were organized by the KGB in March and May of 1972 near the synagogue in Kiev, actions which Shelest's enemies in the CPU leadership and the KGB tried to use for their foul purposes. They spread rumors among the Jewish population that Shelest was the initiator of these pogroms. At the same time, in an attempt to stir up a wave of anti-Semitism among the Ukrainians, the KGB spread the myth that the Jews were allegedly demanding the creation of an autonomous Jewish republic in Ukraine, at the very time that Jews were actually demanding the right to freely emigrate to Israel and to have their national and cultural needs satisfied. Nevertheless, this time the plans of the chauvinists were thwarted; they failed to drive a wedge between Jews and Ukrainians, to start, in this way, a wave of antagonism between them.

After Shelest's deportation out of Ukraine there began a massive purge of party cadres. One after the other, Shelest's supporters in the CC CPU and the regional committees were removed. One of the first to be ousted from his post was Ovcharenko, the CC CPU's Secretary for ideological matters. In his place, Brezhnev and Suslov demanded the appointment of a

known Ukrainophobe and fierce Russian chauvinist, the careerist V. Malanchuk (this happened just after he had ■ audience with Brezhnev and Suslov). The First Secretary of the Regional Committee of Poltava, Muzhytsky, ■ sent into retirement and replaced by Morhun, the former cadres inspector of the CC CPU (a KGB position). In passing, we want to mention that the Poltava Region is the least Russified of the regions of Left-Bank Ukraine.

A whole series of retirements, various job transfers, and "promotions" like the one Shelest received went into effect. The purge went into full swing after the April 1973 plenum of the CPU, which focused on cadres. In 1973 the Higher Party School of the CC CPU ■ dealt ■ really devastating blow. Thirty-four of its lecturers were fired, among them Chykalyuk, the head of the school. A number of students were dropped from the rolls and the whole curriculum was reworked anew with a full turn towards dogmatism.

At the regional, city, and district committee levels of the Party, 25% of the secretaries in charge of ideology matters were replaced.

At the Politburo in Moscow voices were heard to even expel Shelest from the Party completely and to subject him to severe censure in the press. The proponents of unobtrusive action won. After the April plenum of the CC CPSU Shelest was sent into "retirement." At present, he is under house arrest and the KGB is keeping ■ strict watch on members of his family.

At the so-called party activists' meetings, Shelest was put up for censure for "nationalistic" deviations. In general, inter-party information has lately been subjected to severe control and reaches down only as far as the leaders of the district committees, in the form of instructions as to practical tasks to be performed; then the circle closes. The party masses are fed only general declarative statements. In the opinion of the ruling party clique, the rank-and-file party members should not know what goes on in the "first circle."

One of the last of Shelest's Mohicans to fall was Kutsevol, the First Secretary of the Regional Committee of Lviv. He went ■

the end of 1973. It is not entirely clear why Kutsevol had lasted ■ long, comparatively speaking, since it ■■ he who sustained the first blows meted out by the central den.

At the personal directive of Brezhnev, Kutsevol's place was taken by Dobryk, the former First Secretary of the Regional Committee of Ivano-Frankivsk, ■ zealous Russifier, an adherent of the KGB's cruel activities, and a careerist.

At one of the first meetings of the Executive of the Regional Committee of the Party, in December 1973, Dobryk declared that the Party had assigned him to this post to rectify the mistakes that the previous leadership of the regional committee had allowed. The new Secretary emphasized that the Lviv Regional Committee had not really been following the resolutions of the April plenum of the CC CPU with respect to selection and assignment of cadres, and that his predecessor had limited himself more to verbal pronouncements.

In characterizing Shelest and his adherents, Dobryk stressed that serious errors had been made in the ■■ of the training of cadres in Ukraine, that through Shelest's fault there were deviations from the party line with regards to the internationalist education of workers (read, "Russification") in the Republic and that if it had not been for the decisive actions of the CC CPU, within the next few years there could have been in Ukraine a recurrence of the Czechoslovakian situation of 1968; furthermore, Shelest paralyzed the work of the Council of Ministers of the Ukr.S.S.R. and had behaved insufferably towards Shcherbytsky. He illustrated this with an example: One time Shelest had asked Shcherbytsky why he was not allocating enough funds for various kinds of publishing activities and for the printing of books. After Shcherbytsky's answer that the allocation of funds here is centralized (that is, came from Moscow) and that, moreover, enough was being allotted, Shelest called Shcherbytsky an ignoramus and declared that Shcherbytsky just didn't want to work.

Dobryk did not forget to remind everyone how he had been warned in the CC CPU to mind his own business when he had objected to the showing of the movie *Bily ptakh z chornoyu*

oznakoyu [The White Bird with a Black Sign], but that he, Dobryk, had remained an unerring Communist and had denounced this thrust against him before the Politburo of the CC CPSU.

It is noteworthy that the purge of party cadres in Ukraine — numerically the highest in all of the U.S.S.R. It can be compared only to the purges of the thirties. In contrast to the purges of the thirties, however, it is even more markedly anti-Ukrainian in character and is being carried out in an atmosphere of strict secrecy under the guise of staff reshufflings, retirements, removal from top positions due to ■ health, a campaign against corruption, etc. The real reasons ■ being painstakingly hidden from the general public.

3. The Prohibition of Ukrainian Scholarship and Culture.

The Persecution of ■ Intelligentsia.

Throughout the whole Soviet period, Ukrainian culture could not and did not develop freely. Even during Khrushchev's era of the thaw the processes of forcible Russification never ceased. But what is happening in Ukraine at this time cannot be compared to any other period before 1971.

The direction taken is towards a total all-encompassing Russification, thought out to the most minute detail.

Everything possible is done to amputate the people's memory of history, to destroy their language and culture. To describe all of this would take many volumes. We do not have the opportunity to do so. Therefore, we will try to describe these processes as laconically ■ possible, characterizing only the general tendencies of the occupational terror; for ■ better understanding of the political situation in Ukraine, we will cite numerous facts of malfeasance.

What is characteristic is that the repressions are differential; at the present the main thrust is directed against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. No longer are large masses of people being sent indiscriminately to concentration camps, as was done during Stalin's time. The leadership of the CPSU has decided to carry

out spiritual ethnocide through the liquidation of the nationally conscious intelligentsia. All intellectuals are kept under KGB surveillance with the aid of ■ army of undercover agents, who ■ without fail present in every organization. Those whose "loyalty is doubtful" are kept under constant watch, which includes the tapping of telephones and surveillance by other electronic devices, and scrutiny of their correspondence. This type of surveillance ■ go ■ for ■ long period of time, in order to uncover as many contacts of the suspects ■ possible.

The active defenders of the national rights of Ukrainians and the disseminators of the *samoydav* are thrown into prisons and concentration camps. An analysis of many of the cases tried behind closed doors has confirmed the fact that information obtained from eavesdropping forms the basis for proof of guilt at the trials. False witnesses, who are acquainted ahead of time by the KGB with the surveillance materials that have been collected, are formally presented for this purpose. In the last two years there has not been one instance of ■ political trial held behind closed doors in which the court found the accused not guilty, with the exception of those who bought their way out of concentration camp sentences with betrayal.

In almost every case the duration of the investigation extended far beyond the limit prescribed by the Criminal Code. This is done ■ that those who ■ physically and spiritually weaker can be broken by the use of blackmail and provocations and coerced into betrayal of the principles of justice—recantations and slanderous letters [implicating others]. In this way, people who were not involved in active work and against whom there is no proof which can be used to send them to prison for ■ term determined by the KGB, yet whom the KGB find intolerable, are cast into psychiatric murder wards. Poets who do not wish to go against their own conscience often find themselves there. Just being acquainted with political prisoners is enough to lose one's job.

A thorough reexamination is being made of Ukraine's historical and literary heritage. Ukrainian historical research has been banned. Scholarly establishments are now busy manufacturing all kinds of forgeries, whose role is to distort and eradicate

Ukrainian history. Those scholars who do not agree with this state of affairs are unceremoniously thrown out of such establishments. The same situation exists in all the other social sciences.

A complete retreat has been made from the principle of class orientation in evaluating the past. Now everything is examined through the prism of imperialistic Russian chauvinism.

We have already discussed the general characteristics of the Party's position in these matters in the first part of this work. Specific instructions are prepared by the ideological branch of the CC and by the KGB, and are then put into practice through the organs of censorship, the leadership of creative arts societies and the administrators of educational institutions, all of which have completely turned into separate sections of the KGB—sections of spiritual terror. But all this is carefully hidden from the general public.

The Ukrainian language is persecuted as never before. The Institute of Linguistics, under the pretext of scholarship, is doing everything to legitimize the mutilation of the Ukrainian language through littering with Russicisms, changes in the rules of orthography, etc.

You will not find an explicit law prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian language; in theory it even has equal status. But it is enough for a student to ask a lecturer to present the material in Ukrainian in order to be suspected of Ukrainian nationalism and dismissed from the institute. And at a public lecture a similar request will attract the attention of the KGB who are always present at such meetings. Such a request is reason enough for a person to be placed under close surveillance. The lecturer will fall back on the fact that "Lenin spoke in Russian." He will continue speaking in Russian, because he knows only too well what he is being paid for, and that otherwise this lecture will be his last.

The Ukrainian language is being forced out under all kinds of pretexts. In this manner, for example, all-Union centralization has reached new heights. Recently almost all of the ministries of the Republic have been turned into all-Union ministries. This

has provided the excuse for conducting and writing everything in the ministries in Russian and to demand the same from all other agencies accountable to them.

In Ukraine almost all courses of specialization and for professional advancement have been made all-Union. And again we have the Russian language.

A group of students from another republic is sent to a given institute—lectures, therefore, have to be given in Russian.

Until 1971, 25% of the courses in the institutes of Western Ukraine, in general, were taught in Ukrainian, but in the last three years their number has dropped to 15% and the figure for the entire Republic is, on the whole, very meager.

For instance, courses in Ukrainian literature at the University of Dnipropetrovsk are taught in Russian. Lately, in the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, only Professor Voytko, the chairman of the Department of Philosophy, gave his lectures in Ukrainian. He was dismissed from the institute a year ago.

The Minister of Higher and Secondary Special Education, Dadenkov, who, guided by directives from Shelest's CPU administration, tried to do something in the direction of the "Ukrainianization" of institutions of higher learning, was replaced by Yefimenko, who himself never speaks the Ukrainian language.

During one of the meetings of the Politburo of the CPU in 1973, a secret resolution was adopted to the effect that all scholarly journals still published either in Ukrainian or those coming out simultaneously in Russian and Ukrainian, would be gradually converted to Russian.

On March 14, 1974, a meeting of the members of the staffs of institutions of higher education of the Republic was held in Kiev. Present at the meeting were the rectors of these institutions and the secretaries of their party committees, as well as top representatives of the CC CPU, the Council of Ministers of the Ukr.S.S.R., and regional committees of the Party. The meeting was conducted in Russian. The tone for the meeting was set by V. Malanchuk, who emphasized that it was necessary to strive to implement the educational process in Russian everywhere, because the Russian language, supposedly, is one of the principal signs of internationalism. Furthermore, he reminded everyone

that from the very same rostrum ■ few years ago his predecessors had given completely opposite instructions. But the Party has corrected these deviations (at that moment, Skaba left the meeting).

In January of 1974 Malanchuk met in Kiev with Tomaszewski, the Consul General of the Polish People's Republic, and demanded that the censorship of all Ukrainian publishing activity in Poland be tightened.

A programmed, pogrom-like article published in the April 1973 issue of *Komunist Ukrayiny*, titled "Pro seryozni nedoliky ta pomylky odniyeyi knyhy [About the Serious Shortcomings and Mistakes of ■ Certain Book],"⁶⁶ became the point of departure for the final prohibition of Ukrainian scientific, cultural, and publishing activity. We will not stop here to provide a detailed analysis of this article, since it is available to the reader; instead we will dwell on something that the reader will not be able to find anywhere in the Soviet press.

In the spring of 1973, at ■ of the conferences, [of the Academy of Sciences, Ukr.S.S.R.], academician B. Babiý announced that all manuscripts from the section of social sciences had been returned from the publishers for examination by scholars of various institutions and that they were to be reviewed anew. Among these manuscripts ■ Volume 3 of the *Arkheolohiya Ukr.S.S.R.* [Archeology of the Ukr.S.S.R.], because its pages contained frequent mention of M. Braychevsky. Criticizing ■ number of scholarly journals that are published in Ukrainian, Academician Babiý reproached the editors of the journal *Narodna tvorchist ta etnoghrafiya* [Folk Creativity and Ethnography] because their journal idealized the past, specifically the poetry of folksongs, Ukrainian folktales, proverbs, and sayings.

I swear to God, Stalin never even dreamed of having such apprentices!

We were successful in getting hold of ■ fragment of ■ blacklist of Ukrainian authors who cannot be cited and whose names it is forbidden to mention in any Soviet publication (this list ■ handed over to the Committee on Censorship by the KGB in the spring of 1973):

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Zalozny | 26. Artymenko |
| 2. I. Ohiyenko | 27. Butovych |
| 3. Ye. Pelensky | 28. O. Hryshchenko |
| 4. V. Perebyynis | 29. V. Khmelyuk |
| 5. V. Shcherbakivsky | 30. V. Vovk |
| 6. M. Holubyev | 31. M. Hirnyk |
| 7. B. Antonych | 32. S. Plachynda |
| 8. N. Andrusiv | 33. Yu. Kolisnychenko |
| 9. S. Hordynsky | 34. P. Shelest |
| 10. D. Hornyatkevych | 35. I. Bahryany |
| 11. M. Dmytrenko | 36. A. Lyubchenko |
| 12. S. Lytvynenko | 37. N. Polonska-Vasylenko |
| 13. R. Lisovsky | 38. O. Ohloblyn |
| 14. V. Sichynsky | 39. R. Smal-Stotsky |
| 15. Dashkevych | 40. D. Soloviy |
| 16. Ya. Dzyra | 41. P. Fetsenko |
| 17. O. Kompan | 42. V. Chaplenko |
| 18. M. Osadchy | 43. K. Shtepa |
| 19. V. Skrypka | 44. V. Zakharchenko |
| 20. Zinkivsky | 45. O. Berdnyk |
| 21. S. Yefremov | 46. B. Antonenko-Davydovych |
| 22. M. Mushynka | 47. I. Dzyuba |
| 23. M. Osinchuk | 48. I. Svitlychny |
| 24. Anastazyevsky | 49. Ye. Svertstyuk |
| 25. Andriyenko-Nechytaylo | 50. I. Kalynets |

Such lists are constantly updated by [the addition of] new names.

The administration of the Writers' Union of Ukraine has become an instrument of spiritual oppression, an appendage of the KGB. Such writers as Kozachenko, Shamota, Levada, Soldatenko (a colonel in the KGB, and the real boss of the Union), Zbanatsky and M. Zarudny, all scramble one before the other to strangle every Ukrainian creative word, and thus please the KGB. Under the guise of "doing battle with antihistoricism," all historical subject matter in Ukrainian literature has been forbidden.

Starting in 1973 only those graduate students who ■■■ specializing in Russian literature ■■■ the literatures of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. were being accepted into the Institute of Literature. Not one single student ■■■ accepted into the Department of Ukrainian Literature. The ■■■ type of situation exists in the Institute of Linguistics. This is how the occupying regime is taking care of the development of Ukrainian culture!

In the last few years many talented Ukrainian writers have been expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine.

1. V. Zakharchenko;

2. O. Berdnyk, a talented science fiction writer;

3. H. Kochur, translator;

4. M. Lukash, translator, polyglot (knows 36 languages); he was expelled because he asked to be allowed to serve out the sentence given to the very ill I. Dzyuba (before Dzyuba had bought his way out through betrayal).

Moreover, scores of writers have been forbidden to publish their works, which is in essence an expulsion from the writers' organization. The Press Committee has a list of writers whose works may not be published. First ■■■ the list is the name of B. Antonenko-Davydovych, ■■■ writer and a patriot, an unsurpassed expert and defender of the Ukrainian language, and ■■■ long-time inmate of Soviet concentration camps, against whom the pro-KGB leadership of the Writers' Union of Ukraine and the press are waging a constant underhanded campaign of harassment and slander. Other prominent writers whose names are to be found on the list are L. Kostenko, I. Chendey, R. Ivanychuk, and V. Nekrasov (a Russian writer and member of the Kiev branch of the Writers' Union of Ukraine). A total of 100 writers are on this list.

The poets Z. Krasivsky, A. Lupynis, and V. Ruban have been thrown into psychiatric prisons.

All sorts of scum who thrive ■■■ the present mass production of anti-literary trash have rushed into the Union.

After December 30, 1971, when the Politburo gave the KGB

the assignment of destroying the *samoydav*, a wave of arrests engulfed the whole empire. Ukraine and Georgia have been the hardest hit by this rampage of terror.

Mass arrests and searches began as early ■ 1972.

Consequently, in January through March of 1972 in the Lviv Region alone there were over 1,000 searches and arrests, during which 3,000 copies of *samoydav* literature were confiscated.

Without exception, arrests ■■■ made in all the regional capitals and in many districts, but as all of this ■■■ being executed under conditions of the strictest secrecy, it is hard to determine ■■■ an appropriate number of those arrested. Most of the available information came from Kiev, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk, although even there only the arrests of the most prominent Ukrainian cultural leaders came to light. However, many engineers, teachers, doctors, students, and workers were also arrested. The broadcasters at Radio Liberty were far off the mark when they announced that approximately 100 persons were arrested in Ukraine ■ that time. This is absolutely false.

Residents in a given building would not know for ■ long time that some of their neighbors had been arrested. In such instances the KGB makes the relatives sign an oath of secrecy; at the [victim's] place of work they spread the rumor that the person has gone on a business trip, has quit, or is sick.

Those who were released after their arrest were warned that they would be criminally charged if they made the secret public.

Therefore, at this time we can name only ■■■ of those who have been arrested and sentenced.

THE FOLLOWING WERE SENTENCED IN 1972 to serve terms in prisons and strict-regime [hard-labor] camps:

1. V. Romanyuk—ten years of imprisonment and three years of exile (priest from the village of Kosmach, imprisoned for his connections with V. Moroz);

2. Yu. Shukhevych—ten [years' imprisonment] and five [years' exile] (he had refused to write ■ slanderous denunciation of his father;⁶⁷ during a search, only memoirs of his camp life were found);

3. Antonyuk—seven [years' imprisonment] and three [years' exile];

4. Plakhtonyuk—five and three;

5. V. Stus—five and three;

6. V. Rakytsky, ■ resident of Odessa—five;

7. O. Serhiyenko—seven and three;

8. D. Shumuk—ten and five;

9. S. Shabatura—five and three;

10. I. Kalynets—seven and three;

11. I. Stasiv-Kalynets—six and three;

12. M. Osadchy—seven and three;

13. I. Hel—ten and three;

14. I. Senyk—six and three;

15. Dyak, a resident of Stryi, ■ engineer and poet—ten and five;

16. A. Lupynis—psychiatric imprisonment;

17. Kovalenko;

18. Hluzman, a Jew and psychiatrist—seven and three;

19. L. Serednyak—one.

Also arrested were Z. Franko, M. Kholodny, L. Seleznenko, but they were released after coming forth with shameful defamatory statements against themselves and their friends.

In December 1972 in the city of Skadovsk, Kherson Region, the physician L. Huk was arrested (his fate is unknown).

Polishchuk, ■ Jew who spoke out for the human rights of Ukrainians and Jews, was arrested in Kiev in 1972 (fate unknown).

THOSE SENTENCED IN 1973:

1. N. Strokata-Karavanska—four years' imprisonment (a resident of Odessa, microbiologist; wife of political prisoner S. Karavansky; stood up in defense of her husband and gave financial support to the family of Yu. Shukhevych);

2. [Ivan] Svitlychny—seven [years' imprisonment] and five [years' exile];

3. Ye. Sverstyuk—seven and five;

4. N. Svitlychna (sister of I. Svitlychny)—four;

5. I. Dzyuba—five and five (released after spending almost

one and one-half years in prison in return for agreeing to cooperate with the KGB; major Kolchuk of the KGB conducted the investigation);

6. Tsytsyk (Chervonohrad)—three years' imprisonment;
7. B. Rozlutsky (Chervonohrad)—four years' imprisonment;
8. V. Chornovil—seven and three;
9. Yaromyr Mykytka (student at the Lviv Institute of Forestry)—seven and three;
10. Zoryan Popadyuk (student at the University of Lviv; editor of the illegal magazine *Postup* [Progress])—seven and three;
11. V. Lisovy (philosopher, wrote the CC CPU a letter of protest against the imprisonment of I. Dzyuba)—seven and three;
12. Ye. Pronyuk (philosopher; wrote the CC CPU a letter of protest against the imprisonment of I. Dzyuba)—seven and five;
13. V. Ruban—psychiatric imprisonment (the inquest was conducted by KGB investigator Kovpak);
14. L. Plyushch—psychiatric imprisonment (the inquest was conducted by KGB investigator Kovpak);
15. Ovsienko—sentence unknown;
16. V. Marchenko (writer)—six and two;
17. V. Lobko—sentence unknown (sentenced in March 1974; engineer from Kiev).

Avrakhov, the prorector of the Kiev Institute of Culture, was arrested in May 1973 for sending Dzyuba's *Internationalizm chy rusyfikatsiya* [Internationalism or Russification?] abroad (fate unknown).

Typical is the fact that the number of people who have been persecuted for reading and disseminating I. Dzyuba's work *Internationalism or Russification?* is probably greater than the number of letters of print in it.

The wave of terror against Ukrainian intellectuals has not abated. Thousands of scholars have been dismissed from their jobs. A great number of students have been expelled from institutions of higher learning.

The following scholars have been dismissed from the INSTITUTE OF ARCHEOLOGY of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.S.S.R.:

1. Kompan,
2. O. Apanovych,
3. M. Braychevsky,
4. Leskov,
5. F. Shevchenko (former director).

N. Tolochko was severely criticized for his works *Topohrafiya starodavnyoho Kyryva* [Topography of Ancient Kiev], and *Nashchadky Monomakha* [The Descendants of Monomakh] but he was able to retain his job at the institute by performing a lackey's deed (he wrote a defamatory review of I. Bilyk's novel, *Mech Arey* [The Sword of Arey]).

At the INSTITUTE OF THEORETICAL PHYSICS, V. Shelest (son of P. Shelest) was dismissed from the post of director.

At the INSTITUTE OF FOLKLORE AND ETHNOGRAPHY, the following were dismissed:

1. V. Skrypka,
2. Zynych,
3. Syvachenko (former director).

The assistant director and the party organizer were severely reprimanded in public.

At the INSTITUTE OF PSYCHOLOGY:

1. Kostyuk (former director),
2. Tkachenko,
3. Kharchenko.

At the INSTITUTE OF LITERATURE of the Academy of Sciences:

1. O. Stavytsky (dismissed in 1972; has two under-aged children and his elderly mother to support),
2. V. Ivanysenko (has two children to support; his wife does not work).

At the INSTITUTE OF COLLOIDAL CHEMISTRY AND WATER of the Academy of Sciences:

1. Kurylenko—director of ■ department (the department was disbanded because the ■■■■ of Professor Barboya, who emigrated to Israel, appeared in its publications).

The Assistant Director, Kruhlytsky, was severely reprimanded in public.

At the INSTITUTE OF HISTORY of the Academy of Sciences:

1. Ya. Dzyra,

Academician Skaba was dismissed from the post of director.

At the INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES of the Academy of Sciences (in Lviv):

1. R. Kyrchiv,

2. M. Valyo,

3. Shchurat,

4. Yedlinska,

5. Dumnych,

6. Hryhoruk,

7. Yaroshynsky.

(All those listed above lost their jobs in 1972. In 1973 Oleksyuk was demoted from director to department head. Even his slavish groveling before the occupiers and his shameful slander against his fellow Ukrainians did not ■■■■ him).

At the INSTITUTE OF POLYMER COMPOUND CHEMISTRY of the Academy of Sciences:

1. Kolotylo,

2. H. Minyaylo,

3. Nosorih,

4. Skarychenko (his Ph.D. dissertation is finished but he is not allowed to defend it).

All were dismissed as part of a "staff reduction"; the real reason was that they had been photographed by the KGB standing near T. Shevchenko's monument⁶⁹ on May 22, 1972.

At the INSTITUTE OF PETROCHEMISTRY:

Sklar was demoted from the post of director to the rank of ■ junior researcher because Antonyuk had worked at the institute.

At the KIEV ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATORY:

O. Shemaka was dismissed from his job of researcher.

At the PEDAGOGICAL INSTITUTE IN DROHOBYCH:

1. Krayevska,
2. Voronchuk,
3. Chorniy (rector).

At the INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY of the Academy of Sciences (in Obrosyno):

L. Reyblat was dismissed (he is an invalid of the second category; has tuberculosis of the bones; *samvydav* literature was found during ■ search).

At the PUBLISHING HOUSE *NAUKOVA DUMKA* [Scholarly Thought]:

1. Cherkasky—editor,
2. Pokrovska—editor.

A chauvinistic pogrom was carried out at the *Robitnycha hazeta* [Workers' Newspaper]. Yu. Lazebnyk, the editor-in-chief, was fired, as ■■■ the following three heads of the science, culture, and information departments:

1. Palchyk. He had been dismissed from his position in the Republic's radio because he stood up in defense of P. Shestopal

(as was said at the meeting of the CC--"for his speech in defense of a nationalist"). Afterwards he ■■■ hired by Lazebnyk in the *Robitnycha hazeta*, where he eventually became head of the information department.

2. Tarasenko. Eight years ago, while head of the culture department, he had published an article praising the current number of the *Ukrayinsky Kalendar* [Ukrainian Calendar], which is published in Warsaw. On orders from the "administrative organs," he was dismissed from his position, but Lazebnyk retained him as a rank-and-file member and later transferred him to the newly-formed science department and eventually made him its head.

3. Korenevych. Years ago the KGB had caught him with ■ package that he was transporting for I. Svitlychny. Korenevych gave the excuse that he did not know the contents of the package. For this he was fired from his job with the *Robitnycha hazeta*, but Lazebnyk rehired him ■ ■ rank-and-file worker and eventually appointed him head of the department on culture.

The position of editor-in-chief of *Robitnycha hazeta* has been given to V. Burlay, a special correspondent of *Pravda* in Kiev.

FAMILIES OF CURRENT AND FORMER POLITICAL PRISONERS are being persecuted.

THOSE DISMISSED FROM WORK:

1. V. Hrytsenko, philologist (wife of V. Lisovy, has two children to support).

2. S. Kyrychenko, philologist (wife of Yu. Badzyo; has two children to support. By the way, Badzyo himself has not been able to find a job for the last several years. Lately, he had been working loading trucks but was dismissed after three days on the job. The organs of the militia have warned Badzyo that he will be banished from Kiev for being ■ "idler" and sent to "projects for the building of communism." We want to remind the reader that Yu. Badzyo was the author of a well-known letter to the editor of the *Literaturna Ukrayina* [Literary Ukraine].

3. The wife of Ye. Pronyuk (has two children to support).

4. In the spring of 1973, in Boyarka, the wife of Kovalenko ■ dismissed from work (she is a teacher who had been working for 30 years and had only ■ year left before retirement). KGB major Tyutyunnikov ■ present at the meeting in the school and tried to intimidate the teachers. The teachers did not give in and kept protesting the high-handed tactics, but they ■ unable to save their colleague.

In 1971, I. Skrypnyk, a teacher in Nadvirna, was dismissed from his position because of his acquaintance with V. Moroz. He was forbidden to work in the Ivano-Frankivsk area. Soon after he had found a job in Lviv he was fired again and was forbidden to look for work in the western regions of Ukraine.

LVIV UNIVERSITY was subjected to a pogrom in March to May, 1973.

Party officials and the KGB ordered the rector to forbid the holding of the traditional evenings in honor of Shevchenko. The students tried to organize such ■ evening on their own initiative, but were dispersed. Flyers protesting this action were circulated and an illegal magazine, *Koryto* [The Trough], ■ published.

The KGB sent its agents among the students with their own provocative flyers. Mass arrests began. Those arrested were subjected to physical torture (rubber bags were pulled over their heads until they lost consciousness; they were beaten).

A mass wave of student dismissals swept the university. At first the KGB tried to organize the censures and expulsions at Komsomol meetings, but seeing that the students were in support of those arrested, brought the expulsions about in semi-secrecy, through the orders of the rector. Access to the university was limited strictly to those holding passes. For every class missed, the student had to submit ■ written explanation and exonerating documents (a note from a physician, ■ telegram calling him home to sick parents, etc.).

During the summer vacation the students were herded into compulsory labor brigades and sent ■ work in various corners of the empire, mostly in Siberia. Those who did not leave with such contingents were obligated to leave the exact address at which they would spend their vacation.

All the expelled students were scholastically outstanding. Their names are as follows:

The DEPARTMENT OF UKRAINIAN PHILOLOGY:

1. Valentyn Kornychuk—third year,
2. Nadiya Stetsula—third year,
3. Vasyl Hanushchak—third year,
4. Volodymyr Udovychenko—third year (expelled in June after the final examinations, which he passed with distinction, for refusing to become a KGB undercover agent),
5. Volodymyr Pidsadnyuk—third year,
6. Bohdan Rakytsky—fourth year,
7. Yaroslav Lemeha—fourth year (foreign philology),
8. Volodymyr Yavorsky—third year,
9. Ihor Sluka—third year,
10. Ihor Koman—third year,
11. Hryhory Khvostenko—third year (there is strong evidence that he is a provocateur),
12. H. Yaremych—third year;

The DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS:

13. Oleksander Hudz,
14. Ihor Petryna;

The DEPARTMENT OF JOURNALISM:

15. Fedyuk;

The DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY:

16. Ivan Svarnyk—first year (after his expulsion, his father was dismissed from his post of director of the *Kamenyar* publishing house),
17. R. Kozovych—fourth year,
18. L. Filonov—fourth year,
19. M. Dolynska—fourth year,

20. I. Khudy—fourth year,
21. Khozhan—fourth year,
22. Hondysyak—fourth year,
23. V. Morozov—fourth year (Department of Philosophy).

A group of lecturers were dismissed from the university [among them]:

PROFESSORS:

1. Redko,
2. Kovalyk,
3. Petlychny,
4. Ya. Kys (graduate research professor of history),
5. I. Huzar (graduate research professor of philosophy),
6. Krushelnytsky (graduate research professor of history);

ASSOCIATE PROFESSORS:

7. Kobilyansky,
8. Pachovsky
9. Pushkar,
10. H. Lastovetska,
11. Roman,
12. Y. Kubiv,
13. Khudash;

ASSISTANT PROFESSORS:

14. I. Danylevsky,
15. A. Bosnyk,
16. Z. Bulyk,
17. P. Hileta,
18. L. Popadyuk,
19. I. Solevsky,
20. Krushelnytska.

The number of persons at the university who suffered persecutions is much larger, but unfortunately we do not have full data.

In December 1973 ■■■ group of students was dismissed from the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY for reading the Bible.

In 1974 the administration of the University of Lviv, on instructions from V. Malanchuk, decided to organize ■ evening

"in honor" of Shevchenko. But only those students who ■■■ activists and who had passes ■■■ allowed to attend the evening. Agitators from the Party bureau instructed the student activists not to stand during the singing of Shevchenko's "Testament"⁶⁹ (the students, however, did not follow these orders). The evening's program consisted of songs about the Party, and the Komsomol, while only a few of the numbers had anything to do with Shevchenko.

Stunder, the well-known compiler of the folklore of Boykivshchyna and assistant professor of the Lviv Conservatory, was dismissed from her post.

In January 1974 M. Melnyk, a student of the LVIV MEDICAL INSTITUTE, was expelled for taking flowers to the graves of UHA⁷⁰ soldiers at Yaniv Cemetery. The KGB ordered his instructors to give him failing grades during his examinations.

The purges at the UNIVERSITY OF KIEV continue. Lately, Kruk, one of the most gifted fifth-year students in the Department of Philology, was dismissed, ■ were two students from the Department of Journalism—Ivan Hayduk (fourth year) and Rayisa Sydorenko (fifth year). All those students who at the student meeting voted against the expulsion from the university of the above-named students were thrown out of the Komsomol; their names were entered on the KGB's "black" list.

In recent times it has become known that instructions have been given that no more than 25% of those accepted into institutions of higher learning in Western Ukraine may come from local youth.

The Ukrainians of Western Ukraine are subjected to particularly cruel discrimination. Not ■■■ manager at the large plants come from among the local inhabitants.

Offices of notaries public have been given secret instructions not to process, under any circumstances, permits for the purchase of private houses to Ukrainians who have returned from exile.

Former political prisoners are truly marked men. They are

not given residence permits in the western regions of Ukraine, and frequently not even in all of Right-Bank Ukraine.

Thus, in January 1973 the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukr.S.S.R., I. Hrushetsky, made a tour of the Lviv Region. While passing through Sokal, Brody, and Kamyanka-Buzka, he demanded that the local administration give him a list of former political prisoners and categorically forbade the issuance of residence permits to any of them at the present time.

Another very characteristic example of the KGB's terror tactics is the case of Y. Hoysak. A resident of the village of Dashava in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region, Hoysak, who is the village blacksmith, was held under arrest for three days and fined in 1973 because he had painted his gate in yellow and blue.⁷¹ Following this incident, he is being continuously harassed by the local authorities.

Dobryk, the First Secretary of Lviv's Regional Committee, at a meeting held in December 1973, strongly criticized the KGB because, supposedly, they are not waging a strong enough battle against Ukrainian nationalists. He personally examines the repertoire of performing groups.

The work of Lviv's television studio is practically paralyzed. In general, it broadcasts only all-Union programs.

Lviv radio's Sunday concerts, which used to be programmed around listeners' requests, have been discontinued (now the program is either put together by the staff itself or only chauvinistic requests are played).

Petriv, the head of the regional committee in charge of television and radio, has been dismissed from his post.

Artists' groups all over Ukraine are being purged. Ukrainian *dumas*⁷² and historical songs are completely forbidden. Repertoires may include only current topical songs and even then those which are in Russian and which praise the Party must predominate.

Ukrainian books are also included in the ban. Libraries are constantly getting instructions to remove Ukrainian books from circulation. Lately, such a memorandum was circulated with respect to the poetry collection *Kryla* [Wings] by D. Pavlychko.

Also removed have been O. Berdnyk's *Chasha Amrity* [The Chalice of Amrita] and *Zoryany Korsar* [The Astral Corsair], Yu. Kolisnychenko's and S. Plachynda's *Neopalyma Kupyna* [The Burning Bush], R. Ivanychuk's *Maloy* [The Hollycocks], R. Fedoriv's *Turetsky mist* [The Turkish Bridge], I. Bilyk's *Mech Arey*a [The Sword of Arey], R. Andriyashyk's *Poltva* [a Ukrainian river], P. Shelest's *Ukrayino nasha radyanska* [Our Soviet Ukraine], all the works of M. Braychevsky, the quarterly *Poeziya* [Poetry] for 1968, and many others. Almost all of the literary and scholarly works published in the sixties are categorized ■ "not recommended"; in other words, they will be kept in the library but will not be available to the reading public.

Hitler's fascists burned books in the town squares. The Soviet Gestapo does this in secret.

In the last two years the organizing of literary evenings in honor of Shevchenko has been forbidden. One or two official evenings are held by those hypocrites who really despise both Shevchenko and the Ukrainian people most and who constantly strive to falsify the works of Shevchenko. Those evenings ■ held exclusively for propaganda purposes. On orders from the KGB, the collaborators in the Writers' Union of Ukraine will bring a wreath to Shevchenko's monument, while at the same time the KGB will be taking photographs of those who bring Shevchenko flowers and their hearts. Afterwards, students will be expelled from the institutes and intellectuals from their place of work. And if anyone there dares to read aloud the poems of Shevchenko, he will be sent to the "Gulag Archipelago" or to a psychiatric prison.

Hellish conditions ■ created for political prisoners in prisons and concentration camps. With each year the conditions in the camps become more inhumanly cruel.

The camps themselves are moved to more distant regions, where the climate is more severe. And so it is that the camps of Mordovia have been relocated in the Urals. In mid-1972 Mordovian concentration camp No. 3 in Barashevo was closed down. Those prisoners who ■ nearing the end of their terms of imprisonment were transferred to other camps in the Mor-

dovian A.S.S.R., while 500 prisoners, most of them Ukrainians, were transferred into the ■■■ of Solikamsk in the Urals.

The prisoners are used for hard physical labor that is beyond their strength while they ■■■ kept on semi-starvation diets.

Thus, Ukrainian political prisoners are put to work at the plant for grinding glass, where the rules of safety are constantly being violated (among the prisoners there is the seriously ill poet I. Kalynets).

The "sovereign" Ukr.S.S.R. is not allowed to keep political prisoners on her territory.

In the last few years the KGB itself has been undergoing some reorganization. Moreover, it is expanding numerically (as has become known, in Lviv in 1970 the KGB had a staff of 2,000; in Ternopil in 1969, there were 400). The number of undercover agents in the KGB network is also increasing very rapidly. A lot of attention is paid to the qualitative aspects. In the first place, Russians sharply predominate in the KGB (in 1973 there ■■■ a "secret" purge of KGB agents in Ukraine). They are now recruiting qualified specialists into the KGB: psychologists, engineers, philologists, etc.

Furthermore, in order to intensify the terror, the salaries of the KGB have been raised and their authority has been greatly increased.

4. The Destruction of Ukrainian Historical and Cultural Monuments.

Within the overall framework of the policy of Russification, the occupiers assign an important place to the destruction of historical and cultural monuments of Ukraine's past.

All of this is done for the purpose of destroying that which the genius of the Ukrainian people has created throughout the centuries.

In step with the general intensification of the regime's terror in the last few years, there has been ■ sharp rise in the tendency to destroy everything that is Ukrainian in our historical heritage.

The Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments was given ■ directive to concentrate its attention

mainly on the preservation of the so-called historical-revolutionary monuments, as well as the monuments dedicated to the "liberators." Special attention is given to Lenin's monuments.

In 1973 more than 100 Ukrainian cultural monuments were taken off the list of the Society. The majority of them were churches. With regard to many registered monuments, nothing is done with them except that explanatory plaques are attached. Here are some examples:

The Church of St. Paraskeviya in the village of Kosmach in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region is falling apart. For years now, the villagers of Kosmach have been asking that the church be restored. This church is a unique monument of Hutsul⁷³ wooden architecture of the 18th century (it was built in 1718 with funds provided by a villager, Matviy Vatomanchuk, about which there are documents in Lviv's State Museum of Ukrainian Art). Its existence has been recorded in the documents on art by D. Shcherbakivsky (in his *Ukrayinske mystetstvo* [Ukrainian Art], Kiev-Prague: 1926) as a monument of 18th century architecture and sculpture.

After numerous letters written by the Kosmach inhabitants to various Soviet agencies, and also after the enthusiast V. Bobyak gathered the signatures of twenty Ukrainian writers asking to have the church included on the list of historical and cultural monuments (the name of O. Dovbush⁷⁴ is tied to this church; it was here that his *opryshky* were blessed), after numerous trying experiences that V. Bobyak underwent in various republican establishments, the republican Society for the Protection of Monuments finally conducted an inspection of the church.

The senior consultant of the Society, V. Skvarchevska, and research professors of historical studies Kompan and Hrabovetsky, wrote a detailed description of the church and gave it unusually high marks for its artistic value. The central republican office of the Society recommended that the regional branch should include the church on its list and hang a protective sign on it. The KGB would not allow the plaque to be hung and began to terrorize Bobyak in various ways. The director of the local school, Dedyukh, a KGB protege who constantly terrorizes the

teachers and villagers of Kosmach, bragged that he would burn down the church himself, and if he wouldn't be able to do it, then it would rot, because the restoration of a church in which the *banderivtsi*⁷⁶ took the oath of loyalty and had their weapons blessed should not be allowed.

In November 1971 Lviv's restoration bureau sent skilled workers and materials for the restoration of the church. Dedyukh called the KGB men in Kosiv, who came and chased the artisans away, telling them never to appear in Kosmach again. (We remind the reader that Kosmach, Sheshory, and other villages of the Hutsul area are under the police regime of the KGB, and all those coming into a village must report immediately to the village administration to register.)

The central republican office of the Society has become silent and does not reply to Bobyak's letters. As this example is so very typical, we have described the incident involving the church in Kosmach in detail so that the reader may have a more complete picture of how Ukraine's spiritual heritage is laid to waste.

Other historical monuments ■ also being destroyed.

In 1972, at the Yaniv Cemetery in Lviv, on the eve of the Pentecost, all the remaining ■ in the memorial section of the cemetery, where the graves of the soldiers of the UHA are located, were destroyed.

The same has been done in the cemeteries of Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zolochiv, Horodok, and in other cities.

The occupiers have destroyed all the graveyards associated with the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people. Who can cite just one example of similar acts of banditry and savagery being committed anywhere else in the world?

A unique collection of ancient Ukrainian pictorial art is rotting away in the Armenian Cathedral in Lviv.

In 1972, on orders of the KGB, I. Honchar's Ukrainian Museum in Kiev has been shut down. Honchar himself is constantly being harassed by the authorities.

The construction of a Kozak museum and national park on the island of Khortytsya has been stopped.

In December 1972, the monument to B. Khmelnytsky in Zboriv ■■ taken down. A statue of Lenin ■■ put up ■■ that very same pedestal, while the sculpture of Khmelnytsky was moved to some secluded place.

In 1972 in Drohobych the bas-relief of I. Franko ■■ taken down from the building of the old high school where I. Franko went to school (now it is a branch of the pedagogical institute).

A few years ago in Drohobych ■ plaque in honor of M. Shashkevych was removed from the church.

In recent years it has been forbidden to put up any monuments to T. Shevchenko in Ukraine.

There is no marker of any kind in the Leningrad cemetery where T. Shevchenko was originally buried.

Ukrainian museums are given meager funds and all kinds of artificial obstacles are set up against their growth. For example, repairs at the I. Franko Museum in Kryvorivna were started only after a student on an excursion in 1971 fell through the rotted floor of the museum.

In this very same Kryvorivna not even a memorial plaque has been put up on the house of the famous progressive cultural leader, the Reverend O. Volyansky. It is in this very building that such famous people as L. Ukrayinka, M. Kotsyubynsky, H. Khotkevych, V. Hnatyuk and many others came to stay when they were passing through Kryvorivna. All of them availed themselves of Rev. Volansky's extensive library.

The Museum of Ukrainian Art in Lviv needs a new wing, but it is impossible to get any action in this matter. And so on without end. . . .

5. The Destruction of Churches and Persecution of the Faithful.

In Eastern Ukraine almost nowhere in the villages can you see a church. And once they were in every village. The black deed of destruction was done there back in the sinister thirties.

Now the same thing is being done step-by-step in Western Ukraine.

Thus in the Lviv Region after the war there were over 1200 functioning churches; in 1961 there were 528. With every year their number grows smaller. All this is done very cunningly. If ■ priest dies or retires, he is often not replaced or his place is taken by such an ignoramus or adventurer that the faithful ■ forced to reject him.

Various administrative obstructions are placed in the way. As a result, not one priest has been assigned to the Stry District in the last two years.

In the spring of 1972 the villagers of Volytsya in the Nesterov District demanded that the Lviv Eparchy send them ■ priest. But Soviet officials categorically refused to assign one. The collective farm workers there went on strike for a week. The cattle breeders were especially steadfast and refused to be swayed by threats. The KGB agents immediately tried to sniff out the organizers of the strike, but good organization and manliness determined the outcome. The villagers won. So far, we know of only this one case where ■ uneven battle was won by the pariahs of Soviet society.

Here is another example. In 1972, ■ old church on Artem Street in Lviv was being demolished. Residents of Lviv threw themselves under the tank which was being used to bulldoze the church; however, the militia dispersed the faithful by force. The Lviv Eparchy received monetary compensation—Judas' pieces of silver!

In 1971 the church in the village of Pidlisky in the District of Nesterov (overlooking the Lviv-Kiev highway) was destroyed. A teahouse was built on the site. The Church of the Epiphany in Zhytomyr is in danger of being torn down.⁷⁴

As is well known, it is forbidden to build new churches in the U.S.S.R.

The faithful suffer endless persecution. The persecutions become especially intensified during the greatest Christian holydays and take on the form of mass campaigns against the faithful.

Thus, Easter, Christmas, and other holydays are declared workdays even when they fall ■ calendar days otherwise free from work.

Students and schoolchildren are assigned Sunday sessions, various obligatory excursions, etc.

Before Christmas in 1973, the directors of schools throughout the Lviv Region were summoned to district party committee offices and warned that if even ■■■ student ■■■ seen in or near a church (for this purpose, especially appointed persons took turns in keeping watch near the churches), the director would be immediately dismissed from his post.

In the last two years teachers are obliged to warn their students in school not to go caroling, strewing grain⁷⁷ or to participate in any such other traditional religious folk customs.

On Easter and Christmas, the Party's district committees send out their communist activists to the churches in order to take note who among the communists, teachers, management personnel or white-collar workers in general, has come to the church for the holyday. These party watchdogs are issued special passes. That is because the KGB also keeps watch near the churches and if a party member should come under KGB observation and later it turns out that he ■■■ to the church on his own initiative, then nothing will save him from losing both his party membership card and his job.

Bus drivers are warned, under the threat of losing their jobs, not to take any passengers who are going to church to bless their *paskas*.⁷⁸

Militiamen take turns standing on church steps and turning away parents with children, etc., etc.

In the city of Kozova in the Ternopil Region in 1973, ■ priest was fined 50 rubles only because he had extended the Mass by one hour (in rural and urban churches, with the exception of the big cities, the time of Liturgical services is determined by government officials; as a rule, Mass should end no later than ■ A.M.)). In most cities it is forbidden to ring church bells.

Maybe after ■■ enumeration of just a few of these facts, Filaret, the Exarch of Ukraine, will ■ longer dare to say that he is not aware of any instances of the condemnation of churches or of any harassment of the faithful in recent years.

On the night of December 18, 1973, all crosses along the village roads of Babukhiv, Verbylivtsi, Zaluzhzhya, in the District of Rohatyn, Ivano-Frankivsk Region, some of which had been erected in commemoration of the end of serfdom, were sawed down and broken.

And maybe the Exarch will tell ■ what he did with Father Sava of St. Volodymyr's Cathedral in Kiev, after the Reverend began delivering his sermons in Ukrainian? Maybe he can also tell us why in 1972 only four students from the Lviv Region were accepted into the Odessa Theological Seminary? Why an atmosphere of [Russian] chauvinism pervades the seminary? Why services in the churches of Ukraine are conducted in Russian, with the exception of the western regions, and even there not in all areas? In Volyn, for example, only Russian is used in almost all the churches. Why is there no religious literature published in the Ukrainian language? No, the Exarch will not answer these questions. We will do this for him. It is because there is no official Ukrainian Church in Ukraine. Moscow usurped the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church in Eastern Ukraine in the thirties and the Greek-Catholic Church in Western Ukraine in the forties.⁷⁹ Moscow's Orthodox Church is ■ instrument of Russification. Key administrative positions in the Church are held by obedient lackeys who care only about their earthly comforts and who receive a dole from the satanical regime for their black hypocritical deeds.

The Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine and throughout the empire suffer the most cruel persecution.

Following the forcible liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine after World War II, the Ukrainian Catholics have waged ■ uneven battle for their rights.

All churches where the priests refused to accept union with the Muscovite church were closed down and marked for eventual destruction. In some places, the parishioners refused to turn the church keys over to the authorities and met to pray secretly, without ■ priest. But in recent years the repression has been intensified, especially after V. Malanchuk admitted at ■ meeting of the Politburo of the CPU that the Catholic Church in Western

Ukraine had not been fully liquidated, and that the Party should devote more time to the struggle with this Church, because it had always been in the vanguard of Ukrainian nationalism.

Following this, Ukrainian Catholic priests are being persecuted even more. They fulfill their spiritual mission under extremely difficult circumstances. They are harassed, thrown into prisons, and tortured.

At the same time, the persecution of those Catholics who are faithful to their religious beliefs has been intensified. Their churches are being desecrated.

Here are a few examples:

In the village of Zabuzhzhya in the Sokal District in 1972, "activists" began forcefully throwing the faithful out of church. This led to a fight. The interior of the church was doused with chemicals, church property was destroyed. When the parishioners refused to hand over the keys to the church, the lock was welded shut with an electric torch.

In the village of Mezhyrichchya in the Sokal District, the church was often filled with grain and mineral fertilizer. In 1972, its doors were sealed shut by an iron bar. The faithful gathered for holydays in the church yard, where they had built an improvised altar, and prayed. They were forcibly moved away from the church and beaten. The villagers had previously rejected an Orthodox priest.

In the summer of 1972, in the village of Volsvyn in the Sokal District, bolshevik bandits forced their way into the church at night, plundered church property, tore the church banners and the embroidered decorative cloths to pieces, broke the candleholders, slashed the icons, etc. In a few days, Broder (a Jew), who was in charge of usable scrap, was called into the office of the state farm and ordered to remove the destroyed church property for scrap. When Broder categorically refused to do this, he was so severely beaten that he had to be taken to the hospital. Broder took the matter against the bandits to court, but the case was dragged out until it was closed completely.

In 1972, the church in the village of Smilna in the Stryy area was filled with mineral fertilizer. The faithful cleaned the church and continued gathering for prayer. Then the church

doors were welded shut with ■ electric torch. The villagers sent an invalid veteran of the Patriotic War [World War II] to Kiev and to Moscow with a plea for the right to meet in church for prayer, but the officials remained deaf.

In 1973, the church in the village of Sutkivtsi (?) in the Rava-Ruska District burned down under very mysterious circumstances. The villagers began rebuilding it, but the authorities categorically denied them the right to go on with the construction.

In the spring of 1973 in the village of Slobidka near Stryi, the villagers began repairing the church fence. The militia tore the fence down, and a fight ensued.

In the city of Nesterov ([formerly] Zhovkva), the indigenous inhabitants almost never attend the Orthodox church, but organize prayer meetings in private homes, for which they are cruelly persecuted. The KGB hunts down the Catholic priests.

We have cited a few examples of the crimes of the occupiers against faithful Catholics in the Lviv Region. But how many more are there all over Western Ukraine? Probably only God Himself knows. We only wonder why the Vatican administration has forgotten about the Ukrainian part of its flock, which is being torn to pieces by hungry wolves. Has it not become too deeply mired in its materialistic and opportunistic policies?

The Ukrainian Evangelical Christians are carrying on a truly heroic battle for their spiritual rights.

Together with the multi-million, freedom-loving Ukrainian people, Ukrainian Christians of all faiths are fighting for their national and spiritual rights.

• • • • •

In this work ■ have shown, by citing many examples, how Moscow is "solving" the national question in the U.S.S.R., especially in Ukraine. On the basis of demographical data ■ have exposed the essence of the nationalities policy of Russian Bolshevism, a policy which is based on the systematic ethnocide of the non-Russian peoples in the U.S.S.R. With ■ whole series of facts we have denied assertions made by L. Brezhnev and by other Moscow leaders that the national question in the U.S.S.R. has been solved and that a national problem does not exist. The

very nature of the cited facts helps the reader to understand that the Soviet regime is really a fascist dictatorship (in the form of social-fascism).

We address this work to Secretary General of the UN Kurt Waldheim and we appeal that:

1.) The question of the liquidation of Soviet-Russian colonialism be taken under consideration during the next session of the UN General Assembly;

2.) A special UN committee be formed to review all the secret political trials which took place in the U.S.S.R. and to inspect the prisons, concentration camps, and special psychiatric hospitals where political prisoners are being held;

3.) UN observers be sent to Ukraine during preparations for elections to a Supreme Body of Government in Ukraine;

4.) The World Congress of Free Ukrainians⁴⁴ be given the right to represent the interests of the Ukrainian people, until the time that the above-mentioned elections can take place in Ukraine;

5.) This work be disseminated among all the members of the UN.

Actions on the part of the UN such as we are calling for cannot be considered meddling in internal affairs. Such a point of view is fundamentally incorrect because what we are talking about here is an imperialistic state with a most reactionary political regime, a state in which scores of nations are being oppressed and made victims of physical and spiritual genocide, a state where there exists a real threat that national culture and whole nations will be completely liquidated, a state where the greatest crime against mankind is thus being perpetrated. The UN today has adopted the tactics of reconciliation with the status quo of the greatest evil. It becomes necessary to acknowledge the paradoxical fact that wherever evil exists in its worst form, it finds silent approval from the UN. This makes the UN a passive partner in the crime that is being perpetrated in the U.S.S.R. and which can lead to fatal consequences for all of humanity.

It is possible that there will be some UN members who will call our demands Utopian. We reply to them that we do not delude ourselves by thinking that the Soviet regime will yield to ■ demands without ■ struggle and will give up its colonial and chauvinistic policies. But a world-wide indictment of Soviet colonialism would provide us with great support in our consecrated struggle for the Ideals of Freedom, while the members of the UN would at the same time be rid of their moral culpability for their pernicious silence.

The Ukrainian people have carried the unblemished banner of their struggle for liberation down through the centuries.

The Ukrainian people through their long history have conquered not one piece of foreign territory, have made no attempts to infringe on the freedom of their neighbors. Under conditions of ruthless enslavement, the Ukrainian people were able to create their own original culture and at the same time gave their share, to the extent they could under the circumstances, to mankind's treasure-trove of spiritual and material achievements.

There is no power in the world that could break the spirit of our indomitable people!

Thousands are coming to replace the hundreds of nationally conscious fighters for Ukraine's freedom who fell in battle—or who are imprisoned. It is too late to stop this process with any fascist methods.

We firmly believe in our final victory, but the price of the sacrifice that we will have to pay will depend to a great degree on the citizenry of the whole world, to whom we turn for support.

It is ■ question of honor for every nation, for every democratic body of men, for every honest national leader, to direct every possible effort toward the struggle with Soviet neo-fascism, which stands today as the main threat for all of mankind.

Part III

***Maksym Sahaydak:* POEMS**

THE WAY

— Dedicated to Valentyn Moroz

I'll not repent
The road I chose is spinier than blackthorn,
And neither fame nor praise desire or await.
It's all the same if the horizon I don't reach
Under this heavy cross,
For firmly I do know:
Though some may fall,
It will be raised by others—

and carried on.

So that a martyred people
Might win a flowering future,
Unwavering, I'll give my life,
And may my death then flow—
A tiny drop of life—into
A people's deathless organism,
In their unbridled run to happiness and freedom.
So I've no fear of them—
Mordovia's cold snows
And gray "Vladimir's" stony sacks—
For happiness I've found,
Secrets of progress I have fathomed.

January 12, 1973

Cowards! To you I cry:
Tear the roots of feeble fear
Out from your wretched souls.
Devils! From alien lips
Stop licking off the lies.
Lackeys! Filthy slaves! Find strength
To straighten up arched backs.
Then human beings you'll become,
And mothers will cease to bathe in tears,
And righteous sacrifice will not be hopeless,
And weeds won't grow where blood was spilled,
And unrelenting foes will yield
Before a monolith of harmony and strength.

January 12, 1973

Ask me, ask!

Why ■ I sad and gloomy?

Because roses have been trampled,
Ukraine's sons ■ in bondage.

Ask me, ask!

Why ■ I grim, indignant?

A wanton wind from the East
Would uproot my native field's poplars.

Ask me, ask!

Why cruel woe left me unbowed?

A full ear of grain in my native land's field,
I am Ukraine's loyal, steadfast son.

Ask me, ask!

Why do I laugh? Why don't I weep?

I see the rabid foe raging,
Powerless to break ■ people who seethe.

Ask me, ask!

Why am I joyous and gay?

I hear the unrest of a great living Ruin,
Voices of the manly ■ of Ukraine.

A ROSE AMONG WEEDS

I sowed flowers in a garden,
Nurtured, watered them,
To delight the Guelder-rose, the mother,
And I cleared the weeds,
So they wouldn't choke the roses.
Then one darkened night,
Covetous neighbors
Broke into the garden.
With cunning lies
They gagged my mouth,
Bound my eyes with wire.
A bloody axe
Cut down the Guelder-rose.
Rapacious hooves
Trampled the flowers.
In the uprooted roses' stead
The neighbor cultivates weeds.
But every spring,
When rays of sun just pierce the clouds,
From deep beneath the ground
The Guelder-rose sends young shoots,
And asks her children:
Can weeds, whose strength is wildness,
Choke the tenderness and beauty that's in roses?

April 8, 1973

GOLGOTHA

Into Siberian taiga's wild thickets—
Where cranes don't fly,
Where bears cleared paths,
Where laboring beavers lodges built—

They convoyed people:
Nursing infants,
Old grandfathers,
Weary mothers.

To monotones of clicking wheels,
And rivers of the mothers' tears,
Those endless, endless convoy trains
Left bloody traces:

Corpses, thrown out—
Infants, turned cold,
Famished old men,
The sick they'd straved.

They who their land, their own Ukraine,
Shielded till death, though spent of hope,
Sprinkled their blood as rain upon it,
Covered it thickly with their bones.

And there in Moscow, far away,
In predatory, gloomy Kremlin,
The tyrants held their bloody banquet
And, their teeth bared, they celebrated:
"There'll be no Ukraine on this Earth!"

Twentieth-century Mongols, remember this:
Ukraine will ——— die!
My people stand like Titan wrapped in mist,
Like a volcano that cannot be extinguished.

And we, we're streams of fiery lava,
Who rotted souls awaken,
Who sow unsullied seeds.
They will all sprout come spring,
And from the dead Ukraine will rise!

February 15, 1973

I saw:

 the sad, low bend
 of poplars, lining roads
 in native fields,
When mourning the young oaks
That enemy axes felled;
A mother crying
Over the body of ■ son
An executioner had killed;
And crosses cut down in a graveyard;
A steel harrow
Leveling a burial mound
For ■ planting of weeds—
Feed for the turncoats;
The Mother of God being lynched
To the sounds of the devil's obscene curses;
My land caressed with machine-gun fire
By an unmasked stranger
Who'd forced our door
And pharasaically called me his brother.
But all the while, I was growing . . .
And searched my native fields
For azure flowers of fate
That grew among the weeds, in bondage.
I'll gather them together!—
My brothers, to our native house,
And, ■■■■ the time of holy vengeance,
To Cain, our brother, we shall sing,
A leaden song from automatics!

October 23, 1973

NOTES

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

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NOTES

1. *Roskurkulennya* means, literally, "the unmaking of the *kurkuls*." The Ukrainian term "*kurkul*" and the Russian "*kulak*" refer to the wealthy peasants who were the prime targets of the collectivization of Soviet agriculture in the late 1920's and early 1930's.

2. The Ukrainian term "*samvydav*" and the Russian "*samizdat*" both mean "self-publishing" and refer to the unofficial, uncensored, and usually repressed literature published in manuscript, typescript, ■ photocopy form and disseminated, usually from hand to hand, in the Soviet Union.

3. Reference is to the chairman of Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Armand Hammer.

4. The article was written prior to President Nixon's resignation.

5. "*Prodsahon*" is an acronym for "*prodovolchy zahon*," meaning supply detachment." The *prodsahons*, formed from Bolshevik zealots and backed by units of the Red Army, were given license to requisition grain from the Ukrainian peasant for the cities. The *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary* gives them credit for the liquidation of the wealthier peasants—the *kurkuls*, ■ *kulaks*. The methods the *prodsahons* resorted to did not discriminate between rich peasants and poor; consequently, the famine of 1932-33 destroyed the Ukrainian peasant class ■ a whole.

6. Vladimir Illich Lenin, *Statti i rechi ob Ukrainye* [Articles and Speeches ■ Ukraine] (Kiev, 1957). Referred to in the text as *On Ukraine*.

7. Acronym for "*Donetsky Basen*" (Donets Basin), a geographical ■ southwest of the Donets River in Eastern Ukraine. Today it has the greatest concentration of industry in Ukraine. It is also considered the most Russified area in Ukraine.

8. In 1926 the Khmelnytsky Region (*oblast*) had the ■■■■ Kamyanets-Podilsky, while the present-day Donetsk Region ■■■■ called Stalino Region. In the table ■■■■ of regions ■■■■ given in the more familiar form of the regional capital.

9. Solzhenitsyn again spoke about the millions of Ukrainian lives that ■■■■ lost in the artificial famine of 1932-33 during his trip to Canada in 1975. The extent of the Ukrainian tragedy has largely gone unnoticed ■■■■ ignored in the West, while it is being carefully covered up in the Soviet Union.

10. The eventual failure of the Ukrainian national state, the Ukrainian People's Republic, does not contradict the author's statement. The extremely difficult conditions, the lack of proper preparation, the hostility of the West to the idea of an independent Ukraine, and, ■■■■ the author establishes, the unfortunate inclination of Ukrainian communists to believe in the possibility of Ukrainian autonomy within ■■■■ federation with a Soviet Russia were factors which weighed heavily against Ukrainian independence.

11. The Ukrainian Central *Rada* (Council) was the representative coordinating body which united various Ukrainian political parties in the formation of a Ukrainian national state after the Russian Revolution. During the period 1917-18 the Central *Rada* based its policies first on the principle of Ukrainian autonomy within a framework of federation with Russia, then with its Third Universal proclaimed on November 20, 1917, the creation of a Ukrainian national state, the Ukrainian People's Republic. The *Rada* reaffirmed this act on January 22, 1918, with its Fourth Universal, in which it proclaimed: "From this day on the Ukrainian People's Republic becomes the independent, free, and sovereign state of the Ukrainian people."

12. The *Tsentrálny vykonavchy komitet*—the TsVK—(Central Executive Committee) was elected at the Kharkiv Congress. Five days after convening, the Committee formed the first Soviet government of Ukraine, the People's Secretariat. Soviet historian N. Popov has written that this government ■■■■ created "with the energetic participation and partly by the direct initiative of the military units . . . transported here mainly from the Moscow and Petrograd garrisons." Refer to his *Narys istorii Kommunistychnoyi Partiyi (būshovykiv) Ukrayiny* [An Outline of the History of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine] (Kharkiv, 1928).

13. Reference is to the proclamation of the Fourth Universal by the Central *Rada* on January 22, 1918. See Note 11 above.

14. Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy* [Complete Collection of Works] (Moscow, 1960-). Referred to in text ■■■■ *Works*.

15. The area around the city of [redacted] had since the 16th century been one of Ukraine's commercial centers. Today it is part of Odessa Region.

16. The Borotbists had their beginnings in May 1918 as a splinter group of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries. On February 23, 1918, the group began publishing a journal, *Borotba* (The Struggle), and in May 1918 organized itself into a party with a platform based on national communism within an independent Ukrainian state. The Borotbists' advocacy of social reforms and the essentially Ukrainian character of the party made them increasingly popular and influential and set them up as an alternative to the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine—the CP(B)U—which was subordinated to Lenin's Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and in which Russian influences predominated. In August 1919, after various attempts at compromise and cooperation with the CP(B)U, the Borotbists joined with the leftist Ukrainian Social Democratic Party to form the Ukrainian Communist Party of Borotbists, which endeavored to insure the Ukrainian character of any future Ukrainian communist state. The Comintern, on Lenin's orders, forced the dissolution of the Borotbists' party on March 10, 1920. Most of the Borotbists then joined the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. The majority of them were liquidated in the purges of the 1930's, which culminated in the fall of 1935, when approximately 4000 Borotbists who had become members of the CP(B)U were executed after being charged with attempts to organize a "counterrevolutionary" "All-Ukrainian Borotbist Center."

17. The Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine—the CP(B)U—was formed in April 1918 in Tahanrih (Taganrog) as a party independent of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). At the party's First Congress in Moscow in July 1918, however, the Russian majority in the CP(B)U forced through a declaration subordinating the party to the RCP(B). As the author of *Ethnocide* points out, the CP(B)U, representing as it did a brand of communism imported from Russia, was in conflict with the Ukrainian communists, such as the Borotbists, who wanted a communism with a Ukrainian face. The Ukrainian communist opposition to the Russian-oriented policies of the CP(B)U continued after the dissolution of the Ukrainian Communist Party of Borotbists by a group, the Ukrainian Communist Party (the *Ukapisty*), formed in January 1920. However, this party was also forced to disband by the Comintern and in March 1925 merged with the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. The conflict between the Russian element and the forces insisting on an increased Ukrainianization of the CP(B)U continued on into the 1930's.

18. The terminology and the borders of administrative units in the Ukrainian S.S.R. have changed periodically. Thus in 1924-25 *guber-*

niyas (provinces) and *povits* (counties) — replaced by *okruhas* (departments or divisions) and *rayons* (districts). In 1931-32 administrative division was based on *oblasts* (regions) and *rayons* (districts), terms which are in use today.

19. On February 2, 1918, Russian Bolsheviks in Kharkiv, the seat of the Soviet Ukrainian government during the time the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic controlled Kiev, proclaimed the independence of the "Donets-Kryvyi Rih Soviet Republic." The author of *Ethnocide* considers this act and the similar proclamation of a "Soviet Odessa Republic" attempts at dismembering Ukraine piecemeal, in the face of the determination of Ukrainian communists to preserve a Ukrainian Soviet Republic independent of Russia.

20. The Ukrainian Communist Party. See Note 17 above.

21. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) had its beginnings in the late 1920's and the 1930's in the national resistance movement against the Polish occupation of Western Ukraine. A militant, revolutionary, and disciplined organization, the OUN stood on the principle of complete independence of all Ukrainian territory. With the approach of World War II, the OUN had an orientation toward Germany as a power which would favor Ukrainian independence. The OUN organized resistance against the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine and, when German hostility to the idea of an independent Ukraine became obvious, against the German occupation as well. The OUN was the prime mover behind the formation of the UPA—the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrayinska Povstanska Armiya*)—which fought the Germans, the Red Army, and communist partisans during the war and which continued organized armed resistance against the Soviet regime well into the 1950's. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army constituted a formidable, organized guerrilla force until at least March 1950, when the UPA commander-in-chief, Roman Shukhevych (alias Taras Chuprynka) was killed in an ambush near Lviv. Intensive campaigns by special Soviet security forces, in cooperation with Polish and Czechoslovak units, finally resulted in the liquidation of the UPA. Captured surviving members were summarily sentenced, usually with their entire families, to 25-year terms in Soviet hard-labor camps in Eastern Siberia and the Far North. While the UPA constituted the military arm of Ukrainian organized resistance, the OUN maintained a parallel underground network and held political control. The name "OUN," however, had come to represent militant Ukrainian nationalism in general and, in the Soviet lexicon, was applied to any Ukrainian who resisted Soviet rule.

22. The author's sarcasm is directed at the fact that Western Ukraine — "voluntarily re-united" with the Ukrainian S.S.R. according to the terms of the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact between Nazi Ger-

many and the U.S.S.R. Spheres of influence were agreed upon and on September 17, 1939, the Soviet army invaded Western Ukraine.

23. The *Ukrayinska Halychska Armiya* (Ukrainian Army of Halychyna) — the army of the Western Ukrainian National Republic, which had been formed in November 1918 after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. "Galicia" is the Polish and therefore probably the more recognizable — for that part of Western Ukraine known in Ukrainian as "Halychyna"; consequently, the UHA is sometimes referred to as the Ukrainian Galician Army.

24. In the late 1890's and the early decades of the 20th century, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians from Halychyna, Bukovyna, and Zakarpattya, Ukrainian lands then under Austro-Hungarian rule, emigrated for economic reasons, most of them going to Canada and the United States. Ukrainians living on Ukrainian lands which were part of the Russian Empire similarly sought opportunity in the Far East. Several million of them emigrated to the — near the Amur River, and there established a compact Ukrainian enclave, which they called *Zeleny Klyn* (The Green Wedge).

25. A paraphrase of a much-quoted line from Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's national poet.

26. A Candidate of Sciences degree (*Kandydat Nauk*) is about equivalent to a Western Ph.D. *Doctor Nauk* (Doctor of Science) indicates academic achievement well above the Ph.D. level.

27. A term used by Russians in the past to designate Ukraine, especially during the period when it had been incorporated into the Russian Empire. For an explanation of the historical theories on the origin of the names applied to Ukrainian territory in the past — *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 3-5. The terms "Little Russia" and "Little Russians" carry a negative connotation, implying natural subordination of Ukraine and Ukrainian within a "greater" Russian identity.

28. Area in the Baltics between Riga Bay and the Sea of Chudskoye. In 1721 it — annexed by the Russian Empire and set up as a province. Today it is divided between the Estonian S.S.R. and the Latvian S.S.R.

29. The text of the treaty agreed to in January 1654 in the Ukrainian town of Pereyaslav by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and representatives of Czar Alexei of Muscovy and incorporated into a written agreement in March 1654 in Moscow has not been preserved. The vagueness of the terms led to its being interpreted differently by the two sides at the time of its implementation, even — the absence

of its text engendered sharp debate among historians up to the present. Historical opinion ranges from that of those who consider the treaty a military alliance between two equal and sovereign states, to that of those who regard it as an act of incorporation, or of complete union. The author refers to the kind of interpretation of the treaty by the Muscovite side which led to the gradual erosion of Ukrainian independence and the eventual annexation of Ukraine to Russia.

30. The Ukrainian language has become a battleground between the proponents of Russification and those who wish to preserve its uniqueness. While official linguists try to "modernize" the Ukrainian language through the introduction of "international" words and words and expressions which are either borrowed, or have a common root with the Russian language, nationally minded Ukrainian poets, writers, and other intellectuals consciously employ historical terms and archaisms (words which have become obsolete), as well as words which have fallen into official disfavor (even though they remain in everyday use), in order to keep the Ukrainian language as Ukrainian as possible.

31. Reference here is to the Soviet method of dealing with dissidents by forcibly placing them into psychiatric hospitals, some of which are under the direct administration of the KGB. Recalcitrant "patients" are usually subjected to "treatment" designed to break them spiritually and physically.

32. The increasing use of Russicisms—words, terms, and expressions borrowed from Russian—in the Ukrainian language is viewed by nationally conscious Ukrainians as another threat to the Ukrainian identity.

33. Galicianisms—more correctly *Halychisms* (from Halychyna, the Ukrainian name for Galicia)—are dialecticisms peculiar to the Ukrainian-speaking inhabitants of the Halychyna area of Western Ukraine. The argument against the use of Galicianisms is that they represent a dialect and therefore cannot claim to be a part of Ukrainian literary language and that, while this dialect might be relatively free of Russicisms, it does, in turn, reflect a certain influence of the Polish language.

34. The words listed as "outdated" are, in fact, used in everyday Ukrainian and in most cases are listed as acceptable for everyday use in Soviet Ukrainian dictionaries, for example, the *Slovnnyk ukrayinskoyi movy* [Dictionary of Ukrainian Language] (Kiev, 1970). The controversy over these words stems from the fact that they continue to be used instead of terms officially promoted with the intent of standardizing and sterilizing the Ukrainian language and moving it closer to Russian. See Note 30 above.

35. The author wants to stress Byelodyed's strong Russophile tendencies, since his name in Ukrainian should be written "Bilodid." In some circles in Ukraine, Bilodid (Byelodyed) is considered one of the most vigorous proponents of the Russification of the Ukrainian language.

36. The deciding battle of the Northern War was fought in 1709 at Poltava, where the Ukrainian hetman Ivan Mazepa joined forces with Sweden's Charles XII. Their defeat at the hands of Peter I paved the way for the abolition of the last vestiges of Ukraine's autonomy from Russia.

37. When after the Battle of Poltava Peter I moved to consolidate his control over Ukraine, he appointed a resident general with supervisory rights over the hetman and administration of the Ukrainian state, and also began the practice of personally appointing colonels. Russians and foreigners who were supporters of Moscow were placed in administrative positions. See Note 29 above.

38. Peter I ordered the "election" of Ivan Skoropadsky as hetman in November 1708, before the Battle of Poltava and at the time that Ivan Mazepa was still the head of the Hetman state, chosen according to Kozak custom and law. In 1722 Peter set up the Little Russian College—a governmental body consisting of six staff officers of Russian regiments stationed in Ukraine—to which he progressively transferred authority until it became in April 1723 the supreme administrative organ in Ukraine. The opposition of Pavlo Polubotok, Skoropadsky's successor as hetman, was ended in 1724, when he and his chief associates were imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul in St. Petersburg. Thus, although the Hetmanate continued to exist until Catherine II abolished it in 1764, the effective existence of a Hetman State, or Hetmanate, was ended by Peter I.

39. The Sich was founded in the 1540's as the fortress-center of the Ukrainian Zaporozhian Kozaks who had settled the sparsely-inhabited areas of South Ukraine. In time, the Kozaks evolved into a highly disciplined military organization which functioned as an independent state organism. Peter I destroyed the Sich after the Kozaks fought on the side of Ivan Mazepa at the Battle of Poltava in 1709.

40. Khortytsya is the island in the lower Dnipro (Dnieper) River on which the first Zaporozhian Sich was built.

41. The free Kozak lands and the Sich were located south of the great rapids of the Dnipro River; thus, *Zaporizhzhya*—"land beyond the rapids"—from *za* (beyond) and *porohy* (rapids), and also "Zaporozhian" Sich and "Zaporozhian" Kozaks. "Kozak" is the term used to denote the social element which was a Ukrainian phenomenon, in

order to differentiate it from the more general connotation represented by the term "cossack." The latter is used to identify similar social elements of non-Ukrainian origin, such as the Don Cossacks.

42. The Zaporozhian Kozaks under Hetman Sahaydachny played a key role in the defeat of the Turkish forces at the Battle of Khotyn in 1621. The Kozak period has special significance with respect to the Russification issue because it represents a point in Ukrainian history characterized by 1) a struggle for independence which culminated in the creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state, 2) highly visible military strength and political prestige (the Zaporozhian Kozaks were recognized as one of the most powerful military forces in Europe, and the Ukrainian hetmans, especially Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan Mazepa, conducted a vigorous foreign policy and established diplomatic relations with most of the European states and the Ottoman Empire), and 3) the democratic nature of the Kozak social order (Kozak hetmans and other high officials were elected and could be deposed), among the first in all of Europe. As such, it could serve as a focal point of national consciousness and pride and thus inhibit the effects of the Russification process. For this reason the government has encouraged the playing down of the importance of the Kozak period in particular and Ukrainian history before the Soviet era in general. The result is that literary and even scholarly works which dwell on the historical past of the Ukrainian people (such as Kytsenko's book) are frowned upon and usually blacklisted.

43. The Kievan Mohyla Academy was founded by the Metropolitan of Kiev, Petro Mohyla, and became the academic center of Ukraine. The author makes this point to underscore Sahaydachny's contributions to Ukrainian culture, in addition to his military accomplishments.

44. An ornamental mace, the symbol of the authority of a hetman.

45. The Zaporozhian Kozaks settled and controlled territory in the steppes of Southern Ukraine, lands which were considered "free" because they were beyond the reach of the system of serfdom practiced by the Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian gentry on much of the remaining Ukrainian territory.

46. As Catherine II's court favorite, Prince Grigori Potemkin exercised great influence on Russia's internal and foreign policy. It was his advice that Catherine ordered the destruction of the Sich in 1775.

47. Refers to the method of farming used by Kozak settlers, according to which large areas of land were worked with the smallest possible use of labor and tools.

48. The two main centers of Ukrainian settlement in Asia — on the border of Siberia and Kazakhstan and in the *Zeleny Klyn* (Green Wedge), the name given by Ukrainians to their enclave in the Amur Region in the Far East. See Note 24.

49. The author has mistakenly attributed the publication of Symonenko's works to Smoloskyp. A collection of Symonenko's poetry — first published in 1965 under the title *Bereh Chekan* (The Shore of Expectations) by Suchasnist Publishers. A second edition followed in 1973.

50. At the time of the 1926 — Ukrainian lands in the U.S.S.R. — administratively divided into *okruhy* (divisions or departments) and *rayons* (districts). Refer to Note —

51. *Stanytaya*, in Ukrainian, and *stanitsa*, in Russian, — terms denoting the settlements or villages of the Kuban Kozaks, as well as those of the Don and Terek Cossacks.

52. This period in the history of the Russian Empire, marked by intermittent hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, — heavy settlement of the borderlands for the purposes of security.

53. Kozaks living at the Zaporozhian Sich were divided and housed according to *kurins*, each such unit usually uniting men from the same — of Ukraine. Each *kurin* had a — and elected its own leadership.

54. The Ukrainian Kozak State established by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky after his revolt against Poland in 1648 was also called the Hetman State. It constituted the first independent Ukrainian government of modern times. Czar Peter I took away much of its autonomy after the Battle of Poltava in 1709 (see Note 38) and Catherine the Great abolished it completely in 1764.

55. Budzhak is — area which in the 18th century belonged to the Ottoman Empire; now it is part of Odessa Region. The Azov Kozaks had settled — the mouth of the Danube after the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich. Subsequently, they were relocated to the Azov — and then to Kuban.

56. Eastern Ukraine, the name being derived from the left bank of the Dniipro River.

57. Foreigners, or, literally, "those from other cities."

58. Refers to the old administrative units (*guberniï*), not to the present-day regions.

59. Refer to Note 1.

60. The term *rusky* (pronounced *rus'kyy* in Ukrainian) derives from *Rus'*, the [redacted] of the ancient Ukrainian state which existed in the 10th to 14th centuries. *Rusky* and its variant form *rusyn* [redacted] used to designate inhabitants of Ukraine throughout the Kozak period (even while the term "Ukrainian" [redacted] becoming widespread) and into the 20th century. *Russky* (*russkiy*) denotes an inhabitant of Russia. Much has been written on the relationship between and origin of the two terms, inasmuch [redacted] they have a bearing [redacted] the Ukrainian claim to an identity and [redacted] history separate from Russia.

61. The author is sarcastically referring back to the line from *Kubanskiye stanitsy* which reads (in Russian): "In determining nationality the decisive factor for them is the place of birth or the district of prolonged residence."

62. A two- or four-line Russian folk verse, usually humorous and topical.

63. A type of men's pants made popular by the Zaporozhian Kozaks, which eventually became part of the Ukrainian national costume. They were characterized by their full cut, with each pant leg being almost balloon-like in shape. In this and in their brighter colors, the *sharavary* differed from the pants [redacted] by Russian men.

64. Ukrainian men would tuck their shirts into the *sharavary*, while the Russians wore theirs over the top.

65. The author is referring to the fact that Western Ukraine first felt Russian influence in 1939. At various times in its history, it had been under the control of Lithuania, Poland, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and, from 1920 to 1939, again Poland.

66. Reference is to *Ukrayino nasha radyanska*, whose author [redacted] formally Petro Shelest, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party at the time (though it is probable that the book [redacted] ghostwritten at his behest). Reviews of the book were initially very favorable; however, they soon became highly critical, [redacted] turnabout which served [redacted] an official signal that Shelest had fallen into disfavor with the Kremlin leadership. The cardinal sin of the book lay in the fact that although it glorified the Soviet period in Ukrainian history, it nevertheless included frequent reference to Ukraine's pre-Revolutionary existence, especially the Kozak period. See Note 42.

67. Shukhevych's father, Roman Shukhevych, had been the [redacted] der-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Yuriy Shukhevych [redacted] arrested in 1948 at age 15 for being his father's son. In 1972 he

was sentenced to ■ third ten-year term for his continued refusal to publicly denounce his father.

68. Evening's in honor of Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's national poet, and gatherings near his monuments, especially ■ May 22, the anniversary of the moving of Shevchenko's body from St. Petersburg to its final resting place ■■ Kaniv, have served as manifestations of Ukrainian national consciousness.

69. Shevchenko's "Testament," sung to music composed by M. Ly-senko, has recently become an unofficial national anthem to nationally minded Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.

70. Yaniv Cemetery in Lviv contains ■ section consisting of the graves of the soldiers of the Ukrainian Galician Army (Ukrainian Army of Halychyna, or UHA), who died in the Ukrainian-Polish War for control of Western Ukraine after World War I. It became a regular custom to formally honor these ■■ dead, especially during Pentecost. Ironically, the Polish government, while it occupied Western Ukraine, usually allowed even mass manifestations in honor of the dead soldiers of the UHA, yet the Soviet government today does not permit ■■ individual expressions of reverence. Also refer to Note ■ above.

71. Blue and yellow, the colors of the flag of the Ukrainian People's Republic, symbolize Ukrainian independence.

72. *Dumas*, epic ballads which tell of events and heroic figures from Ukrainian history, were first made popular during the Kozak period by old wandering Kozaks, who accompanied themselves on the *kobza* instrument.

73. The Ukrainian inhabitants of ■ area in the Carpathian Mountains, the Hutsuls, developed a unique style of architecture, perhaps best represented by their wooden churches. For more ■ Hutsul art and culture and the special spirit of independence and individuality of these people, ■ Valentyn Moroz's essay "A Chronicle of Resistance" in *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz* (Smoloskyp Publishers, Baltimore, 1974).

74. Oleksa Dovbush (1719-45) ■■ probably the most famous leader of the *opryshky*, the armed outlaws of the Hutsul region who fought and robbed the rich. Dovbush and his *opryshky* personified the spirit of resistance of the poorer elements of the area against exploitation by the rich; ■ such, they ■■ to be regarded as heroes, and became the subjects of local legends. Again, ■ Moroz's "A Chronicle of Resistance."

75. "*Banderivtsi*" was the term used ■ designate the followers of Stepan Bandera, who until his assassination by a Soviet agent in 1959 in Munich ■ the leader of ■ of the factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The term is also applied, by extension, to any Ukrainian nationalist, and even, in the Soviet Union today, to anyone who exhibits ■ degree of Ukrainian consciousness. In the text the reference is to members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which fought against Soviet occupation during and after World War II. See Note 21 above.

76. On August 13, 1975, the Church of the Epiphany in Zhytomyr was, in fact, destroyed by the authorities, despite ■ two-year-long effort by the faithful to save it. On August 16, 1975, the parishioners sent statements protesting the destruction of their church to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, various heads of state, and "all people of good will."

77. Refers to the Ukrainian custom according to which young people go from house to house on New Year's Eve strewing grain, thus wishing the master of the house and his household ■ bountiful and prosperous coming year.

78. According to Ukrainian custom, *paskas* (Easter bread) and other foods are taken to church on Easter Saturday to be blessed.

79. Both the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic, or Uniate, Church were forcibly absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church. Church buildings were handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church authorities, and the clergy and hierarchy of both Ukrainian churches were ordered to join the Russian Orthodox Church. Few of them did; as ■ consequence, many were executed, while thousands were deported to exile in Siberia. Metropolitan Filaret is the Exarch of Ukraine for the Russian Orthodox Church.

80. The coordinating body of ■ Ukrainian civic, religious, and cultural organizations outside of Ukraine. The World Congress of Free Ukrainians was created at ■ convention of delegates in New York in 1967. A second convention was held in Toronto in 1973. The Secretariat of the World Congress, its executive organ, is presently located in Toronto.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

The notes below identify individuals referred to in the text. In the main, four categories were included: 1) Ukrainian literary figures who were liquidated during the purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia following the collapse of Ukrainianization in the 1930's; 2) cultural and civic activists who belong to the present period of national ferment in Ukraine and who are repressed by the regime; 3) literary figures whose names are found in the KGB blacklist filed with the Censorship Committee; and 4) selected outstanding figures of Ukrainian literature. Each category is far from complete. Information was provided with the intent of establishing for the reader the significance of those important individuals listed in the text.

Individuals belonging to the first category were often mentioned in association with one or more literary organizations identified in the notes only by their acronyms. These are the Kharkiv society VAPLITE—*Vilna Akademiya Proletarskoyi Literatury* (The Free Academy of Proletarian Literature), and the Kiev organizations ASPYS—*Asotsiatsiia Pysmennykiv* (The Writers' Association), LANKA, and MARS—*Maysternya Revolyutsynoho Slova* (The Workshop of the Revolutionary Word).

Prominent within the notes of the second category is the phrase "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." It refers to the purposely vague catchall Article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian S.S.R., which is most often used as the basis for political charges, and which defines the "crime" as "Agitation and propaganda conducted for the purpose of undermining or weakening Soviet rule, or the commission of individual crimes which are of particular danger to the state; the dissemination, for the same purpose, of slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet state and social system; as well as the circulation, production, or possession for the same purpose, of literature of similar content."

ROMAN ANDRIYASHYK (1933-): Writer, journalist; member of the Communist Party and the Writers' Union of Ukraine. Criticized for "idealization" of the Ukrainian People's Republic in his novel *Poltva*, now on the list of forbidden books.

BORYS ANTONENKO-DAVYDOVYCH (1899-): Writer. During the 1920's, a member of the Kiev group of writers which formed the literary organizations ASPYS, LANKA, MARS. Among his better-known works — the drama *Lytsari absurdu* (Knights of the Absurd), the novel *Smert* (Death), which dealt with the incompatibility of the communist philosophy and the Ukrainian psyche, and the collection *Zemleyu Ukrayinskoyu* (Throughout the Ukrainian Land), which dealt with the questions of de-Russification and industrialization. Arrested in 1934 during the purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia; political prisoner in Soviet concentration camps, then exiled, until his return to Ukraine in 1957; rehabilitated at that time. Signer of several appeals and open letters in defense of repressed Ukrainian intellectuals in the sixties and seventies; refused to testify against Valentyn Moroz in 1970. His name is on the KGB's blacklist.

BOHDAN ANTONYCH (1909-37): Poet; editor of and contributor to numerous literary publications. Five collections of his poetry were published in Western Ukraine in the 1930's; twice poet-laureate of Western Ukraine. His — appears on the KGB's blacklist of Ukrainian authors whose works may not be quoted or names mentioned in any publication.

IVAN BAHRYANY (1907-63): Poet and writer; member of the Kiev literary organization MARS. Repressed in 1932; emigrated to the West during World War II. Ukrainian emigré political leader as head of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party. Among his better-known works are the novel *Tykhrobovy* (1944), which — translated into English under the title *The Hunters and the Hunted*, and *Sad Hetsymansky* (The Garden of Gethsemane, 1950), which has been translated into French—both works deal with the problem of survival within the Soviet system of concentration camps and prisons in the 1930's. His — is — the KGB's blacklist.

OLES BERDNYK (1927-): Writer, specializes in the science fiction genre. From 1949 to 1955 lived in exile in the Far North and Kazakhstan. Among his better-known published works, most of which — characterized by mysticism and a tendency away from social realism, are the novels *Shlyakh tytaniv* (The Way of the Titans, 1959), *Dity bezmezhhzhyia* (The Children of Infinity, 1964), *Podvyh Vayvasvaty* (The Feat of Vayvasvata, 1967), and *Vohnyany vershnyk* (The Flaming Horseman, 1967). Of his newest works, the fable *Okotsvit* (1970) was destroyed just after printing and the novel *Zoryany Korsar* (The Astral Corsair, 1971) was removed from circulation. In

April 1972 the KGB searched his apartment; he was forbidden to lecture in public. Expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine in 1973; forbidden to publish. His [redacted] is [redacted] on the KGB's blacklist. A collection of his *samydav* short stories, mostly science fiction, reached the West and was published by Smoloskyp under the title *Zolati Vorota* (The Golden Gate, 1975).

IVAN BILYK (1929-): Writer, journalist; member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine. Author of the historical novel *Mech Arey* (The Sword of Arey, 1972), which was destroyed shortly after publication because it had idealized the beginnings of the Ukrainian nation.

MYKHAYLO BRAYCHEVSKY (1924-): Archeologist, historian, writer; senior researcher at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, Ukr.S.S.R., until 1968, when he [redacted] dismissed for signing an open letter to Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, protesting political trials in Ukraine and the U.S.S.R. Author of several hundred research papers, articles, studies, and monographs on Ukrainian and Slavic history and archeology. His *Pryyednannya chy vazyednannya?* (*krytychni zavvaky z pryvodu odniyeyi kontseptsii*) (Unification or Annexation? Critical Remarks about a Certain Concept), an historical study of the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654, in which he argued that Ukraine was forcibly annexed to Russia, was not allowed to be published, but circulated in the *samydav*. After the work was published abroad in 1972, Braychevsky [redacted] interrogated and forced to write an apologetic open letter. Out of work since 1968.

KOST BUREVIY (1888-1934): Writer, journalist, theater critic, and political leader; member of the Ukrainian Central Rada; later, taught history of the theater in the Ukrainian Drama School in Moscow. Author of numerous satirical works, as well [redacted] the drama *Paulo Polubotok* (about the Ukrainian hetman) and several monographs [redacted] the history of the theater. Executed during the purges of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1930's.

MYKOLA BUTOVYCH (1895-1966): Graphics illustrator and engraver. Employed themes based on Ukrainian mythology, folklore, and customs in his art. Resides in the U.S. since 1948. His name appears [redacted] the KGB's blacklist.

VASYL CHAPLENKO: Writer, philologist, and literary historian. Presently residing in the U.S. Author of [redacted] history of the Ukrainian literary language (1955), [redacted] monograph (1960) on the destruction of Ukrainian writers and Ukrainian literature in Soviet Ukraine, titled *Propashchi syly: Ukrayinske pyshmenstvo pid komunistychnym rezhymom, 1920-1933* (The Lost Powers: Ukrainian Literature Under the Communist Regime, 1920-33), and several novels. His name is [redacted] the KGB's blacklist.

VYACHESLAV CHORNOVIL (1938-): Journalist; graduate of the Department of Journalism at the University of Kiev (1960); worked ■ ■ ■ editor of Lviv television studio, and ■ ■ ■ staffs of several publications and Kiev radio; one-time secretary of Komsomol in Ukraine. Covered trials of Ukrainian intellectuals in 1965-66, after which he wrote ■ petition to authorities, protesting the violations of legality he witnessed, and compiled ■ collection of materials about those sentenced. Collection was published in the West under the title *The Chornovil Papers* (McGraw-Hill, 1968). Arrested and in November 1967 tried for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"; served one and ■ half years in ■ labor camp in Mordovia. After release in 1969 joined in defense of other repressed Ukrainian intellectuals, especially Karavansky and Moroz; founding member of the Citizens' Committee for the Defense of Nina Strokata. Author of *Relapse into Terror or Justice?*, and ■ defense of Dzyuba's *Internationalism or Russification?*, titled *What B. Stenchuk Defends and How He Does It*, works which were highly popular in the *samvydav*. Arrested again in January 1972; tried in February 1973 under Article 62, Criminal Code of the Ukr.S.S.R.; sentenced to seven years' severe-regime labor camp, five years' exile. On December 13, 1975 the London *Sunday Times* awarded Chornovil its award for outstanding journalism in recognition of the report he wrote ■ the 1965-66 trials, a report the *Times* called "a classical product of investigative journalism."

MYKHAYLO DRAY-KHMARA (1889- ?): Poet, philologist, and literary scholar specializing in Ukrainian and Serbian literature and the history of the Serbian and Byelorussian languages. Belonged to the neo-classicist school of Ukrainian poets. Severely criticized in the 1920's for his "non-proletarian" approach to literature. Arrested in 1935 and sent to the Kolyma concentration camp in Siberia, where he died in either 1938 or 1939.

IVAN DZYUBA (1931-): Literary critic, writer; editor and editorial assistant of ■ number of Soviet Ukrainian literary journals and publishing houses; leading activist of the Ukrainian literary and cultural renaissance of the 1960's. Author of approximately 100 articles published in Soviet periodicals before 1965. In September 1965 publicly called on the citizens of Kiev to protest against arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals; dismissed, as a result, from his position with the *Malod* publishing house. Wrote and signed numerous open letter and appeals to Soviet authorities, protesting against political repressions, especially in the ■ ■ ■ of Vyacheslav Chornovil and Valentyn Moroz. In 1965 wrote *Internationalism or Russification?*, ■ analysis of the Russification policies of the Soviet regime, which he sent to party and government leaders. The work became the most widely read document of the *samvydav*; in 1968 it was published in the West in Ukrainian, English, and Italian, which led to increased official pressure against him; in ■ ■ ■ he was forced to write an open

letter condemning Ukrainian nationalism. Expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine in March 1972; arrested in April; tried in March 1973 on a charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and sentenced to five years' labor camp. Imprisoned until late 1973 in a KGB prison in Kiev, at which time, ■ a result of various KGB methods of persuasion and failing health (incurable tuberculosis), he agreed to sign a statement condemning his previous activity and ■■ released.

DMYTRO FALKIVSKY (1898-1934): Poet; in the 1920's, member of the Kiev literary organizations ASPYS, LANKA, and MARS. Executed in December during the purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

IVAN FRANKO (1856-1916): Writer, poet; after Shevchenko, the greatest figure in Ukrainian literature. Although he produced some of the most lyrical and individualistic poetry of the period, as well as children's literature and historical novels, Franko's importance rests with his works dealing with social inequity, the oppression of the Ukrainian peasantry, the exploitation of workers in the oil fields of Western Ukraine—*Boa Constrictor*, *Boryslav Smiyetsya* (Boryslav Laughs)—and the idea of national liberation—the dramatic poem *Moysey* (Moses). Franko is thus considered both a revolutionary against social injustice and a symbol for Ukrainian national aspirations.

IVAN HEL (1937-): Active participant of the Ukrainian civil rights movement. Served three-year term in labor camps in the Mordovian A.S.S.R. (1966-69) for dissemination of *samvydav* literature. On December 7, 1970, spoke at funeral of Alla Horska in Kiev. In 1972 arrested again for dissemination; sentenced to ten years' labor camp, five years' exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." As of December 1975 he was still in a labor camp in the Mordovian A.S.S.R., where he is an active participant in hunger strikes and protests by political prisoners.

SEMEN HLUZMAN (1946-): Ukrainian Jewish psychiatrist; active participant of the civil rights movement. Arrested in May 1972 for dissemination of *samvydav* literature and for giving ■ dissenting psychiatric evaluation of Gen. Petro Hryhorenko; October, 1972, sentenced to seven years' labor camp, three years' exile on ■ charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Author of *An In-Absentia Forensic Psychiatric Examination in the Hryhorenko Case*, and co-author (with Vladimir Bukovsky) of *A Dissident's Guide to Psychiatry* (dedicated to Leonid Plyushch); both works circulated in the *samvydav* and deal with Soviet abuses of psychiatry against dissidents. As of December 1975 he is still in a labor camp in Perm Region, R.S.F.S.R., where in the summer of 1974 he was the initiator of ■ massive hunger strike by political prisoners protesting violations of their rights.

OLEKSA HRYSHCHENKO (1883-): Prominent painter and scholar of the arts; studied in Kiev and St. Petersburg; graduated from the University of Moscow. Lived and worked in Paris in the 1920's; had thirteen showings in Paris, a total of thirty-two in the cities of Europe. Author of several monographs on art. His name is ■ the KGB's blacklist.

ROMAN IVANYCHUK (1929-): Writer, philologist; member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine and the Communist Party. Author of the novel *Malvy* (The Hollyhocks), in which he analyzed the turn-coat mentality and for which he ■■ criticized and temporarily forbidden to publish.

VIKTOR IVANYSENKO (1927-): Literary critic and scholar; member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine and the Communist Party; a senior researcher at the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences, Ukr.S.S.R., until 1972, when *samvydav* literature was found at his place of work. Expelled from the Union, the Party, dismissed from the Institute, and prevented from defending his dissertation for ■ Doctor of Sciences degree.

IHOR KALYNETS (1938-): Poet; considered one of the brightest young literary talents in Ukraine. First collection of poetry was due to be published in 1965, but, for reasons unknown, ■■ not; poetry collection *Kupalo's Bonfire* published in 1966, but blacklisted soon thereafter. Arrested in 1965, but released; since then, forbidden to publish, but became very popular in the *samvydav*. Active in defense of arrested Ukrainian intellectuals, especially Valentyn Moroz, whose 1970 trial he attended and to whom he dedicated his collection *Summing up Silence* (1970). Arrested August 11, 1972, and sentenced to six years' labor camp, three years' exile, on a charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Recently transferred from ■ labor camp in the Mordovian A.S.S.R. to ■■ in Perm Region, where in May and June 1974 he participated in the prolonged hunger strike by political prisoners. Three of his collections of poetry have been published in the West, including *Vohon Kupala* (Kupalo's Bonfire) by Smoloskyp (1975).

SVYATOSLAV KARAVANSKY (1920-): Poet, writer, translator. Sentenced in 1945 to twenty-five years' imprisonment for membership in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists; amnestied in 1960. Compiler of 1200-page *Dictionary of Rhymes in the Ukrainian language*; translator of Byron, Shakespeare, Kipling, and Shelley into Ukrainian; author of numerous published articles ■ linguistics. In 1965 protested against the Russification of Ukrainian schools in two letters to Soviet authorities, and against violations

of Ukrainian sovereignty and ■ arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in ■ petition to Polish and Czechoslovak communist leaders. Arrested on November 13, 1965; returned, without trial, to ■ out the remaining nine years of his original sentence. Transferred to Vladimir prison in 1967 for writing several petitions criticizing violations of civil rights, the Soviet nationalities policy, and the 1941 ■ executions of Polish prisoners of ■ in Katyn Forest. In 1970, put on trial at the prison and given a new sentence of five years in prison, three years in labor camp. As of December 1975 he is still in ■ labor camp in the Mordovian A.S.S.R.

MYKOLA KHVYLOVY (1893-1933): Literary pseudonym of Mykola Fitylov—poet, writer, publicist. Leader of the movement among Ukrainian communists for the psychological independence of Ukraine from Moscow, especially in literature. In 1925, founded the writers' organization Free Academy of Proletarian Literature (VAPLITE), whose purpose it ■ to develop ■ true Ukrainian literature based on Ukrainian literary tradition and its ties with European literature, and to oppose the provincialism dictated from Moscow; Khvylovy carried ■ the polemic on these issues in a series of pamphlets and the novel *Valdshnepy* (The Woodsnipes, 1927); increasingly, the VAPLITE and other similar literary organizations which supported Ukrainianization came under attack for "nationalist deviation"; the VAPLITE was forced to dissolve in 1928; all literary organizations were disbanded in 1932 ■ part of a policy of forced centralization. Khvylovy committed suicide in May 1933 during the purge of those members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who had been proponents of Ukrainianization.

HRYHORIY KOCHUR (1908-): Translator, literary critic. Signed an open letter protesting arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals. Expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine in 1973 for offering to serve Ivan Dzyuba's prison term.

LINA KOSTENKO (1930-): Poetess; one of the leading members of the Kiev group of young intellectuals who began the Ukrainian cultural renaissance of the 1960's. First poems were published in 1950; collections published in 1957, 1958, 1961, and 1962, although the last one, *The Astral Integral*, was destroyed shortly after printing. Although ■ member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, has had nothing published since 1962, with the exception of several poems in ■ Kiev newspaper in 1967. Actively protested against arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in the mid-1960's, especially those of M. Osadchy, Chornovil, and Karavansky. In 1969, ■ anthology of her works was published in the West by Smoloskyp under the title *Poeziyi* (Poems).

HRYPORIY KOSYNKA (1899-1934): Writer. Several collections of his short stories were published between 1922 and 1933. Leading participant in the Ukrainian literary renaissance of the 1920's; member of the Kiev literary organizations ASPYS, LANKA, and MARS. Severely criticized in official circles for his "kulak ideology," "counter-revolutionary ideas," and "banditism." Executed in 1934 during the purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

MYKHAYLO KOTSYUBYNSKY (1864-1913): Writer, literary critic, translator; one of the greatest figures of Ukrainian literature. Prominent themes in his works include the social patterns of the Ukrainian masses, especially the peasantry, against a background of national and social oppression, and the responsibilities of the intelligentsia vis-a-vis the masses. Major works include *Fata Morgana* (1903-10), *Intermezzo* (1908), and *Tini zabutykh predkiv* (Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, 1911). Kotsyubynsky's writings place him among the leading revolutionaries of the 1900's, those opposed to the social oppression of the czarist regime, especially as it was coupled with national oppression in Ukraine. The high artistry and deep lyricism of his works, his exploration of various literary directions, especially impressionism, exerted a strong influence on the development of Ukrainian literature.

ZINOVIIY KRASIVSKY (1930-): Student activist, poet, writer. In 1947, deported with his family from Western Ukraine to Siberia, where he served five years in a labor camp. Arrested again in 1967 with a group of young student activists at Lviv University; charged with organizing an underground organization, the Ukrainian National Front, and with publishing an illegal journal, *Fatherland and Freedom*; sentenced to five years' prison, seven years' labor camp, and five years' exile, on a charge of "treason." In 1969, along with other Ukrainian political prisoners in Vladimir Prison, sent an appeal to the UN; in 1970, participated in a hunger strike by political prisoners. A collection of his poetry written in the prison was found and confiscated during a search; this and his continued protests served as the basis for new charges against him and for his eventual transfer in 1973 to a special psychiatric hospital in Sychovka, Smolensk Region, the R.S.F.S.R., where he is being held for an indefinite term, deprived of all visitation rights, and subjected to forced "treatment" of heavy doses of drugs.

IVAN KRUSHELNYTSKY (1905-34): Poet, graphics artist, art scholar; in 1929-32, co-editor of the Western Ukrainian Sovietophile journal *Novi shlyakhy* (New Roads). Several collections of his poetry were published in Western Ukraine. Moved to the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1932. Executed in 1934 on a fabricated charge of counter-revolutionary activity. Rehabilitated in 1957.

MYKOLA KULISH (1892-1942): Playwright; co-founder (with Les Kurbas) of modern Ukrainian theatre. His works often satirized Soviet reality; other themes dealt with the incompatibility of Ukrainian national aspirations and communism, and the Ukrainianization issue of the 1920's. As president of the Kharkiv literary organization VAPLITE and supporter of Khvylovy, he was one of the leading proponents of a Ukrainian literature free of the dictates of Moscow and based on traditional ties with Western European literatures. Arrested in 1934 during the purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and imprisoned in a concentration camp in Siberia, where he died in 1942. Although rehabilitated in 1956, his best works are still forbidden.

MYKHAYLO LEBEDYNETS: Executed in 1934 during the purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

VASYL LISOVY: Academic assistant at the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.S.S.R.; contributor to the journal *Philosophical Thought*. Co-author (with Yevhen Pronyuk) of letter to Soviet authorities and prominent individuals protesting against the 1972 political arrests in Ukraine (especially in the case of Ivan Dzyuba) and criticizing the Party's cultural and economic policies in Ukraine. Arrested in July 1972; sentenced in November 1973 to ■■■■■ years' labor camp, three years' exile, on ■ charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

MYKOLA LUKASH (1919-):: Translator. Among his published translations are *Faust* (1955), *Decameron* (1964), *Madame Bovary*, and numerous poetic and prose works from eighteen different languages. Member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine until 1973, when he was expelled and threatened with psychiatric imprisonment for offering to serve Ivan Dzyuba's five-year sentence.

ANATOLIY LUPYNIS (1937-):: Poet. From 1956 to 1967, ■ political prisoner in Soviet labor camps, where he actively protested against violations of prisoners' rights; staged a two-year hunger strike (kept alive by force-feeding) in order to dramatize his demands for the democratization of Soviet society. On May 27, 1971, recited ■■ of his poems at a spontaneous meeting in honor of Taras Shevchenko; arrested ■ few days later; tried in January 1972 on ■ charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"; sentenced to ■■ indefinite term in ■ psychiatric prison-type hospital.

ARKADIY LYUBCHENKO (1899-1945): Writer. Active participant of the literary movement of the 1920's and thirties; co-founder and secretary of the VAPLITE literary organization in Kharkiv. His name appears on the KGB's blacklist.

VALENTYN MOROZ (1936-): Historian, publicist. First arrested in August 1965 for possession of *samvydav* literature; sentenced in January 1966 to four years' imprisonment for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"; during imprisonment, wrote *A Report from the Beria Reservation*; released in September 1969. Arrested again on June 1, 1970; tried in November 1970, again under Article 62, Criminal Code of the Ukr.S.S.R., for his authorship of the essays *A Chronicle of Resistance, Amid the Snows, and Moses and Dathan*, written after his release; sentenced to six years in prison, three in labor camps, five in exile. Since 1971, in Vladimir Prison, where in the summer of 1974 he spent 145 days on a hunger strike in support of his demand to be transferred to a labor camp. Moroz has become the leading symbol of the present Ukrainian movement for civil and national rights. In 1974 Smoloskyp published his works in English under the title *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz*.

VIKTOR NEKRASOV (1911-): Russian writer; member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine. Author of award-winning novel *In the Trenches of Stalingrad* (1946), other novels and short stories. Protested against political arrests and trials in Ukraine in the 1960's. Allowed to emigrate to the West in 1974. His name is on the KGB's blacklist.

IVAN OHIYENKO (1882-1972): Clerical name—Illarion; Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Canada; historian of the Church and outstanding philologist; member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Author of [redacted] monographs on church history and the Ukrainian language, among them, *Istoriya ukrayinskoyi literaturnoyi movy* (The History of the Ukrainian Literary Language, 1950). Translated many religious works into Ukrainian; throughout the years, editor of several philological and religious periodical publications. Name appears on the KGB's blacklist.

OLEKSANDER OHLOBLYN (1899-): Historian. In 1931-32, assistant director of the All-Ukrainian Museum in Kiev; in 1932-33, director of the Center of Archives of Old Documents in Kiev. Emigrated to the West in 1944. Professor at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich; in 1946-51, professor at the Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Academy; member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and president of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Arts and Sciences. Author of over 250 published works on the history of Ukraine, historiography, archeography, and genealogy; presently, professor at the Harvard Center of Ukrainian Studies. His name appears on the KGB's blacklist.

MYKHAYLO OSADCHY (1936-): Writer, poet, journalist, university lecturer. Sentenced in April 1966 to two years' labor camp for possession of *samvydav* literature. Author of *Bilmo* (The Cataract), an autobiographical description of life in a Soviet labor camp, which circulated widely in the *samvydav* and was published in the West in Ukrainian and in French (*Cataracte*, Fayard, Paris, 1974). Arrested again in January 1972 in Lviv; tried in September 1972; sentenced to seven years' labor camp, three years' exile, again for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

SERHIY PLACHYNDA (1928-): Writer; member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine. Author of the novel *Neopalyma kupyna* (The Burning Bush), which was banned soon after publication because it allegedly idealized Ukraine's past. Plachynda's name is found on the KGB's blacklist.

YEVHEN PLUZHNYK (1898-1938): Poet, writer; member of the literary organizations ASPYS, LANKA, and MARS in Kiev in the 1920's. Arrested in 1935 during the purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia; received death sentence, which was later commuted. Died in 1938 in concentration camp on Solovky Islands. Rehabilitated in 1966.

LEONID PLYUSHCH (1939-): Mathematician, cyberneticist. Active participant in the civil rights movement; member of the Initiative Group for Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. Expelled from the Cybernetics Institute, Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.S.S.R., in 1968 for open letter he wrote in defense of Russian dissident Aleksandr Ginsberg. Arrested in January 1972 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"; tried in camera in January 1973, and sentenced, on the basis of psychiatric examinations at the Serbsky Institute in Moscow, to an indefinite term in a special psychiatric hospital for treatment of "schizophrenia with messianic and reformist tendencies." Held from July 15, 1973, in special prison-type psychiatric hospital in Dnipropetrovsk until January 8, 1976, when he was released and allowed to leave the U.S.S.R., as a direct result of widespread protests on his behalf in the West.

YEVHEN PRONYUK: Academic assistant at the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.S.S.R. Co-author of letter to Soviet authorities protesting against 1972 political arrests in Ukraine and criticizing the Party's cultural and economic policies. Tried in November 1973 in Kiev with V. Lisovy for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," specifically for the preparation of the letter; sentenced to years' imprisonment, five years' exile. As of December 1975 still in a labor camp in Perm Region, the R.S.F.S.R., where a violation of his visitation rights by camp officials in the summer of 1974 led to an extended protest and hunger strike by political prisoners.

VASYL ROMANYUK (1922-): Orthodox priest. First arrested in 1944 for "nationalist-religious activity"; sentenced to ten years' labor camp; family deported to Siberia. Protested against arrests and trials of Ukrainian intellectuals in the 1960's; removed from his parish in the village of Kosmach after he sent a letter to the Supreme Court of the Ukr.S.S.R. in defense of Valentyn Moroz in 1970. Arrested in January 1972; tried in July and sentenced to ten years' special-regime labor camp and five years' exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." On August 1, 1975, in a labor camp in the Mordovian A.S.S.R., he declared a hunger strike in support of his demand to be allowed to have a Bible and in protest against persecution of dissidents; in the summer of 1975, wrote appeal to Pope Paul VI and to the World Council of Churches, asking for their intervention on behalf of those imprisoned for their defense of civil rights and religious freedom.

VASYL RUBAN (1942-): Poet. Arrested, tried, and sentenced in 1973 to an indefinite term in a psychiatric prison-type hospital.

IRYNA SENYK (1925-): Poet. Served ten years (1944-54) in Soviet hard-labor camps for her participation in the Ukrainian resistance movement. Returned to Ukraine in the early 1960's. Signed protests against the 1965 political trials and appeals in defense of S. Karavansky, V. Moroz, and V. Chornovil. Arrested in October 1972; tried and sentenced to six years' labor camp, five years' exile, for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." In December 1973 participated in a hunger strike by women-political prisoners of a Mordovian labor camp, in protest against the Soviet Union's violations of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

OLEKSANDER SERHIYENKO (1932-): Art teacher. Father died in a Soviet concentration camp during Stalin era. Serhiyenko protested against Valentyn Moroz's harsh sentence in a letter to the Supreme Court of the Ukr.S.S.R. in 1970. Dismissed from teaching position shortly after speech at Alla Horska's funeral in December 1970; arrested in January 1972; tried in June and sentenced to seven years' labor camp, three years' exile, for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

STEFANIYA SHABATURA (1938-): Artist, specializing in Ukrainian tapestries. Protested against Moroz's 1970 trial in letter to the Supreme Court of the Ukr.S.S.R. Arrested January 1972 in Lviv; tried in July on basis of her defense of Moroz and "political motifs" in her art; sentenced to five years' labor camp, three years' exile, for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." As of December 1975 still in labor camp near Barashevo, the Mordovian A.S.S.R., where she has participated in hunger strikes, written to the Procurator-General of the U.S.S.R. in protest against a prohibition to paint (April 1973), and co-authored an appeal to the UN (May 1973).

MARKIYAN SHASHKEVYCH (1811-1843): Poet, writer; one of the leading figures in the revival of cultural and political life in Western Ukraine; member of the "Ruthenian Trinity," which published the literary collection *Rusalka Dnistrova* (The Dniester Nymph) in 1836.

PETRO SHELEST (1908-): Communist Party leader; member of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 1961; member of the Politburo of the CPSU, 1966-73; First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, 1963-72. His ■■■ is on the KGB's blacklist ■■■ the formal author of the banned book *Ukrayino nasha radyanska* (Our Soviet Ukraine, 1970). See Note 66, p. 171.

TARAS SHEVCHENKO (1814-1864): Poet, playwright, artist; considered the greatest figure in Ukrainian literature. Shevchenko's significance rests on his immense contribution to the development of the Ukrainian language and literature, his opposition to the social oppression and inequities under the czarist regime, and his ardent Ukrainian patriotism. Exiled by the czarist government to Siberia from 1847 to 1857 for his revolutionary poetry and his membership in the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Collection of poetry first published in 1840 under the title *Kobzar*; other important works include the historical poem "Haydamaky" (1841), and the political poems "Rozryta mohyla" (The Ransacked Grave), "Kavkaz" (The Caucasus), and "Poslaniye" (The Epistle). His "Zapovit" (Testament) is considered by many nationally conscious Ukrainians ■■■ an unofficial national anthem. Shevchenko's ■■■ of themes from Ukrainian history, his opposition to social and national oppression, and advocacy of national liberation for Ukraine have made him the leading symbol of Ukrainian national aspirations.

YURIY SHUKHEVYCH (1933-): Son of General Roman Shukhevysh (also Taras Chuprynka), commander in chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. First arrested in 1947 as ■■■ fifteen-year-old; sentenced to ten years in labor camps. Rearrested in 1958 on the day of his release; sentenced to another ten years' imprisonment, formally, for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," actually, for his refusal to renounce his father and condemn Ukrainian nationalism; released in August 1968. Signed collective letter protesting arrest and trial of Moroz. Arrested again in January 1972 for his continued refusal to renounce his father and for writing his memoirs from the previous periods of imprisonment; tried in September 1972 in Kiev, again according to Article 62, Criminal Code of the Ukr.S.S.R.; sentenced to five years' prison, five years' labor camp, five years' exile.

DANYLO SHUMUK (1914-): Revolutionary; until 1943 active member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine. Arrested in 1935 by Polish police; imprisoned until 1939; 1939-41, communist activist; 1941-43, fought in Red Army, after which became disillusioned with communism and joined the Ukrainian national resistance; arrested in 1945 for membership in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and imprisoned for ten years; 1957, arrested and imprisoned for another ten years for writing the memoirs from his 1945-55 period of imprisonment; January 1972, arrested again after the second volume of his memoirs was found during a search; tried in July 1972 under a charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"; sentenced to ten years' special-regime labor camp, five years' exile. In December 1974 wrote a statement to authorities renouncing his Soviet citizenship. Shumuk's memoirs circulated in the *samvydav* and were published in the West in 1974 by Smolenskyp under the title *Za skhidnym obryem* (Beyond the Eastern Horizon).

MYKOLA SKRYPNYK (1872-1933): Ukrainian communist revolutionary and party leader. Active participant in the Revolution as a member of the Russian Bolshevik Party; initiated the formation of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine in 1918; head of the Soviet Ukrainian government in 1918; held other important posts, including that of the People's Commissar of Education from 1927 to 1933. An ardent believer in the communist ideology, Skrypnyk based his "national communism" on a firm trust in the sincerity of the internationalism of Russian communists, and therefore opposed those Ukrainian communists, led by Shumsky and in the cultural sphere by Khvylovy, who distrusted Russian influence and feared Russian chauvinism. Won the struggle within the Ukrainian communist camp over the issue of Ukrainianization when the Shumsky-Khvylovy forces were branded as "nationalist deviationists" and forced to disband in 1926. Continued pressure from Moscow for the total elimination of all "nationalist deviation" among Ukrainian communists, and the artificial famine of 1932-33 led to his suicide on July 7, 1933.

IRYNA STASIV-KALYNETS (1940-): Poetess, writer; along with her husband, the poet Ihor Kalynets, an active member of the group of nationally conscious intellectuals in Lviv. After the 1965-66 arrests of Ukrainian cultural and civic activists, Ihor Kalynets among them, she could no longer publish. Protested against Russification policies and violations of civil rights in Ukraine, which led to her dismissal from Lviv's Polytechnical Institute in 1970; especially active in defense of Valentyn Moroz; attended his trial in 1970 and wrote several protests to Soviet authorities; founding member of the Citizen's Committee for the Defense of Nina Strokata. Arrested in early 1972; tried in July in Lviv on a charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and

propaganda"; sentenced to six years' labor camp, three years' exile. As of December 1975 still in a labor camp in the Mordovian A.S.S.R., where, though in very poor health, she is ■ active participant in protests and hunger strikes; co-author of several appeals to the UN and the world community.

NINA STROKATA-KARAVANSKA (1925-): Microbiologist, physician. Graduated from the Odessa Medical Institute, later worked there and at the Institute of Microbiology; author of numerous articles published in scientific journals. Wrote appeals in defense of her husband, political prisoner Svyatoslav Karavansky; signed collective letter in defense of Valentyn Moroz in 1970; defended Karavansky at his trial in Vladimir Prison in April 1970 and resisted official pressure to renounce him, for which she ■ censured in the press. Expelled from the Medical Institute in May 1971; arrested in December 1971; tried in closed court in May 1972 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"; sentenced to four years in severe-regime labor camps. In June 1973 and early 1974, one of the leaders of hunger strikes by women-political prisoners of camp near Barashevo, the Mordovian A.S.S.R.; author of a protest statement to the Procurator-General of the U.S.S.R., co-author of several appeals to the UN and the world community. In May 1974 she was voted ■ full member of the American Society for Microbiology. Defense actions ■ her behalf include the formation of a committee in the U.S.—Microbiologists in Defense of Nina Strokata.

VASYL STUS (1938-): Poet, literary critic. Individual poems and literary articles were frequently published in Soviet periodicals until 1965; when he was expelled from the Taras Shevchenko Institute of Literature, Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.S.S.R., for publicly protesting against the arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals; signed a collective open letter protesting the secret trials of 1966 and the trial of Vyacheslav Chornovil; in 1968 wrote open letter to the Writers' Union of Ukraine, protesting against slanderous attack on Chornovil and Karavansky in the Union's official organ; in 1969 wrote an open letter defending Ivan Dzyuba against attacks in the official press; read poem he dedicated to Alla Horska at her public funeral in December 1970. Arrested in January 1972; tried in September in Kiev ■ a charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"; sentenced to five years' labor camp, three years' exile. In 1975 two documents which had circulated widely in the *samvydav* reached the West from the Dubrovlag labor camp in the Mordovian A.S.S.R. where Stus is now imprisoned: his condemnation of violations of legality by the KGB, titled "I Accuse," and a copy of the official verdict against Stus, with his commentary.

YEVHEN SVERSTYUK (1928-): Literary critic, writer. Member of the Psychological Association of the U.S.S.R. One of the leading supporters of the literary renaissance of the 1960's. Author of the popular *sumvydav* essay *Sobor ■ ryshkovanni* (Cathedral in Scaffolding, 1968), in which he held up Oles Honchar's novel *Sobor* (The Cathedral) ■ an example of what Ukrainian literature could achieve if allowed to grow without repression. Imprisoned briefly during the 1965 wave of arrests. Active defender of other repressed intellectuals, especially Valentyn Moroz and Vyacheslav Chornovil; delivered eulogy at the funeral of Alla Horska in December 1970. Dismissed from the Institute of Psychology, Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.S.S.R. in 1969; arrested in January 1972; tried in March 1973 and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, five years' exile, on ■ charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." As of December 1975 still in labor camp in Perm Region, the R.S.F.S.R.

NADIYA SVITLYCHNA (1925-): Philologist; sister of Ivan Svitlychny. Actively defended repressed Ukrainian intellectuals, among them her brother and Vyacheslav Chornovil; pressed for ■ thorough investigation of the mysterious murder of her friend, the artist Alla Horska, despite strong indications that the KGB was behind the crime. Arrested in April 1972 for possession of *sumvydav* literature; tried in March 1973 on ■ charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"; sentenced to four years' labor camp. As of December 1975 still in a labor camp for female political prisoners near Barashevo, the Mordovian A.S.S.R.; co-author of several appeals to the UN and the world community and author of ■ protest statement to the Procurator-General of the U.S.S.R.

IVAN SVITLYCHNY (1929-): Literary critic, publicist, translator. Strong supporter of the group of young poets and writers of the sixties, the *shestydesyatnyky*, which brought him into disfavor with the authorities. Dismissed in 1964 from the Institute of Philosophy, the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.S.S.R., for ■ public speech at ■ evening in honor of Symonenko; dismissed in 1965 from a position at ■ publishing house for his criticism of influential academician Bilodid; imprisoned for eight months during the 1965-66 arrests in Ukraine and forbidden to publish. Active defender of others repressed for political reasons, especially Valentyn Moroz. Arrested again in January 1972; tried in closed court in March 1973 on ■ charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"; sentenced to seven years' labor camp, five years' exile. As of December 1975 still in labor camp VS 389/35 in Perm Region, the R.S.F.S.R., where he has been an active participant in protests and hunger strikes by political prisoners; in 1974 took part in a *sumvydav* organized interview of political prisoners (*An Interview with Political Prisoners in a Soviet Perm Camp*, Smoloskyp Publishers, 1975).

VASYL SYMONENKO (1935-1963): Poet; leading member of the group of young poets and writers known as the *shestydesyatyky*—"the generation of the sixties"—who were responsible for initiating the literary renaissance of the 1960's. Symonenko's bold, uncompromising poetry and his undisguised love for Ukraine made him the inspiration of the Ukrainian cultural and national rebirth. Died of cancer at age 28. Six collections of poetry were published between 1962 and 1966, all presumably heavily censored; poems deleted from or altered in the official collections, and his diary were among the first *samvydav* materials to circulate widely. An anthology of Symonenko's poetry was published in the West in 1965 by Suchasnist Publishers under the title *Bereh Chekan* (The Shore of Expectations), the presumed title of an unpublished collection. After his death, evenings in his honor became occasions for the manifestation of national consciousness, much in the manner of anniversaries associated with Ukraine's national poet Taras Shevchenko, with whom Symonenko was sometimes compared.

LESYA UKRAYINKA (1871-1913): Literary pseudonym of Larysa Kosach-Kvitka—poetess, playwright. One of the greatest figures in Ukrainian literature. As the daughter of Olena Pchilka, an important writer and civic activist, and niece of the renowned cultural and political figure Mykhaylo Drahomanov, Lesya Ukrayinka had a most favorable environment for the development of her poetic talent. From early childhood she had tuberculosis and died of the disease at age 42. Combining her deep erudition and knowledge of the masterpieces of world literature (she knew eleven languages) with her enormous poetic talents, Lesya Ukrayinka created unsurpassed works of lyric and dramatic poetry, plays, and literary sketches. In her early lyric poems, she developed themes from Ukrainian folklore; later works dealt with such universal themes as the alienation of the poet from society and his responsibility towards it, and the love of freedom; the themes of national liberation and of an uncompromising struggle against all forms of oppression were developed in her poems "Davnya kazka" (Ancient Fable), "Robert Bryus, korol shotlandsky" (Robert Bruce, King of Scotland), and "Odno slovo" (One Word). Other major works include "Kassandra" (Cassandra), "Kamynny hospodar" (The Stone Master), and her masterpiece, the drama "Lisova Pisnya" (The Forest Song), which depicts the universal conflict of the exalted dream against stark reality. Her personal philosophy is to be found in the poem "Contra Spem Spero" (I Hope Against Hope). Aside from her immense contribution to the treasurehouse of Ukrainian literature, Lesya Ukrayinka's significance lies in the example she gave by her own life and in her works, an example of strength and manliness, of opposition to everything weak, undecided, and lukewarm, which became a part of her revolutionary commitment to social justice and of her deep faith in the eventual national, political, and social liberation of the Ukrainian people.

OLEKSIY VLYZKO (1908-34): Poet; co-editor of the futurist journal *Nova Generatsiya* (The New Generation). Seven collections of his poetry were published between 1927 and 1932; while paying its dues to the party line, Vlyzko's poetry was marked by a joyous romanticism, ■ searching for ■■ directions. Vlyzko was executed by the NKVD in December 1934 during the purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

SERHIY YEFREMOV (1876-?): Literary critic and scholar, publicist, political leader. Prior to World War I, ■ member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences; co-editor of numerous political and scientific journals. Arrested several times by the czarist government for his publicistic and civic activity. Member of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Ukrainian delegation to talks with the government of Kerensky. Remained in Ukraine after the communist takeover, dedicating himself to the pursuit of literary scholarship. His uncompromising opposition to the regime won him widespread respect, but also led to his arrest in 1929 as the head of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. Sentenced to death in 1930; the sentence was commuted to ten years' imprisonment, which he served in solitary confinement in the prisons of Yaroslav and Vladimir. Fate after 1939 is unknown. Yefremov's name is on the KGB's blacklist.

MYKOLA ZEROV (1890-?): Literary historian, poet, translator. Editor of the bibliographic journal *Knyhar*; professor of literature at Kiev University. Leading member of the neo-classicist group of poets in Kiev in the 1920's; active proponent of an independent Ukrainian literature rooted in traditional ties with European literature; opponent of the literary provincialism encouraged by Moscow. Arrested in 1935 during the purge of Ukrainian cultural leaders; sentenced to a ten-year term in the concentration camps on the Solovky Islands in the Far North. Fate after 1938 is unknown.

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(Continued from front flap)

In this era of detente the role of the West will be crucial for Ukraine and the other nationalities of the Soviet Union. Will it be the force that nudges the Soviet regime towards a democratization of Soviet society, will it find itself a seat on the fence, or will it become the regime's partner, whose technological and economic assistance will help drive the last nail into the coffin of the nationalities of the Soviet Union? Perhaps, the *Ukrainian Herald* was addressed more to us in the West, who are the ones that need these alternatives defined for us, than it was to those who live the reality.

— From the PREFACE

From the *Ukrainian Herald's*
WORD TO THE READER:

Honored Reader!

For over two years you have not had the opportunity to familiarize yourself with our journal. Possibly, the long wait caused you to lose faith. But there is no power on earth that could kill the free word of a people who refuse to submit. No repressions, however cruel, have the power to break the spirit of Freedom.

And so it is that, under the most difficult circumstances, the next consecutive issue of our journal appears. The trying times have toughened us even more and brought us closer together.

Our journal will take a clearly marked political position, the guiding direction of which will be uncompromising anti-colonialism.

We will attempt to further unite around our organ all democratic, anti-colonial groups in Ukraine, for it is only in this direction that we can foresee progress in broadening the national liberation struggle and the struggle for democracy.

Journal hopes to incite Ukrainians against alleged Soviet "ethnocide"

Moscow Bureau of The Sun

MOSCOW—An underground dissident journal, now circulating here, is attempting to rally Ukrainian nationalists against Soviet rule, according to Ukrainian sources.

The latest issue of the Ukrainian *Herald* calls for a campaign against what it considers Russian colonialism in the Ukraine, a region of 48 million, in the southwestern Soviet Union.

The *Herald*, last published more than two years ago, says that it "will attempt to unite further around our organ all democratic, anti-colonial groups in the Ukraine," according to a summary translation made available by Ukrainian sources.

"It is only in this direction that we can foresee progress in spreading the struggle for national liberation and democracy."

Demand for Autonomy

This represents a significant change in the journal's philosophy, according to Ukrainian sources, for the *Herald* previously had accepted Soviet rule in the Ukraine while demanding that constitutional and legal promises of cultural and political autonomy be observed.

The dissidents now associated with the *Herald*, which is being published clandestinely in typescript, now are taking an openly anti-Russian, anti-Soviet position, to judge from excerpts from the latest issue made available here.

Two-thirds of the new issue is taken up with a lengthy study, "Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union," charges the Russian-dominated central leadership is working methodically to destroy the ethnic identity of not only Ukrainians but the 129 other non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union.

The study attacks Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, in harsh terms and praises a Ukrainian leader, Pyotr Shelest, whom he purged in a dispute over East-West detente and over Ukrainian nationalism.

Mr. Shelest, who had been a member of the party's ruling political bureau as well as the party chief in the Ukraine, "resisted Russification, encouraged the gradual Ukrainianization of the educational system in the Ukraine and promoted cultural ties between the Ukraine and other countries," the summary of the *Herald* article asserts.

Fostered Nationalism

Shortly before his removal from the Politburo 18 months ago, Mr. Shelest was charged with fostering Ukrainian nationalism, but most observers here believe that he lost his showdown with Mr. Brezhnev over detente, which he is said to have opposed.

The Ukrainian *Herald* also publishes an article attacking Soviet-American rapprochement as effectively strengthening "the reactionary regime in the Soviet Union."

"Now is precisely the time for the American side to show its resolve and place alongside economic considerations those of an ideological nature," the article contends, "and secure from the Soviet side a guarantee of civil rights for the citizens of the Soviet Union."

The *Herald* article asserts that the Kremlin will have to make ideological concessions because "it must have American economic assistance, whatever the cost," according to the summary.

"Brezhnev understands that without such aid, the present regime will find it difficult to stay in power."

The Baltimore Sun
October 16, 1974

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